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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATRICK GARDINER AND ADA ) SUPREME COURT NO. 35007 
GARDINER, husband and wife ) 
) 
PlaintiffsIRespondents, ) District Court No. CV 2006 339 
vs. ) 
1 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD ) 
OF COMMISSIONERS, 1 
) 
DefendantsIAppellants. ) 
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Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of ldaho, in 
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HON. JAMES R. MICHAUD 
Senior District Judge 
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First Judicial District Court - Boundary County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0000339 Current Judge. Steve Verby 
Patrick Gardiner, etal. vs. Boundary County Commissioners 
User: 
DARMSTRONG 
patrick Gardiner, Ada Gardiner vs. Boundary County Commissioners 
Judge 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Date Code User 
NCOC SELENA 
SELENA 
Petition for Judicial Review 
Filing: R2 -Appeals And Transfers For Judicial 
Review To The District Court Paid by: Paul 
Vogel Receipt number: 0003198 Dated: 
911 112006 Amount: $78.00 (Check) 
Plaintift Gardiner, Patrick Appearance Paul W. 
Vogel 
Plaintiff: Gardiner, Ada Appearance Paul W. 
Vogel 
Order Governing Judicial Review 
Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Record 
Objection to Amended Notice of Lodging of 
Transcript and Record 
Supplemental Objection to Amended Notice of 
Lodging of Transcript and Record 
Stipulation as to Record 
Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 864 Dated 
3/12/2007 for 302.25) 
*Minute Entry+Re: TranscripffRecord Bond 
Stipulation Re: Settlement of Record 
Amended Notice of Lodging of Transcript and 
Record 
Amended Notice of Lodging of Transcript and 
Record 
Amended Notice of Lodging of Record 
Administrators Record 
Administrators Record 
Amendment to Record 
Agency's Transcript and Certified Copy of 
Minutes of 8/7/06 
Agency's Transcript and Certified Copy of 
Commissioner Minutes from 7/24/06 and CD of 
7/24/06 AND 8/7/06 Hearings Before 
Commissioners 
Amendment to Transcript 
Supplemental Amendment to Transcript 
Notice of Filing of Transcript and Record 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 115 dated 
4/4/2007 amount 297.00) 
Transcript Bond Exonerated (Amount 5.25) 
Memorandum In Support Of Appellants' Petition 
For Judicial Review 
Memorandum In Opposition Of Appellant's 
Petition For Judicial Review 
I 
Steve Verby APER SELENA 
APER SELENA Steve Verby 
ORDR 
NOTC 
MISC 
SELENA 
SELENA 
SELENA 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
MISC SELENA Steve Verby 
STlP 
BONT 
SELENA 
TAClE 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
ME 
STlP 
NOTC 
TAClE 
SELENA 
SELENA 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
NOTC SELENA Steve Verby 
NOTC 
MlSC 
MlSC 
MlSC 
TR AN 
SELENA 
SELENA 
SELENA 
SELENA 
SELENA 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
SELENA Steve Verby 
MlSC 
MlSC 
NOTC 
BNDV 
SELENA 
SELENA 
SELENA 
TAClE 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
BNDE 
MEMO 
TAClE 
TACIE 
TAClE Steve Verby MEMO 
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First Judicial District Court - Boundary County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0000339 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Patrick Gardiner, eta1 vs Boundary County Commissioners 
Patrick Gardiner, Ada Gardiner vs. Boundary County Commissioners 
Code 
HRSC 
CONT 
REQT 
MEMO 
INHD 
*LOG 
MEMO 
MEMO 
MlSC 
MEMO 
DPHR 
*LOG 
NOTH 
HRSC 
APSC 
NOTC 
MEMO 
ORDR 
NOTC 
MEMO 
ORDR 
MEMO 
User: 
DARMSTRONG 
User Judge 
TAClE Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 09/06/2007 Steve Verby 
11:30 AM) 
TAClE Notice Of Hearing Steve Verby 
TAClE Continued (Oral Argument 10/25/2007 01:30 Steve Verby 
PM) 
TACl E Amended Notice Of Hearing Steve Verby 
TACIE Request For Judicial Notice Steve Verby 
TACIE Memorandum Of Points And Authorities Steve Verby 
TAClE Hearing result for Oral Argument held on James R. Michaud 
10/25/2007 01:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
TAClE #7-1-139 James R. Michaud 
TAClE Memorandum And Opinion And Order Setting James R. Michaud 
Aside Special Use Permit 
TAClE Civil Disposition entered for: Boundary County James R. Michaud 
Commissioners, Defendant; Gardiner, Ada, 
Plaintiff; Gardiner, Patrick, Plaintiff. 
order date: 1/4/2008 
TAClE Memorandum And Affidavit Re: Attorney Fees Steve Verby 
And Costs 
TAClE Objection To Attorney Fees And Costs Steve Verby 
DARMSTRONG Memorandum and Argument in Support of Steve Verby 
Petitioner's Fee and Cost Memorandum 
JAMIE Hearing result for Oral Argument held on Steve Verby 
01/31/2008 08:30 AM: Disposition With Hearing 
RespondenPs Objection to Attorney Fees and 
costs 
JAMIE Bonner County Minutes-No CD Steve Verby 
JAMIE Notice Of Hearing Steve Verby 
JAMIE Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 01/31/2008 Steve Verby 
08:30 AM) Respondent's Objection to Attorney 
Fees and Costs 
TACIE Appealed To The Supreme Court Steve Verby 
TACIE Notice Of Appeal Steve Verby 
JAMIE Attorney Fee Memorandum Steve Verby 
DARMSTRONG Order (Amended Notice of Appeal) Steve Verby 
DARMSTRONG Amended Notice of Appeal Steve Verby 
TACIE Memorandum Opinion And Order Setting Aside James R. Michaud 
Special Permit (Corrected) 
TACIE Ordercorrecting Memorandum Opinion And James R. Michaud 
Order 
DARMSTRONG Memorandum Opinion and Order Awarding Steve Verby 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East Lake Street 
Suite 313 
P.0. Box 1828 
Sandpdnt, ID 83864-0903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fsr: (208) 2656775 
PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Petitioners, PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, CASE NO. CV-2006- 339 
Respondent. i 
VS. 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, husband and wife, the above-named Petitioners, 
through their attorney, Paul William Vogel, file this Petition for Judicial Review and in 
support thereof state and allege as follows: 
1. The name of the agency for which judicial review is sought is the Boundary 
County Board of Commissioners. 
2. This Petition is taken to the District Court of the First Judicial District in and 
for Boundary County, Idaho. 
Fee Category: R(2) 
Fee: $78.00 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1 
3. Judicial review is sought for a decision of the Boundary County Board of 
Commissioners approving an application for a Special Use Permit filed by Tungsten 
Holdings, Inc. The case contains a County designation of SUP 05-05. 
The Boundary County Board of Commissioners conducted a public hearing on July 26, 
2005. The hearing was continued until August 8, 2005. At hearing on August 8, 2005, the 
application was approved. Thereafter, Petitioners herein filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
under Boundary County Case No. CV-2005-380. Pursuant to an Order of Remand in Case 
No. CV-2005-380, filed May 30,2006, the special use application and proceedings associated 
therewith were remanded to the Boundary County Board of Commissioners for a new public 
hearing. The new public hearing occurred on July 24, 2006. Thereafter, the matter was 
adjourned until August 7, 2006 at which time the Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
approved the application. 
4. There was a public hearing before the Boundary County Board of 
Commissioners on July 27, 2006. 
Additionally, on August 14, 2006, the Respondent Board of Commissioners adopted 
Findings of Fact and issued their decision. 
The method of recording the hearings was by tape recording. The name and address of 
the person with possession of such recording is Michelle Wallace, Deputy Clerk, Boundary 
County Board of Commissioners, P.O. Box 419, Bonners Feny, ID 83805. 
5. Petitioners assert the following issues on judicial review: 
A. The Board's actions were in violation of constitutional and statutory 
provisions in that: 
I I PETITION FOR JUDICLAL REVIEW - 2 3 
1) The Respondent has not complied with the provisions of 
LC. 67-6535 in that the Findings approved on August 14, 2006 do not state the relevant 
contested facts relied upon, and fail to explain the rationale for the decision based on the 
applicable provisions of the Comprehensive Plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, 
pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record. 
2) The decision of the Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
is in violation of I.C. 67-6512 in that a Special Use Permit may be granted only if the 
proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the zoning ordinance. Bonner County 
Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 7: Section I, relating to agriculturallforestry zones, does not allow 
a gravel pigrock quany operation as a conditional use in said zone. 
3) The decision of the Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
is in violation of LC. 67-6512 in that said decision approving a Special Use Permit is in 
conflict with the Boundary County Comprehensive Plan as follows: 
a. The approval of the special use application violates the 
Section I: Private Property Rights section of the Comprehensive Plan in that said approval 
interferes with the health and safety of Petitioners and said approval constitutes 
uncompensated deprivation of Petitioners' private property rights. 
b. The approval of the Special Use Permit violates 
Section TV: Land Use in that said decision adversely impacts Petitioners' agricultural use of 
their property and thus said decision does not encourage agricultural enterprise. Said decision 
violates the commercial land use policy of Section N on the basis that consideration has not 
been given to the impact the gravel pigrock quarry operation has on the current uses of 
surrounding land, nor does it consider the impact on the flow of traffic in the area. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3 
5 
4) Pre-hearing comments by the Board of Commissioners violated 
Petitioners' procedural due process rights in that, prior to the public hearing before the Board, 
unidentified Commissioners stated confidence in the Road and Bridge Supervisor's support of 
the Special Use Permit and, further, expressed unhappiness with the proceedings before the 
Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission. 
5) Discussions between applicant Tungsten Holdings, Inc. and 
Boundary County's Road Supervisor, wherein the Road Supervisor initiated talks with the 
applicant about the prospect of obtaining rock from the Tungsten property, deprived 
Petitioners of a fair hearing and thus violated their procedural due process rights. 
B. The decision of the Boundary County Board of Commissioners was 
made upon unlawful procedure in that: 
1) The participation of the County's Road and Bridge Supervisor, 
Jeff Gutshall, in procuring the subject application and advocating for approval of the same, 
violates Petitioners' procedural due process rights. 
2) Pre-hearing comments by the Board of Commissioners violated 
Petitioners' procedural due process rights in that, prior to the public hearing before the Board, 
unidentified Commissioners stated confidence in the Road and Bridge Supervisor's support of 
the Special Use Permit and, further, expressed unhappiness with the proceedings before the 
Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission. 
C. The decision of the Boundary County Board of Commissioners is 
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion on the basis that the deliberations undertaken 
, by the Boundary County Board of Commissioners on August 7, 2006 did not constitute true 
I PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4 
deliberations but, instead, consisted of a mere recitation of a decision that was prepared in 
writing, prior to deliberation, by unknown parties. 
D. The decision reached by the Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 
6. The substantial rights of the Petitioners have been prejudiced. 
7. Pursuant to the Order of Remand in Boundary County Case No. CV-2005-380, 
the record on appeal shall consist of the record previously lodged with this Court in that action 
and any additional record developed as a result of the new proceedings. Accordingly, 
transcripts of the public hearing on July 27, 2006 and the Commissioners' meeting on 
August 14,2006 are requested. 
8. A. This Petition has been served upon the Boundary County Board of 
Commissioners. 
B. The Boundary County Clerk has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the transcripts. 
C. The Clerk for the Boundary County Commissioners has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the record. 
9. Petitioners reserve the right to supplement their issues on appeal. 
Dated this 8th day of September, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of September, 2006, I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVEW via U.S. first class mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to: 
John Topp, P.A. 
P.O. Box 586 
Kootenai, ID 83840 
Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
6452 Kootenai St. 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 n 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 6 
8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, ) CASE NO. CV 2006-339 
husband and wife, ) 
Petitioner, ) ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
VS. ) 
) 
Boundary County Board of ) 
Commissioners, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
A Petition for Judicial Review having been filed in this case, and it 
appearing that the time requirements of Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure should be modified in this case, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
I Within seven (7) days from the date this order is filed, the Agency shall 
provide Petitioner with an estimate of the cost for preparation of the agency 
record and an estimate of the cost for preparation of the transcript, if requested. 
Within fourteen (14) days from the mailing of the cost estimate, the Petitioner 
shall pay the estimated fee for the record to the Agency. If a transcript is 
requested, the Petitioner has fourteen (14) days from the mailing of the estimate 
to pay the estimated fee for preparation of the transcript. The balance of the 
costs for the record and transcript must be paid when notice is received from the 
Agency. 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1 q 
2. In accordance with Rule 84(j), upon completion of the agency 
record and upon receipt of the transcript, if applicable, the Agency shall mail a 
notice of lodging of the transcript and record to the parties. The parties have 
fourteen (14) days from the date of the mailing of the notice to file with the 
agency any objections to the record andlor the transcript. The notice shall also 
advise the petitioner to pay the balance, if any, of the fees for preparation of the 
agency record and transcript. 
3. If there is no objection to the transcript and record within fourteen (14) 
days from the mailing of the notice described in Paragraph 2, the agency record 
and transcript shall be deemed settled. If objections are received, the record and 
transcript shall be deemed settled on the date that such objections are 
determined by the Agency. 
4. Within forty-two (42) days from the date this order is filed, the Agency 
shall transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the settled record in 
this proceeding. 
5. If a transcript has been requested, the Agency shall cause the 
settled transcript to be transmitted to the Clerk of Court within forty-two (42) days 
from the date this order is filed. 
6. The Agency, upon lodging with the court the record (and transcript, 
if necessary), shall send notice of such filing to all parties in accordance with 
Rule 84(k) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
7. At the time the notice described in Paragraph 6 is received, the 
Petitioner shall contact Cherie Moore, at (208) 265-1445, to request that this 
ORDER GOVERNTNG JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2 I0 
case be set for oral argument at a time which allows the briefing schedule set 
forth in Paragraph 8 to be completed. 
8. Briefing Schedule: After the record is deemed settled, the parties 
shall submit briefs according to the following schedule: 
a. Petitioner shall submit his or her initial brief (Petitioner's Brief) within 35 
days from the date the record is deemed settled; 
b. Respondent shall file a reply brief (Respondent's Brief) within 28 days 
from the date the Respondent's Brief is filed; 
c. Petitioner will then have 21 days from the date the Respondent's Brief 
is filed to submit a closing brief or to notify the court that the matter is fully 
submitted. 
Briefs shall be in compliance with Rule 84(p) of the ldaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 35 of the ldaho Appellate Rules, except that the briefs need 
not be bound or have colored covers and need not contain a table of contents. 
Failure of any party to timely comply with the above orders may be 
grounds for such action or sanctions as the court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the Petition for Judicial Review, pursuant to Rule 84(n) of 
the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this &day of September. 2006. 
Steve Verby 
District ~ u d g e  L' 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3 
I I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correc opy of the foregoing was mailed, 
regular mail, faxed, and/or delivered this day of September, 2006, to: 
Paul Vogel 
Attorney For Petitioners 
PO Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ldaho 83864 
John Topp 
Attorney At Law 
PO Box 586 
Kootenai, ldaho 83840 
Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
6452 Kootenai St. 
Bonners Ferry, ldaho 83805 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4 la 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
In the Matter of : ) CASE NO. CV06-339 
) 
Patrick & Ada Gardiner, Plaintiff. ) NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
Vs. ) TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD 
Boundary County Planning & Zoning ) 
Application SUP 05-05, Tungsten 
Holdings Inc. Gravel Pit 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
TO: THE PARTIES ABOVE NAMED OR THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 83(r), the transcript and 
Agency's Record ordered in the above entitled matter have been lodged with the Clerk of 
the Boundary County Commissioners, the Agency, of Boundary County, State of Idaho. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that you have fourteen (14) days from the date of 
this Order to secure your copy of the transcript and Agency's Record from the Clerk of the 
Agency, and to file any objections to the content thereof. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2006. 
Board of Boundary County Commissioners 
BY J\?n ce,kLi k, R ,4r,.uw 
Deputy Clerk 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular 
mail, postage prepaid, faxed, andlor delivered, this 25th day of September, 2006, to: 
Paul W. Paul, P.A. 
120 E. Lake Street, Suite 31 3 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ldaho 83864-0903 
Attorney John Topp 
P.O. Box 28 
Kootenai, ldaho 83840 
. . 
\ TKL~~IU k J?J Rt> h *l iv . - )~-~~h.  &9,7 
Deputy Clerk I 
Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East Lake Street 
Suite313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 83864-0903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fax: (208) 265-6775 
PAUL WLLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, JD 83864 
PRONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEJE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Petitioners, 
VS. 
PATRICK GARDlNER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
OBJECTION TO AMENDED NOTICE OF 
LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT 
AND RECORD 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. I 
Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, Petitioners above named, through their attorney, 
Paul William Vogel, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84Cj), and the Court's September 19, 2006 Order 
Governing Judicial Review, hereby file the following Objection to Amended Notice of 
Lodging of Transcript and Record lodged with the Clerk of the Boundary County 
Commissioners on September 25,2556. 
The following documents have been omitted from the record: the record lodged with 
the Clerk of the Court in Boundary County Case No. CV-2005-380. 
Pursuant to the Court's Order in Boundary County Case No. CV-2005-380, filed 
May 30, 2006, the record on appeal, in the event of further judicial review (the instant case) 
OBJECTION TO AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - 1 
I5 
shall consist of the record previously lodged with the Court and any additional record 
1 developed as a result of new public hearings. 
I/ The agency can resolve this matter by stipulation of Respondent Boundary County I I Board of Commissioners that the record on review in the instant case consists of the record 
currently lodged with the agency, to be forwarded to the Court, as well as the record from 
1 1  Boundary County Case No. CV-2005-380. 
J" 1 1  Dated this 1day of November, 2006, 
i jkdr  
Paul illiam V gel 
Attorney for Petitioners 
/ / CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certi$ that on this 1 $5 day of November, 2006, I delivered a true and I /  correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
1 TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
John Topp, P.A. 
P.O. Box 586 
Kootenai, ID 83840 
Michelle Rohnvasser, Clerk 
Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
P.O. Box 419 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83505 
Bo e Stout % 
OBJECTION TO AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - 2 
PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHOiW (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
I IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
1 I Petitioners, 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO 
AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGLNG OF 
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, (i 
Respondent. 
Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, Petitioners above named, through their attorney, 
Paul William Vogel, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84@, and the Court's September 19, 2006 Order 
Governing Judicial Review, hereby file the following Supplemental Objection to Amended 
I I Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Record lodged with the Clerk of the Boundary County 1 Commissioners on September 25,2006, 
Petitioners' objections are as follows: 
1. Each and every objection previously lodged in this matter, to-wit: the 
1 1 SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - I \7 
PautWilliamVogel,~.~. 
Altorney-at-Law 
120 East Lake Street 
suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoinl, ID 83864.0903 
P ~ :  (208) 263-6636 
Fax: (208) 265-6775 
Objections to Transcript and Record filed October 5, 2006 and the Objection to Amended 
Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Record filed November 2, 2006 are realleged as if fully 
set forth herein. 
2. The following objections are made to the Amendment to Transcript prepared 
October 25, 2006 by Michelle Rohrwasser, Deputy Clerk, Boundary County Board of 
Commissioners: 
A. Amendment to August 7, 2006 transcript; p. 14, line 5: there should be 
quotation marks before the words "natural resources," in that sentence; 
B. August 7, 2006 transcript, p. 15: the quotation marks following the 
word "system" in line 10 should be deleted. 
C. August 7, 2006 transcript, p. 15: quotation  arks should be added 
before the word "allowing" on line 1 1. 
D. August 7, 2006 transcript, p. 17; line 5: quotation marks should be 
added before the letter "K." Quotation marks should be deleted before the word "the." 
E. August 7,2006 transcript, p. 17, line 20, after the text "far edge of 300 
acres." The transcript states that Commissioner Kirby stated the next sentence. This is 
incorrect, as that sentence was read into the record by Commissioner Smith. Therefore, 
line 20 should end &er the word "acres" and a new line 21 should begin with "Commissioner 
Smith. . .' the proposed use has a potential to create . . ." and continue with the rest of current 
line 21. In other words, the text "the proposed use has the potential to create possible adverse 
affects on adjacent property owners, but terms and conditions can or cannot be implemented 
to reduce the impact" was read by Commissioner Smith, not Commissioner Kirby. 
3.  The transcript makes references to various subsections of Chapters 7 and 13 of 
the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance. Only excerpts were included in the record. The 
entire Sections 7 and 13 should be included. 
4. The "proposed findings" referenced Tungsten's "permit and reclamation plan 
issued by" the Idaho Department of Lands. This reclamation plan should be included in the 
record. 
5. The findings of the Planning and Zoning Coinmission for May, 2005 were 
alleged to be attached to the 2006 Staff Report but were not. They should be re-included in 
the record from the 2006 proceedings. 
6. Neither the record nor the amended record lodged with the agency contain a 
written decision on the objection. I.R.C.P. 84(j) states, in part, that: "The agency's decision 
on the objection . . . shall be included in the record on petition for review." 
Although one may attempt to understand the agency's decision by its failure to act on 
Petitioners' objections, there should be a specific decision from the agency as to the items, 
requested by Petitioners to be made part of the record, that have not been included in either 
the record or amended record. The basis for the decision should also be set forth 
Dated this 2nd day of November, 2006. 
Id 
Paul William V gel 
Attorney for petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of November, 2006; I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO AMENDED NOTICE OF 
LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Boundary County Prosecuting Michelle Rohrwasser, Clerk 
Attorney Boundary County Board of 
Attn: Tammy Munson Commissioners 
P.O. Box 1148 P.O. Box 419 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 
SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO AMENDEDNOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD - 3 
rq 
Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 Ezat Lake Street 
Suite 313 
F.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 838640903 
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Fax: (208) 2656775 
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ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
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FAX (208) 265-6775 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Petitioners, STIPULATION AS TO RECORD 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GP9UXPER, hgsbmd wife, 
VS. 
CASE 1\10. CV-2006-339 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 1 
Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, the above-named Petitioners, through their attorney, 
Paul William Vogel, and Respondent Boundary County Board of Commissioners, through their 
attorney, John Topp, hereby stipulate that the record lodged with the Court in Boundary County 
Case No. CV-2005-380 be included in the record on appeal in this instant case. 
This Stipulation is based on the Court's Order of Remand in Ro~~ndary Comrltp Case 
No. CV-2005-380 filed May 30,2006. 
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Jo Topp 
tt ey for Respondent 
Attorney for Petitioners 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Boundary 
FILED 311 2/07 
AT 4:30 O'CLOCK pm 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
M I N U T E  E N T R Y  
DATE: 311 2/07 
CASE NO. CV 05-380lCV 06-339 
RE: Transcript and Record Bond 
PATRICK GARDINER, ETAL BOUNDARY COUNTY 
vs. COMMISSIONRS 
Atty: Vogel Afty: Topp 
On 8-22-06 the above referenced bond was posted in CV 05-380. After speaking 
with the Commissioner's Clerk it was determined that this bond should have 
been posted in CV 06-339. The bond was voided in CV 05-380 and reposted to 
CV 06-339 on this date. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East Lake Street 
Suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 83864-0903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fax: (208) 265-6775 
PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
I Respondent. 
~ 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
Petitioners, 
i vS. 
1 BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
i COMMISSIONERS, 
i Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, the above-named Petitioners, through their attorney 1 
STIPULATION RE: SETTLEMENT 
OF RECORD 
of record, Paul William Vogel, and Respondent Boundary County Board of Commissioners, 
~ 
! through Tevis W. Hull, Boundary County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, hereby stipulate and 
I 
represent to the Court that the record is settled and the same can be lodged with the Court. 
I 
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I 
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Date 
!d k d h  
Paul William vonel 
Attorney for petitioners 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of : ) CASE NO. CV2006-339 
Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, 
) 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
husband and wife, Petitioners ) TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD 
) 
vs. ) 
Boundary County Board of ) 
Commissioners Defendant. ) 
TO: THE PARTIES ABOVE NAMED OR THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 84(j), the transcript and 
Agency's Record ordered in the above entitled matter have been lodged with the Agency 
of Boundary County, State of Idaho. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that you have fourteen (14) days' from the date of 
this Order to secure your copy of the Agency's transcript and record, and to file any 
objections to the content thereof. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2006 
Board of Boundaty County Commissioners 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT 93 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular 
mail, postage prepaid, faxed, andlor delivered, this 25th day of October, 2006, to: 
Attorney Paul W. Vogel 
120 E Lake Street, Suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 83864-0903 
Attorney John Topp 
Boundary County Courthouse 
Interoffice Mail 
*ci\~che/tb G ) \ n h m ~ &  . 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT 
aq 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of : ) CASE NO. CV2006-339 
) 
Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, ) AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
husband and wife, Petitioners ) TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD 
Boundary County Board of 
Commissioners Defendant. 
j 
) 
TO: THE PARTIES ABOVE NAMED OR THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 84(j), the transcript and 
Agency's Record ordered in the above entitled matter have been lodged with the Agency 
of Boundary County, State of Idaho. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that you have fourteen (14) days from the date of 
this Order to secure your copy of the Agency's transcript and record, and to file any 
objections to the content thereof. 
DATED this 20th day of December, 2006. 
Board of Boundary County Commissioners 
~y%?\@.hdb 5 6 h i ~ c r 3 r ~ ~ h ; _  
Deputy Clerk 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular 
mail, postage prepaid, faxed, and/or delivered, this 20th day of December, 2006, to: 
Attorney Paul W. Vogel 
120 E Lake Street, Suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 83864-0903 
Attorney John Topp 
Boundary County Courthouse 
Interoffice Mail 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT ab 
ORIGINAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of : ) CASE NO. CV2006-339 
j 
Patrick Gardiner and Ada Gardiner, ) AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
husband and wife, Petitioners ) RECORD 
Boundary County Board of ) 
Commissioners Defendant. ) 
TO: THE PARTIES ABOVE NAMED OR THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 84(j), the Transcript and 
Agency's Record ordered in the above entitled matter have been lodged with the Agency 
of Boundary County, State of Idaho. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that you have fourteen (14) days from the date of 
this Order to secure your copy of the Agency's amended record, and to file any objections 
to the content thereof. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2007 
Board of Boundary County Commissioners 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT 
m 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular 
mail, postage prepaid, faxed, andlor delivered, this 14th day of February, 2007, to: 
Attorney Paul W. Vogel 
120 E Lake Street, Suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 83864-0903 
Attorney John Topp 
Boundary County Courthouse 
Interoffice Mail 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT 
a 
B Y ~ L C ~ P ~ J  @ i ~ t ~ h t ~  IGLJUIL 
Deputy Clerk 
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Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East Lakestreet 
Suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 838660903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fax: (208) 265-6775 
PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
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FAX (208) 265-6775 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' PETITION 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Patrick and Ada Gardiner, appellants, through their altomey of record, Paul William 
Vogel, submit the following Memorandum in Support of Appellants' Petition for Judicial 
Review of a decision by the Boundary County Board of Commissioners: 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On March 22,2005, Tungsten Holdings, Inc., a Montana real estate developer 
("Tungsten"), filed an application for special use permit ("SUP") to operate a permanent, 
commercial gravel pit on seven acres of property in Porthill, Boundary County, Idaho. The 
site is adjacent to appellants' Registered Angus cattle ranch. R.O.A. 2006, p. 1-2. 
The Boundary County Planning & Zoning Commission ("zoning commission") held a 
public hearing on May 19,2005. R.O.A. 2006, p. 29. After hearing the evidence, the zoning 
:ommission made findings and a recommendation to the Boundary County Board of 
E!ommissioners ("'county board" or "board"), to deny the SUP. R.O.A. 2006, p. 183-184. 
Under the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance ("'zoning ordinance" or "ordinance"), 
he zoning commission hears the evidence and makes findings and a recommendation to 
ipprove or deny the SUP. The county board makes the final decision after a second public 
learing. R.O.A. 2006, p. 258-259. The members of the county board are Ron Smith, 
3hairman; Walt Kirby, and Dan Dinning. C.T. 7/26/05, cover page. Board member Dan 
liming is the brother of Tungsten's president, Rick Dinning. R.O.A. 2006, p. 216. 
A hearing took place before the county board on July 26,2005, following which the 
)oard tentatively approved the SUP and took the matter under advisement to determine if 
4EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 1 
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mitigating conditions could be imposed. Board member Dinning participated in the hearing 
but abstained from voting. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 43:7-25, p. 45:lO-22,46:21-25,47-48. 
The board met again on August 8,2005, and approved the SUP subject to a review of 
suggested conditions. Member Dinning participated in the hearing, but abstained from voting. 
C.T. 8/8/05, p. 1:23, p. 39:24-25, p. 41:14-25, p. 42:l-4. The county board met again on 
September 6,2005. Board member Dinning addressed prepared findings with zoning 
coordinator, Mike Weland. No public discussion was aiiowed. C.T. 9/6/05, p. 1:3-12. The 
board approved the SUP and findings. Member Dinning participated in the board's 
discussion, but abstained from voting. C.T. 9/6/05, p. 18: 3-1 7; R.O.A. 2006, p. 61-64. 
On August 13,2005, appellants filed a request for regulatory takings analysis pursuant 
to LC. 67-8003. R.O.A. 2006, p. 174. On September 27,2005, the board denied that a taking 
of appellants' property had occurred. R.O.A. 2006, p. 172-174. On October 3,2005, 
appellants fiied a petition for judicial review under Boundary County Case No. CV-2005-380. 
R.O.A. 2006, p. 218. 
On April 30,2006, appellants and the board stipulated that board member Dinning's 
participation in the hearings had been a conflict of interest that was prohibited by 
I.C. 67-6506, and that the SUP should be voided and the proceedings remanded to the board 
for a new public hearing, without member Dinning participating. As part of the stipulation, 
appellants waived any objection to member Dinning's participation in the prior proceedings. 
On May 26,2006, this Court entered its Order of Remand voiding the SUP and remanding the 
matter to the county board for a new public hearing. R.O.A. 2006, p. 216-217. 
The new hearing took place on July 24,2006, before board members Smith and Kirby. 
C.T. 7/24/06, p. 2:13-16. A second hearing or meeting without public participation took place 
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on August 7,2006. C.T. 8/7/06, p. 1 :1-11. At this meeting, board members Smith and Kirby 
approved the SUP and reaffirmed the validity of the findings that had been voided by this 
Court for conflict of interest, plus an additional condition. C.T. 8/7/06, p. 27:4 to p. 29, 
R.O.A. 2006, p. 236. Appellants filed a request for regulatory takings analysis on August 29, 
2006. R.O.A. 2006, p. 261. On September 26,2006, the county board denied that a taking 
had occurred. Appellants filed this petition for judicial review on September 8,2006. 
11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. APPELLANTS' RANCH, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND ZONING 
ORDNANCE. The Gardiner Prime Angus Ranch in Porthill, Idaho, is a seed stock operation 
in which appellants raise purebred Black Angus cattle for breeding. Appellants' ranch, which 
fronts on county road 46 (also known as "Farm to Market Road"), is adjacent to Tungsten's 
property on the south, approximately .8 of a mile from the proposed gravel pit. R.O.A. 206, 
p. 2, 1 19-120. Appellants' and Tungsten's properties are in an agricultural/forestry zone. 
R.O.A. 2006, p. 191. In Boundary County, commercial gravel pits are not permitted in 
agricultural/forestry zones. In contrast, cattle-breeding is a use by right. R.O.A. 2006, p. 256. 
Under the zoning ordinance, SUPS may be granted for non-permitted uses, but not 
unless the proposed use complies with the Boundary County Comprehensive Plan 
("'comprehensive plan" or "Plan"), and the ordinance. R.O.A. 2006, p. 256,258-259. Among 
other things, the comprehensive plan requires that the proposed special use must not interfere 
with the health or safety of neighboring property owners or deny them the rights of property 
ownership, that development of mineral resources may not pose undue risk to adjacent 
properties, and that development of "non-metallic mineral resources" cannot be 
zccomplished without due consideration of surrounding property uses and the potential impact 
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of such extraction. (Plan, Section I rPrivate Property Rights"], Section 111 ["Economic"], 
Section V r'Natural Resources"].) R.O.A. 2006, p. 243-246. 
The zoning ordinance requires that a special use may not have "any substantial 
adverse effects" on adjacent properties or to the general public, "wilt not create hazards" to 
adjacent property owners, and "will not create noise, traffic, odors, dust or other nuisances 
substantially in excess of permitted uses" in the zone district. (Ordinance, Ch. 13, 
Section 4(C)(3), Section 4(C)(4); R.O.A. 2006, p. 259). Therefore, Tungsten's SUP cannot be 
approved unless it meets these standards. 
B. TUNGSTEN'S GRAVEL PIT AND APPELLANTS' RANCH OPERATION. 
According to Tungsten's application, the gravel pit was to be located on seven acres of 
property next to the Farm to Market Road (also known as County Road 46). It would be 
operated five days per week, Monday-Friday, from 8:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. There would be 60 
non-contiguous days of rock crushing per calendar year, and blasting may be required. 
Material would be stockpiled on site for year-round hauling. Estimated vehicle traffic would 
be five trips per day, depending on season and demand. Water would be used during crushing 
operations to control dust. The gravel pit was to be permanent. R.O.A. 2006, p. 1. 
Appellants commenced their Angus seed stock business in 1994. Their barn, 
veterinary room, calving pens, cattIe handling equipment, and pastures are approximately 
.8 of a mile from the proposed gravel pit site. Their summer pastures, alfalfa fields, 450-foot 
water well and irrigation system are approximately .5 of a mile from the pit site where 
blasting could occur. Appellants use embryo transfer and artificial insemination techniques in 
their breeding program. These require a delicate synchronization process for which a quiet, 
stress-free environment is essential. Power Company blasting for pole installation some years 
ago had agitated the cows for several days afterwards. R.O.A. 2006, p. 120-121; C.T. 
5/19/05, p. 8:5-16. 
Appellants' breeding program runs from April to June, and their calving program nins 
from mid-December through March. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 8:16-20. Appellants sell through 
private treaty when customers come to the ranch and at consignment sales in Idaho, 
Washington and Montana. Customers from as far away as Louisiana and Texas have stopped 
by the ranch to visit and purchase cattle. R.O.A. 2006, p.121. 
Tungsten's proposed special use contained no safeguards to protect adjacent properties 
from noise, potential water loss associated with blasting, for restoring lost water to 
surrounding ranches, farms or residences, or compensating property owners for injuries or 
damages resulting from blasting or operation of the pit, or compensating them for lost 
business or loss of peaceful enjoyment of their property. 
C. COUNTY INVOLVEMENT IN TUNGSTEN'S GRAVEL PIT. County 
officials initiated Tungsten's gravel pit development plan and special use permit application. 
When Tungsten acquired its property, County Road Superintendent, Jeff Gutshall, approached 
Tungsten's president, Rick Dinning, about obtaining rock for the county road. C.T. 5/19/05, 
p. 1:18-20; 4:20-21. Rick Dinning admitted the "initial reason" he applied for the SUP was to 
supply gravel to the county. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 1:18-20,4:20-21. 
It was also revealed that Road Superintendent Gutshall had encouraged other local 
residents to obtain SUPS for gravel pits. In 2000, Dennis and Pam Ponsness obtained an SUP 
for a gravel pit after Road Superintendent Gutshall approached them about getting rock off of 
their property. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 3:14-23, 125-10. The Ponsnesses own and live on a ranch 
adjacent to Tungsten on the north, approximately .8 of a mile from Tungsten's proposed site. 
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R.O.A. 2006, p. 2. But after acquiring their permit, Road Superintendent Gutshall changed 
his mind about using their rock. C.T. 511 9/05, p. 13: 18-24. Rick Dinning said their rock was 
not considered "fit" for road purposes. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 13: 18-25. 
In or about 2003, Toin and Sherry Bushnell acquired an SUP for a gravel pit, after 
Road Superintendent Gutshall approached them about using their rock. C.T. 5/19/05, 
p. 145-10. The Bushnells' property is approximately .5 of a mile from Tungsten's property, 
on the east. R.O.A. 2006, p. 2. The Bushnells obtained an SUP, but due to neighbors' 
concerns about blasting and noise, they were prohibited from blasting and crushing activities 
were limited to January and February each year. The county did not use any rock off the 
Bushnells' property. C.T. 511 9/05, p. 3:19-25; p. 4:l-2. A third gravel pit in the area is on the 
Munson property, approximately 8 miles south of Tungsten's gravel pit site. The Munson pit 
had been "grandfathered" in. Rick Dinning said that Munson's rock was not adequate for the 
county to use for road building. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 9:12-16, 17:19-20. 
D. MAY 15.2005 HEARING BEFORE THE ZONING COMMISSION. The 
public hearing on Tungsten's application before the zoning commission was not scheduled 
until May 19,2005. Appellants did not receive notice of the hearing until May 3,2005. 
Appellants' timely request for a 45 day continuance to prepare for the hearing was denied. 
R.O.A. 2006, p. 149. 
On May 11,2005, Road Superintendent Gutshall sent an e-mail to the zoning 
commission stating that Tungsten's gravel pit would have "no negative impacts" on the Farm 
to Market road which was "already subject to heavy seasonal agricultural hauling." It also 
said the county "may desire to negotiate for materials" from this source. R.O.A. 2006, p. 148. 
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Rick Dinning was present at the hearing on behalf of Tungsten. He repeatedly 
admitted that he was "not a rock person." He said he did not know how much blasting would 
be required, and that the county could m more than five dump trucks per day. C.T. 5/19/05, 
p. 2:7; 4:3-24; 5:11-22. He acknowledged the existing gravel pits in the area, but said that 
none were adequate for the county. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 3:15-20, 17:19-23. 
Appellants and other local residents who were present at the hearing expressed 
concerns about Rick Dinning's lack of knowledge about rocks, blasting and quarrying 
operations, and the potentially harmful effects of blasting and quarrying on current uses of 
surrounding properties. They were concerned about the potentially harmful effects blasting 
could have on local water supplies and current agricultural uses on surrounding properties, 
and other environmental impacts. They expressed concern about the unnecessary duplication 
of gravel pits in the small Porthill area. They questioned what would happen to the 
surrounding properties from an absentee developer's permanent, commercial rock quarrying 
operation in an agricultural area, and possible sale of the quarry to other non-resident 
operators. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 5:ll-22,8:5:22,9:16, 14:23-24, 15:1-9. 
Road Superintendent Gutshall attended the hearing, but the zoning commission felt it 
would be inappropriate for him to comment on his contacts with Rick Dinning or other 
property owners. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 15:17-24; 21 :7-8; R.O.A. 2006, p. 188. Rick Dinning 
provided no expert or other evidence to show that his special use would not create hazards or 
have any substantial adverse effects on adjacent properties, and would not create noise, 
traffic, odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone 
district. 
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11 deliberations, zoning commission members commented that the gravel pit would "seriously, / /  horribly, and drasticaliy" impact the use of surrounding properties and the quiet, rural area in 
/ / which a person could "hear a pin drop" from half a mile away. C.T. 5119105, p. 20:lO-14. / I  The location proposed for intensive commercial development was zoned for non-commercial 
agriculture and agricultural products, and used for such purposes in reliance on the zoning. 
C.T. 5/19/05, p. 22%-14. The narrow area by the Farm to Market road in which the pit would 
be operated was not a good location for an open face mine, particularly since there were other 
pits in the area with rock available. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 22:16-17; 23:2-6. 
The commission determined that without expert or competent evidence about the 
effects of blasting on surrounding properties, it did not h o w  what a safe distance might be for 
blasting respecting water wells and cattle breeding, or what effect blasting could have on 
water strata in the rock. Commissioners were concerned that property owners could be "high 
and dry" if blasting cracked the rock and the water ran out. C.T. 5/19/05, p. 22:19-24; 
p.23:11-18. Without expert or other competent evidence to show how or if the gravel pit 
could be operated safely to adjoining property owners, the commission had no suggestions for 
mitigation. R.O.A. 2005, p. 91; R.O.A. 2006, p. 184. 
Based on the above, the zoning commission found that Tungsten's proposed use did 
not comply with Sections I, 111 and V of the comprehensive plan because the operation would 
pose undue risk, interfere with the health or safety of neighboring property owners and deny 
them their inherent properly rights, and failed to give due consideration to surrounding 
property uses or sufficient consideration for its potential impacts. The commission also found 
that the gravel pit failed to comply with Chapter 13, Section 4, of the zoning ordinance 
j l  MEM0RAP;D.I Ih. SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR NDICIAL REVIEW - Page 8 C13 
because there was not sufficient assurance that potential adverse effects to surrounding 
property owners could be mitigated or prevented as a result of blasting and its effect on water 
and livestock production, and because the gravel pit would create noise, odors and dust 
substantially in excess of permitted uses in the zone district. The zoning commission 
recommended that the county board deny the SUP. R.O.A. 2006, p. 183-184. 
F. JULY 26,2005 HEAF3NG BEFORE THE COUNTY BOARD. The hearing 
before the county board took place on July 26,2005. Prior to the hearing, Road 
Superintendent Gutshall sent an e-mail to the county board stating that the proposed gravel pit 
would not adversely affect the county road because it had "low traffic numbers" and "ample 
sight distance;" also that there was "no developed source for crushed aggregate in the area," 
and that Tungsten's pit "could probably be expanded." Gutshall also submitted a three-page, 
unsigned narrative about his contacts with Rick Dinning, the Ponsnesses, and the Bushnelfs, 
and denying certain things that were said at the zoning commission hearing. R.O.A. 2005, 
p. 69-72; R.O.A. 2006, p. 138-141. Gutshall attended the July 26,2005 hearing as the 
county's expert on road matters. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 15:9-12; 38:19-20. 
Rick Dinning did not provide any expert or other competent evidence at the county 
board hearing that his blasting would not affect appellants' water or irrigation system, or that 
the operation would not have any substantial adverse effects on adjacent properties, would not 
create hazards to adjacent property owners, and would not create noise, traffic, odors, dust or 
other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone district. He only said 
that his rock pit developer told him that appellants would "probably" not hear the crushing. 
C.T. 7/26/05, p. 4:23, 5:14-19. 
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In public comment, George Hays, a resident of Northern Boundary County, said that 
blasting for a new portion of Highway 95 outside of the Porthill area did not affect his cattle, 
and did not cause water loss to the Mission Creek area. He said that the State had taken 
seismic readings before, during and after the blasting. He felt that Tungsten's blasting would 
not be harmful. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 7:3-24; p. 8:14, 13-14. 
Appellants and other Porthill residents expressed concerns about the detrimental effect 
of blasting and rock crushing on ranches and farms near the proposed pit and on appellants' 
cattle-breeding program. C.T. 7/26/05, p.9:10-13; 27:2-9. They were concerned that a 
property developer such as Tungsten, would only be interested in selling off the rock quarry 
msiness to another non-resident operator. Residents stated there was no local need for more 
:ock, that the commercial operation posed a safety risk to people on Farm to Market road, and 
:hat blasting and dynamiting posed a threat to adjacent water wells and irrigation. C.T. 
7/26/05, p. 11:4-13, 12:2-17; 13:9-18; 29:2-17; 30:22-24; 32:7-15; 35:19-25; 36: 1-12, 
Zoncern was expressed about the noise and incompatibility of a permanent, commercial 
parrying operation in the agricultural area, and with the county's involvement in developing 
:he pit. (Id., 14:l-9,17:20-22; 27:1,11-19; 30:1,31:9-20; 37:9-12.) 
Chairman Smith denied that the gravel pit was connected to county road-building, and 
raid that Road Superintendent's Gutshall's involvement was not a reason to deny a permit. 
Cliairman Smith said that he and the other hoard members were "very upset" with Gutshall's 
,'treatment" at the zoning commission hearing, that Gutshall's integrity meant a lot to the 
.ounty board, and Chairman Smith had "a problem when [Gutshall's integrity] is questioned." 
2.T. 7/26/05, p. 15:l-4, 13-21. 
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Chairman Smith asked appellants for "any fact" or "documentation" that dynamiting 
could affect somebody's water, or if that was "just a fear" appellants had. C.T. 7/26/05, 
p.15:23-25, p. 16:2-12. Member Dan Dinning thought it was unfair for people to restrict the 
use of private property and not pay the owner for lost economic opportunities. C.T. 7/26/05, 
p. 28:13-16. Road Superintendent Gutshall had "no concerns about safety along the county 
road." C.T. 7/26/05, p. 16:3-12; 39:5-7. 
In discussion, Chairman Smith said that Rick Dinning had a "right" to have a gravel 
pit. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 43: 11. Member Kirby wanted more time "to dig around to see what's 
going on and ask some questions that haven't been asked." C.T. 7/26/05, p. 45:lO-13. The 
board wanted staff to "come up with" conditions to "ease the pain" on the community. One 
of the conditions could not be to not have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 43:15-21. 
The board made no findings that Tungsten's proposed gravel pit did not create hazards 
to adjacent property owners, and would not create noise, traffic, odors, dust, or other 
nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses in the zone district. Board members made 
no comment on the zoning commission's findings or recommendation to deny the SUP. 
G. AUGUST 8,2005 EIEARING BEFORE THE COUNTY BOARD. The board 
met again on August 8, 2005. Appellants told the Board they had obtained a hydrologist to 
study the effects of blasting on their property. Appellants requested the board to continue the 
proceedings for a reasonable time to obtain a report. C.T. 8/8/05, p. 5:18-25; 7:20-25 to p. 
8:l-4. The board denied appellants' request, on the basis that problems occurring after the 
permit issued were a "civil matter" between appellants and Tungsten that was not the county's 
problem. C.T. 8/8/05, p. 6:ll-13; 7:6-11, 14-17; 8:16-25; 9:2-11. Board members did not 
want to become the "arbitrator" of conflicting reports. C.T. 8/8/05, p. 9:16-21. 
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Rick Dinning wanted his 60 day crushing period to start in mid-February through 
May, and he wanted to have twelve days of blasting each year, not two as he had originally 
stated. Chairman Smith said that two days was not enough blasting, and that twelve days was 
not "out of line." C.T. 8/8/05, p. 22:14-15; p. 33:3-6. Board member Kirby thought that more 
blasting was a "good idea because more days is less intensity," and that "they won't try to do 
as much on each shot if they had the opportunity" for more blasting. C.T. 8/8/05, p. 20:5-9, p. 
22:l-8; 33:3-6; 39:21-25. 
A Porthill resident requested the board to define the intensity of the blasting to occur, 
so that residents could understand its effects. His request was denied because the county had 
"no expertise" in that area, and "no idea" what blasting requirements could be imposed other 
than being done consistent with Idaho Department of Lands' Best Management Practices for 
Mining. They assumed the Department of Lands "takes these things into consideration." 
C.T. 8/8/05, p.30:6-9, 16-24; 34:23-25. Member Dan Dinning said the Board had no 
obligation to consider these issues because they were "civil matters" for "other venues." C.T. 
8/8/05, p. 34:12-17. 
Chairman Smith "definitely wantled] to approve the pit," and did not want "delaying 
tactics" or "road blocks" to "put off the inevitable." He thought appellants should have 
obtained expert evidence before the zoning commission hearing. Further discussion was cut 
off. The board voted to grant the SUP. Member Dan Dinning abstained from voting. C.T. 
8/8/05, p. 33:15-25; 34:l-3; 35:16-20. 
H. COUNTY BOARD HEARING OF SEPTEMBER 6,2005. At its meeting on 
September 6,2005, the county board approved and issued the SUP with the following ten 
conditions: 
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(1) Surface mining operations including crushing, loading materials, storing, etc. 
must be conducted on the site and not encroach onto county road 46. 
I/ (2) Dust abatement measures must be applied "as needed." 
(3) Mining operations shall follow "Best Management Practices for Mining in 
Idaho," published by the Idaho Department of Lands. 
/ /  (5) Blasting shall meet OSHA requirements established at 29 CFR, Subpart U. 
I 
(6) Crushing is allowed from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday between 
February 15 and May 2 each year. 
(4) 12 days of blasting per year, on weekdays between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. 
Tungsten to provide writien notice to property owners within 500 feet ofthe pit 
15 days before blasting is to occur, specifying the date, time and length of time 
blasting will occur. 
(7) Before mining begins, Tungsten must comply with Idaho Department of 
Lands' requirements, including filing a reclamation plan and posting a bond, a 
copy of whicli must be filed with the Zoning office. 
(8) Tungsten must provide written notice to the Zoning office when the 
reclamation bond is redeemed or forfeited, at which time the SUP will lapse. 
(9) The pit site shall be formally identified by survey filed and recorded with the 
Boundary County Recording Clerk. 
(10) Persons employed to conduct blasting shall be notified prior to blasting of the 
concerns expressed during the hearing process over the potential for damage to 
area water systems. 
1 1  R.O.A. 2005, p. 85-88; R0.A.  2006, p. 216-217. 
1. CONFLICT OF INTEREST VOIDS SUP. On May 26,2006, the SUP was 
1 voided by court order, because Board Member Dan Dinning's participation in the county 
/ /  board's proceedings was a conflict of interest in violation of I.C. 67-6506. R.O.A. 2006, 
II p. 216-217. A new hearing on the SUP was scheduled for July 24,2006 
J. TUNGSTEN'S DEVELOPMENT OF GRAVEL PIT WITHOUT A PERMIT. 
On July 6,2006, Tungsten undertook development activities on the pit site without a permit in 
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violation of county law. On July 10,2006, the Board's attorney notified Tungsten to cease all 
activities or development of the pit. But Tungsten worked the pit again on July 11, and July 
17,2006. Tungsten worked the pit again on July 3 1, and August 1,2006. R.O.A. 2006, p. 
215,269,73; C.T. 7124106, p. 14:1-18; 15:13-16. 
K. HYDROLOGY REPORT. Prior to the new hearing, appellants submitted to 
the board the written opinion of hydrologist, Kristine Uhlman, R.G. R.O.A. 2006, p. 79-84. 
Uhlman is a member of the Association of Engineering Geologists and a Certified Ground 
Water Professional under the National Ground Water Association's national certification 
program. She has a Bachelor of Science degree in Hydrology with Distinction, from the 
University of Arizona, and a Master of Science degree in Civil Engineering from Ohio State 
University. Uhlman has thirty-one years of experience in geosciences focusing on ground 
water hydrology, including supervision and direction of aquifer characterization programs and 
the staff and subcontracted firms responsible for subsurface exploration and hydrogeologic 
testing. These programs incIude geophysical exploration, aquifer testing, ground water 
tracing, and geochemical analysis and assessment of ground water flow having fractured rock 
and blasting/excavation attributes similar to those for Tungsten's quarry. R.O.A. 2006, p. 85. 
Uhlman visited and inspected appellants' property from June 9 through June 11,2006. 
Uhlman's opinion as to the vulnerability of appellants' property and potential harm from the 
quarrying operation is based on her special knowledge and experience in hydrology and 
geology and her physical inspection of the property. R.O.A. 2006, p. 87. 
In Uhlman's opinion, the proposed blasting and open pit excavation would cause an 
existing risk of dewatering aquifer fractures providing water to appellants' 450-foot well. 
Because of the fractured rock aquifer on the properties, the quarrying would induce drainage 
that could dewater aquifer fractures important to the well's performance. If dewatering 
occurred, it would be permanent. Once excavated, there would be no way to restore the 
aquifer capacity or remediate the harm. R.O.A. 2006, p. 79-84. 
Appellants also submitted two studies by Michigan State University Extension and 
one article from the Angus Journal on the importance of a stress free environment to cattle 
breeding programs using artificial insemination and embryo transfer techniques. R.O.A. 
2006, p. 89-1 07. These studies discuss the need for a stress-free environment for successful 
artificial insemination ("A.I.") and embryo transfer ("E.T.") programs. They explain how 
excessive stress on the animal can markedly reduce conception rates. R.O.A. 2006, p. 72. 
Appellants further submitted a copy of their July 18,2005 letter to the Zoning 
Commission describing their cattle breeding operation and the substantial adverse affects the 
proposed gravel pit could cause them. R.O.A. 2006, p. 108-1 13. Appellants also filed written 
objections to the gravel pit based upon I.C. 67-6512 and laws prohibiting "spot zoning," and a 
written statement of reasons the SUP should be denied. R.O.A. 2006, p. 67-70,71-78. 
L. JULY 24.2006 DE NOVO HEARING BEFORE TWO MEMBERS OF THE 
COUNTY BOARD. The new hearing took place as scheduled on July 24,2006 before board 
members Smith and Kirby. In his opening remarks, Rick Dinning said that Tungsten's recent 
blasting had been "surprisingly quiet and muffled," like "a series of 22 caliber primers going 
off with an underground rumble." He said that an employee of the Idaho Department of 
Lands who looked at the pit site doubted it would have any effect on appeilants' well. We 
criticized Uhlman's expert opinion as speculative. C.T. 7/25/06, p. 6:7-14; 7:s-11,25; 8:l-2, 
20; 9:5-6. As before, he provided no expert or other competent evidence that his rock quany 
operation would not create hazards or have any substantial adverse effects on adjacent 
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properties, and would not create noise, traffic, odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in 
excess of permitted uses in the zone district. 
Porthill resident, Steve Banks commented that the board members in prior hearings 
had not mentioned the zoning commission recommendation denying the SUP, or referred to 
any of the issues discussed in that hearing, or gave any reasons for reversing that decision 
other than the view that Rick Dinning had the right to do as he chose with his property. As 
before, the board members did not discuss the zoning commission's findings. 
Porthill resident, Jay Epstein commented that the proximity and future unknown 
intensity of the operation made it impossible to ensure that appellants' water resources and 
agricultural enterprise would not be irrevocably injured. C.T. 7/24/06, p. 24: 1-14. Bonners 
Ferry resident, Bruce Martins said that while "22's" are not very loud, "44's" are, and asked 
whether Tungsten would be using more dynamite the more they blasted into the rock. C.T. 
7/24/06, p. 24:20-25; 25:l-6. There were no answers to these questions. Board members 
Smith and Kirby took the matter under advisement. Member Kirby wanted to review staff 
findings and engage in more discussion among themselves. C.T. 7/24/06, p. 25:l-5. 
M. AUGUST 7,2006 HEARING. Board members Smith and Kirby held a second 
hearing on August 7,2006. In this hearing, CHAIRMAN SMITH READ A PREPARED 
DECISION INTO THE RECORD (emphasis provided). The decision consisted of a 
verbatim copy of the full Board's September 6,2005 findings, conditions and decision, a 
second copy of the findings, conditions and decision, with renumbered paragraphs plus one 
additional condition, a one-sided history of this litigation, argument opposing appellants' legal 
objections and hydrologist opinion, and prepared questions and answers. See Draft decision, 
R.O.A. 2006, p. 197-202; 202-203; 203-204,208-210; 204-210; 204-207, see also 207-210. 
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Following the reading of the entire document, including the prepared questions and 
answers, Board members Smith and Kirby "reaffirmed" the full Board's September 6,2005 
findings and adopted the decision as read. No public input was allowed. C.T. 8/8/06, 
p. 1: 10-1 1. The new condition, No. 11, was that persons employed by Tungsten to conduct 
blasting are to be "qualified, licensed and insured." R.O.A. 2006, p. 225-236 (decision); 233 
(eleventh condition); C.T. 8/8/07, p. 1:15-25 to p. 12-6; p. 12:22 to p. 13:4, 13-21; 14:5-9,207 
24; 15:7-13, 15-16, 19-23; 16:l-2, 3-7, 10-11, 12-19; 17:l-2,s-7, 17-18,21-23; 18:l-3,5-7, 
10-12, 18-25; 19:l-2,9-25; 2O:l-19,21-25; 2l:l-10, 16-25; 22:2-3,4-12, 14-16, 18-25; 23:l- 
23; 24:7-11,20-25; 25:1,4-6,9-15, 17-19,22-25; 26:l-3, 5-7,9-15, 17-20,23-25; 27:l-2, 
2-7,22 (reading). Appellants' request for takings analysis was denied. R.O.A. 2006, p. 261- 
265. 
111. ISSUES 
1. Did the Board's action violate I.C. 67-6512 in that a special use permit may be 
granted oilly if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the zoning 
ordinance? 
2. Did the Board's decision conflict with Section I and IV of the Comprehensive 
Plan in that said approval interferes with appellants' health and safety, adversely impacts 
appellants' agricultural use of their property, does not evaluate the impact of the gravel 
pit/rock quarry operation on current uses of surrounding land, and constitutes uncompensated 
deprivation of appellants' private property rights? 
3. Was the Board's decision supported by substantial evidence on the record? 
4. Did the Board's decision fail to comply with I.C. 67-6535 in that the findings 
approved on August 14,2006 do not state the relevant contested facts relied upon, fail to 
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explain the rationale for the decision based on applicable provisions of the Comprehensive 
Plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions and pertinent constitutional principles and 
factual information contained in the record? 
5. Was the Board's decision made upon unlawful procedure and did it deprive 
appellants of due process of law because of inadequate notice or opportunity to respond? 
6. Was the decision made upon unlawful procedure and did it deprive appellants 
of due process in the Board's pre-hearing statements of confidence in their Road 
Superintendent's advocacy for the special use permit, pre-hearing discussions between the 
Road Superintendent and the applicant about obtaining rock from the applicant's property, 
statements at the hearing supportive of the Road Superintendent in retaliation for adjacent 
property owners' public comment at the zoning commission hearing, and the Board's failure 
to allow appellants to comment on matters outside the record the Board relied on in making 
its decision? 
7. Was the Board's decision arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion in 
that deliberations undertaken by the Board on August 7,2006 were biased, and did not 
constitute true deliberations but, instead, consisted of a mere recitation of a document 
containing prepared statements and predetermined responses by unknown parties prior to 
deliberation? 
8. Did the Board's decision constitute unlawful "spot zoning?" 
9. Did the Board's decision prejudice substantial rights of the appellant? 
10. Are Appellants entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this 
action? 
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IY. ARGUMENT 
THE UOAKD'S 1)ECISION VIOI.AI'ES THE IDAHO CONSI ITUTION AND 1. 
I.C. 67-65 12 IN THAT 11 GRAVEI. PITIROCK OliARRY OPERATION IS NOT .4 
C:ONDITION&Y PERMIT'[ED USE WITHIN TI1E ZONE DIS?'R.I(:T. 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of law 
over which the court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 
Idaho 192, 196 (2002), Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). 
I.C. 67-6512 governs the issuance of special use permits by local agencies. It provides 
that a special use permit may be granted to an applicant "if the proposed use is conditionally 
permitted by the terms of the ordinance." I. C. 67-6512(a). 
Chapter 7, Section 1 of the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance specifies three 
categories of uses that are permitted in agriculturelforestry zones. These are: uses by right, 
permitted uses, and conditional uses. Under I.C. 67-6512, SUPS may only be granted for 
conditionally permitted uses in the zone district. 
Under Chapter 7 of the ordinance, the conditionally permitted uses in 
agriculturaWforestry zones are: 
"1. Commercial businesses supplying products and services for agricultural and 
forestry activities. 
2. Agricultural auction yards. 
3. Retail plant nurseries and greenhouses, off-premises produce stands. 
4. Riding and rodeo arenas open to the public, commercial stables, commercial 
kennels, veterinary clinics. 
5. Agricultural packaging and processing facilities. 
6. Public cemeteries and churches or structures intended primarily as a place of 
worship. 
7. Public service facilities and wireless communications facilities." 
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Neither gravel pits, rock quarries, or surface mining operations are in this list. 
Accordingly, the board may not legally grant Tungsten a special use permit for a gravel 
pitirock quarry. Therefore, the board's action granting the SUP is illegal and void. 
Under Chapter 7 of the Ordinance, agricultural uses including farming, livestock 
production and animal husbandry are "uses by right" in agricultural/forestry zones. R.O.A. 
2006, p.256. Accordingly, appellants' cattle ranch is a use by right in the zone district and 
protected by the zoning laws. 
"Permitted Uses" include public or private parks, not for profit community halls, one 
single family residential structure on a parcel not less than ten acres in size, and more than 
one single family residential structure provided the parcel contains at least ten acres per 
dwelling unit. R.O.A. 2006, p. 256. Under this provision, appellants' ranch home and ranch 
employee's home are protected permitted uses in the zone district. 
It is obvious that Tungsten's proposed gravel pit is not a conditionally permitted use 
under Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance. That is the reason Tungsten applied for a special 
use permit, and the zoning commission held a special use permit hearing, and the county 
board found that Section 1E of Ch. 7, pertaining to special use permits, was the basis upon 
which Tungsten's application was considered. R.O.A. 2005, p. 100; R.O.A. 2006, p.1,225 
(para. I(e)j. But Section 1E of Ch. 7 of the ordinance is erroneous and void. 
Section 1E states: "Any use not specified in this section as a use by right or 
conditional use is eligible for consideration as a special use, subject to the provisions of 
Chapter 13." R.O.A. 2006, p. 256. (Chapter 13 states the procedures for obtaining a special 
use permit. R.O.A. 2006, p. 258-260.) In purporting to make a property use that is not 
conditionally permitted eligible for pern~it as a special use, Section 1E conflicts with 
LC. 67-6512, and is void. 
The language of Section 1E is similar to language in an earlier version of 
I.C. 67-65 12. That version had stated that "[a] special use permit may be granted to an 
applicant if the proposed use is otherwise prohibited by the terms of the ordinance." But that 
language was repealed in 1999, and replaced by the current language prohibiting special use 
permits unless the use is conditionally permitted. See Senate Bill No.1202, 1999 Ida. ALS 
396, 1999 Idaho Sess. Laws 396; see also Palmer v. Board of Countv Commissioners, 117 
Idaho 562,564 (1990). 
Thus, the Legislature repudiated the language upon which the Board relies to grant 
Tungsten a special use permit, and changed the law to require that special use permits may 
only be considered for uses that are conditionally permitted in the ordinance. It follows that 
the Board's decision is based on an unlawful and invalid provision in the zoning ordinance. 
As such, the Board's decision is u n l a h l  and void. A county has no authority to act on an 
ordinance that conflicts with I.C. 67-6512. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,356 
(2005). 
The Legislature's repeal of the former language in I.C. 67-6512 makes sense. The 
Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") requires counties to adopt comprehensive land use 
plans and zoning ordinances that promote ordered growth while protecting property rights and 
the environment. I. C. 67-6512. The "catch-all" language in Section 1E of the Ordinance 
would allow local boards to circumvent zoning laws by granting special treatment to favored 
individuals as a "back door" into zone districts where the use is forbidden. The repeal of that 
language bars such action. 
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It is fundamental that a county ordinance may not conflict with general laws. Boise v. 
Bench Sewer Dist., 116 Idaho 25 (1989) (county ordinance that conflicts with general law is 
void); Brower v. Bin~ham Countv, 140 Idaho 5 12,515 (2004) (county ordinance that 
conflicts with local land use planning statutes is void); In re Ridenhaugh, 5 Idaho 371,375 
(1897) (under section 2 of article 12 of the Idaho Constitution, counties may not enact 
regulations that are in conflict with the general laws). Accordingly, the Board's decision 
granting the special use permit violates I. C. 67-6512, and must be reversed. 
I 
'TIIE BOARD'S Dl!CllSlON VIOLATES I.C. 67-6512 IN THAT 7'1-If< DE(:lSION 2. 
CONFLICTS WITH THE COWKEIIT.NSIVE 1'LAN.Lv.D ZONNG OlIDIN.MCL 
I.C. 67-65 12(a) provides that a special use permit may be granted if the proposed use 
is conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance, and when it is not in conflict with the 
plan. The Board's decision violates I.C. 67-6512 because it conflicts with the comprehensive 
plan. 
Section I of the Plan, "Private Property Rights," states that use of private property 
must not interfere with the health or safety of neighboring property owners or deny them the 
same inherent rights. The board's action granting the SUP violates this provision. 
Tungsten's gravel pit is not being developed in an industrial area, or a commercial 
area, or in an abandoned rural area. Rather, it is on a f m  to market road in a small area of 
existing residences, f m s  and ranches on which families live and work. The noisiest day on 
the ranch, with harvest trucks, cattle trailers, thunder storms, or airplanes overhead does not 
come close to the constant din and disruption of the trucks and machinery of a year-round 
open face rock quarry at the side of the road in plain view and hearing of everyone who live 
and work there. 
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Such an operation in a quiet farming and ranching area clearly interferes with the 
health and safety of neighboring property owners and denies them their property rights 
inherent in the zoning of that area. Tungsten's gravel pit is not a use by right or permitted use 
in the agriculturallforestry zone. When he purchased the property, Rick Dinning, a developer, 
should have had no expectation of putting a gravel pit there, and in fact, had none. His 
property was purchased for development. By admission of both Rick Dinning and Road 
Superintendent Gutshall, it was the county that initiated and encouraged the development of 
this pit. 
As Chairman Smith said, it was "inevitable" thal the permit would be granted, 
regardless of legal requirements, local need, or the concerns of local property owners. While 
the zoning commission required Tungsten to show compliance with the Plan and ordinance, 
the county board essentially rubber stamped its Road Superintendent's proposal to Tungsten 
regardless of the potential harm to adjacent properties. The board members' interest in 
protecting their road superintendent and ignoring the public's opposition deprived appellants 
of their property rights without due process. 
The only expert evidence in the record is that Tungsten's proposed blasting causes an 
existing risk of dewatering aquifer fractures providing water to appellants' wells. Scholarly 
writings in the record explain why cattle-breeding using A.I. and E.T. techniques requires a 
stress free environment to be successful. Thus, the only expert evidence in the record shows 
non-compliance with zoning laws health, safety and property requirements. Since the 
proposed blasting and crushing are to take place in a populated area where no similar 
intensive use exists, expert evidence proving that there will be no harm to adjacent property 
owners would be a minimum for prudent and lawhl decision-making. The burden of proof to 
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"be in accordance with the comprehensive plan" rests with the applicant. Tungsten provided 
no evidence and the county board was not interested in any. 
The county board's decision violates the comprehensive plan by its disregard of 
county rules and standards and its personal interest in the subject matter. Tungsten's evidence 
in all of the county board hearings was virtually the same as that before the zoning 
commission, that is, Rick Dinning's personal and admittedly non-expert opinion that his 
proposed quarrying operation was not dangerous or disruptive. While the zoning commission 
applied the evidence to the standards in the ordinance and determined that there was 
insufficient information to show compliance, the county board simply granted the permit, and 
pushed off these determinations to other agencies having nothing to do with the county, 
property owners, local land use planning or local zoning laws. This is an arbitrary and 
capricious abuse of power in violation of the plan and ordinance. 
The Board's decision conflicts with Section IV of the Plan, "Land Use," which states 
that county policy is to encourage agricultural enterprise to retain the predominantly rural 
nature of the community. R.O.A. 2006, p. 243-244. A permanent, open face mining 
operation in the middle of ranches and f m s  does not encourage agricultural enterprise and 
destroys the rural nature of the area forever. 
In this State, appellants have a right to "full and complete" use of their agricultural 
land. Under I.C. 67-6529, county commissioners may not take any action that "deprives any 
owner of full and complete use of agricultural land for production of any agricultural 
product." Appellants produced evidence that constant noise and traffic of the pit operation 
could disrupt their cattle breeding program, and that blasting on the property causes a risk of 
dewatering aquifer fractures providing water to appellants' property. Such damage deprives 
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appellants of the 111 and complete use of their agricultural land for agricultural purposes, in 
violation of LC. 67-6529. 
The decision also fails to comply with the requirement in Section IV that the Board 
give consideration to the impact proposed commercial enterprises will have on current uses of 
surrounding lands and traffic flow in the area, and that county policy will encourage and 
promote "clean, low-impact industrial development in designated industrial zones." R.O.A. 
2006, p. 244. Plainly, the increased truck traffic on the county road will impact current farm 
to market uses in the area. County road 46 is not used industrially and never has been. 
Typical seasonal farm equipment and machinery does not equate with heavy industry. By 
definition, an open face mining operation is not clean, low-impact industrial development in a 
designated industrial zone. 
3. THE BOARD'S DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The Board must make findings that explain the facts upon which the decision is based. 
Gumprach v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983). Explaining the facts requires 
more than copying the text of provisions in an ordinance and reading predetermined responses 
to rhetorical statements designed to rubber stamp a previous decision. Deliberations are 
required to demonstrate that an unbiased decision was made based on evidence showing 
compliance with the Plan and Ordinance. 
For any meaningful judicial scrutiny of an agency's decision, and to require the 
agency to demonstrate it has applied the criteria prescribed by the statute and has not acted 
arbitrarily or on an ad hoc basis, the court must require the agency's order to "clearly and 
precisely state" what it found to be the facts and "fully explain" why those facts lead to its 
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decision. Workman Familv Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32 (1982), 
Neighborhood Leame v. Board of Commissioners, 569 P.2d 1063, 1076 (1977). 
What is needed for adequate judicial review "is a clear statement of what, specifically, 
the decision making body believes" to be the relevant and important facts upon which its 
decision is based. Workman, supra, p. 37. "Conclusions are not sufficient." Id. Failure to 
make factually supportable findings on all the Ordinance requirements is a failure to comply 
with the Ordinance. Taylor v. Board of Countv Commissioners, 124 Idaho 392,401 (1993). 
Under Chapter 13, Section 4 of the ordinance, a special use permit may not be granted 
unless the proposed use "will have a substantial adverse effects" or "create hazards to" 
adjacent property owners, and "will not create noise, traffic, dust or other nuisances 
substantially in excess of permitted uses" in the zone district. (Ordinance, Ch. 13, Section 
4C(3), (4), R.O.A. 2006, p.259 [emphasis added].) Thus, under Ch. 13, Section 4, the 
applicant must show the proposed operation will fit the community, not the other way around. 
By its very nature, a commercial gravel pit on a county road next to a cattle breeding 
operation creates hazards, noise, traffic, dust and other nuisances substantially in excess of the 
uses in the area. Thus, the proposed operation by its very nature does not fit the community. 
The Board's decision disregards the ordinance to obtain a commodity from a Commissioner's 
brother that is easily obtainable from other sources in the area. 
The county board's disregard of the evidence is clear. The county board's decision 
does not deny or overturn the zoning commission's factual findings of the potential harms to 
surrounding properties, and ignores the zoning commission's dilemma of the lack of expert or 
competent evidence to make suggestions for mitigation. The county board avoids confronting 
the issues by purporting to impose conditions on the operation, and by these conditions 
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"passing the buck" to other agencies and the court system in the hope that they will resolve 
the conflicts and deal with any damage. This is contrary to the standards in the ordinance 
which require the applicant to show that the proposed use will not damage adjacent property 
owners. 
Shifting the burden to other agencies is not the standard for local agency decision 
making. The agency must demonstrate that it has applied the criteria prescribed by statute 
and by its own regulations and has not acted arbitrarily or on an ad hoc basis. The agency's 
decision must clearly and precisely state what it found to the facts and fully explain why those 
facts lead it to the decision it makes. (Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls 
(1982) 104 Idaho 32,36-37.) 
No evidence supports the proposition that other agencies or the courts will monitor 
Tungsten's gravel pit or protect adjacent property owners from damage from the gravel pit. 
The county hoard and its employees candidly admit they have no special knowledge about 
blasting or water, and just assume other agencies will take care of it. The Board does not 
specify what the other agencies' regulations say or do to mitigate the potential harm to 
adjacent properties and local water supplies. 
The Board also fails to explain how any of its alleged conditions mitigates any of the 
identified potential harms to adjacent property owners. Conditions 1,6, and 9 (mining 
operations to take place on site, crushing to take place 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday 
through Friday between February 15 and May 2 of each year, s w e y  of the pit site) only 
allow the operation to proceed as described in Tungsten's application. These specifications 
are the basis for the identified potential harms. They do not mitigate the harms. 
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A site plan showing "property boundaries, general topography, building layout, 
access, parking, landscaping and other details necessary to clearly depict the nature of the 
proposed use," is a requirement of Ch. 13, section 4(A)(3) for an application for special use 
permit, not a mitigating factor. R.O.A. 2006, p. 259. The only reason for Condition 9 is that 
Tungsten failed to comply with this requirement in the first place, which caused confusion as 
to the exact location of the pit. A site plan does not mitigate the identified potential harms. 
Condition 4, allowing Tungsten twelve days of blasting rather than the two days 
originally requested expands rather than mitigates the potential adverse impact of blasting on 
water and irrigation. No restrictions are set on the time, intensity or location of blasting. 
There are no facts or expert evidence on which such restrictions could be set. A condition 
that expands the potentially harmful operation does not mitigate it. 
The only expert evidence in the record is that Tungsten's proposed blasting will cause 
an existing risk of dewatering aquifer fractures providing water to appellants' wells. Based 
upon this expert evidence, it was incumbent on Tungsten to prove this would not happen. 
Without such evidence, increasing the number of blasting days without any limitations on the 
location or intensity of blasting does not mitigate the identified risk. "Passing the buck" to 
Tungsten's blasting contractors does not insure that any protective measures will be taken. 
Condition 1 (keeping mining operations off the county road,) is a basic traffic safety 
law for the protection of motorists and pedestrians using the road from dangerous quarrying 
operations. It has nothing to do with the effect of blasting and quarrying operations on local 
water supplies, irrigation, cattle breeding, increased truck traffic, noise or diminished property 
Condition 2 (dust abatement "as needed") provides no ascertainable standards and is 
discretionary with Tungsten, who can eliminate that condition by simply deciding it is not 
needed. The county board's reliance on the Idaho Department of Lands ("IDL") is also 
misplaced. County boards, not the IDL, are supposed to enforce local zoning ordinances. The 
decision does not identify the D L  regulations that are pertinent to the identified harms, if any. 
Conditions 3 and 5 require Tungsten to comply with the "Best Management Practices 
For Mining in Idaho," and the blasting requirements of the federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Act ("OSHA.") What these requirements are is not specified. How OSHA 
requirements mitigate the identified harms is not explained. The Board members do not 
know. 
OSHA, a federal agency overseeing employee safety in the workplace, has no 
responsibilities for protecting local property owners from adjacent rock quarrying operations. 
That is the county board's job pursuant to the plan and ordinance. Requiring Tungsten to use 
licensed blasters does not mitigate the potential harm to local water supplies caused by 
repeated blasting.' 
Similarly, it is unknown how condition 7, requiring Tungsten to comply with IDL 
requirements, including filing a reclamation plan and bond, mitigates potential harm to 
adjacent property owners. A reclamation plan pertains to closing up the gravel pit, not 
operating it. Bond requirements can be waived, as they were for Tungsten. R.O.A. 2006, 
p. 282, para. 4. Similarly, condition 8, requiring Tungsten lo notify the zoning commission 
upon redemption of the reclamation plan or forfeiture of the bond is irrelevant to operation of 
the pit. 
1 OSHA regulations require blasters to be qualified as a matter of employee safety. Accordingly, new 
condition 11, requiring blasters to be qualitied, is redundant of old condition 5. 
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I I Condition 10, requiring Tungsten to notify the blasters Tungsten employs of the / / concern of adjacent property owners does not require the blasters to do anything about those 
1 1  concerns or to take any precautions to protect surrounding properties. Having no evidence I I that precautions for specific, identified harms exist or can be taken, board members have no 1 I knowledge of what, if any protective measures can or should be taken. 
I! The common thread between the conflicting decisions of the zoning commission and 1 the county board is the absence of expert evidence or any other competent evidence that 
1 Tungsten's gravel pit can be operated to mitigate or eliminate potential adverse or hazardous 
I I impacts, or that noise, traffic and dust inherent in the mining operation can be reduced to 1 1  levels commensurate with permitted uses in the zone district. Absent competent evidence to 
I I support the Board's findings, the decision must be reversed. 
4. THE BOARD'S DECISION FAILS TO COMPLY WITH LC. SECTION 67-6535 IN 
THAT IT FAILS TO STATE THE CONTESTED FACTS RELIED ON OR 
EXPLAIN THE RATIONALE FOR THE DECISION BASED ON APPLICABLE 
PROVISIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AM) RELEVANT 
ORDINANCE. 
1 1  LC. 67-6535 governs the issuance of findings of fact or conclusions of law relevant to 1 1  a local land use agency's approval or denial of a land use application. Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho 71,80 (2003). I.C. 67-6535 requires the findings to be in writing explaining the 
relevant criteria and standards, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for the decision 
ll based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and ordinance and factual 
information contained in the record. 
The decision must demonstrate that the agency applied the criteria prescribed by the 
statute, and did not act arbitrarily or on an ad-hoc basis. Workman Family Partnership, supra, 
104 Idaho at p. 37. The Board's failure to identify the relevant facts underlying the 
conclusions in its decision violates LC. 67-6535. 
/ / MEMORANDUM E i  SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 30 
No meaningful discussion took place in the August 7,2006 hearing. Chairman Smith 
simply read a prepared document that essentially told the two board members what to say to 
support a pre-made decision. Chairman Smith and member Kirby simply went along with the 
script. Neither asked any questions. No public comment was allowed. 
At some point prior to the hearing, a decision had been made to readopt the full 
Board's 2005 decision verbatim, and that is what was done. The promised new hearing was a 
sham. It was arbitrary and capricious for the board to give lip service to its promise of a new 
hearing, and then totally ignore it by simply reinstating the former decision.. The old decision 
violated Idaho law prohibiting conflicts of interest. "Reinstating" a decision that violates an 
Idaho statute still violates Idaho law. 
Under LC. 67-6535, land use decisions should be founded upon sound reason and 
practical application of recognized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, courts are 
directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and lo evaluate the adequacy of procedures 
and resultant decisions in the light of practical considerations, fundamental fairness and the 
essentials of reasoned decision-making. 
Going through the motions of holding a new hearing and then "readopting" an illegal 
decision is ad-hoc decision-making at its most contrived. Such decision violates the 
provisions of LC. 67-6535. 
5. THE DECISION WAS MADE UPON UNLAWFUL PROCEDURE AND 
DEPIWED APPELLANTS OF DUE PROCESS BECAUSE NOTICE WAS 
INADEOUATE. 
Decisions by zoning commissions apply general rules to specific individuals. As such, 
they are "quasi-judicial" in nature. Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Fremont CounQ, 
Docket No. 30061,2006 Opinion No. 107,2006 Ida. LEXIS 151 (November 29,2006,), p. 16 
of Opinion, quoting from Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 3 1 
118 (1994). Land use hearings that are quasi-judicial are subject to due process constraints. 
Id. Procedural due process requires some process to ensure the individual is not arbitrarily 
deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. Id. Due process issues 
are generally questions of law over which the court exercises free review. Id p. 17. 
Notice for special use permit hearings is governed by I.C. 67-6512. I.C. 67-6512@) 
provides for published notice 15 days before the hearing, and that specific notice be given to 
property owners within 300 feet of the property being considered, and to "any additional area 
that may be substantially impacted by the proposed special use" as determined by the Zoning 
Commission. Chapter 13, Section 4(B) and Chapter 16 of the zoning ordinance requires only 
15 days' notice be given to property owners within 300 feet of the land being considered. 
R.O.A. 2006, p. 259. 
The Zoning Office gave appellants 15 days' notice as required by Chapters 13 and 16 
of the ordinance. In view of the county board's requirement that appellants needed expert 
evidence to prove that the applicant failed to comply with the plan and ordinance, rather than 
the other way around, the abbreviated 15 day notice period was completely inadequate to 
protect appellants' rights. 
Through its Road Superintendent, the county knew about Tungsten's intentions long 
before the zoning commission hearing in May. But the county did not mail notice of the 
application to appellants or otherwise provide public notice until May 2,2005, only two 
weeks before the hearing. R.O.A. 2005, p. 98. Appellants request for continuance of that 
hearing to submit expert evidence was denied. Appellants' subsequent request for 
continuance of the county board hearing was denied on the basis that appellants had not 
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obtained their expert evidence for the zoning hearing. This Catch 22 in the county's hearing 
process deprived appellants of due process. 
It is clear that the notice provisions in the zoning ordinance are inadequate to provide 
due process to impacted ntral communities. Farm and ranch properties generally exceed 300 
feet from all but their adjacent neighbors. In rural areas such as Porthill, the 300 foot 
limitation essentially restricts notice to ail but the two or three neighboring farms. The impact 
of a commercial gravel pit/rock quarry operation affects the entire community, not just the 
two adjacent neighbors. Such limited notice conflicts with I.C. section 67-6512(b). 
With only the nearest property owners notified, special use permits can be granted 
more or less in secret. Property owners or the county can quietly impose non-compatible uses 
without the impacted community being aware, as happened with the prior two special use 
permit applications in Porthill. Notice by publication is insufficient to directly notice all of 
the impacted property owners in a rural area. These limitations prevent due process and fair 
hearings. 
In planning and zoning decisions, due process requires an opportunity to present and 
rebut evidence. Cowan v. Board of C o r n ' s ,  supra. In its decision, the Board relied on a 
document, Appendix I of the Comprehensive Plan relating to mining, to support its decision 
granting the SUP. Although a public document, Appendix I is not generally available to the 
public. It was not provided to the public or made a part of the record. The Board's reliance 
on selected portions of an unknown document deprived appellants of due process. Other 
sections in Appendix I relating to Agriculture were purposefully omitted from the Board's 
decision. 
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6. TI-IE DECISION WAS MADE UPON UNLAWWL PROCEDURE AND 
DEPRIVED APPELLANTS OF DUE PROCESS IN THAT BOARD MEMBERS 
WERE NOT IMPARTIAL. 
Parties to a quasi-judicial land use hearing are entitled to a tribunal which is impartial 
in the matter -- i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question at 
issue. -cPreservation, 134 Idaho 65 1 (2000) , quoting Fasano v. 
Board of Countv Commissioners, 264 Ore. 574 (Ore. 1973). The county road 
superintendent's pre-hearing involvement in Tungsten's gravel pit, and the county board 
members' expressed interest in protecting its employee deprived appellants of the due process 
requirement of an unbiased hearing tribunal. 
The county board was also biased in their personal preference to obtain rock only from 
a board member's brother. Their bias permeated the hearings, and is expressed in the board's 
written findings. Finding 7 in the 2005 decision, "Transportation," ("readopted" as finding 
viii in the 2006 decision,) states that the special use permit would reduce "costs of road 
maintenance and upgrades by providing a local supply of suitable grade material for road 
use." R.O.A. 2006, p. 227,23 1. In the context of these proceedings, "suitable grade 
material" refers only to rock from the board member's brother's pit, not from any other pit in 
the area. The Board's expressed bias denied appellants a fair and impartial hearing. 
7. THE BOARD'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Board's actions may be reversed if the Court finds the Board acted arbitrarily, 
capriciously or abused it discretion. Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780,784 (2004). The 
Board abused its discretion by failing to comply with the Plan and ordinance, failing to 
provide an unbiased hearing on Tungsten's SUP, and making a decision based on personal 
preference and the desire to obtain rock from a board member's brother. 
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Except for renumbering the paragraphs and adding one redundant condition, the 2006 
findings and decision is a verbatim copy of the former decision. The board's "readoption" of 
a judicially nullified decision is arbitrary and capricious. 
Instead of taking an additional look at the case, the Board continued where it left off 
with the same decision and same conditions and same lack of expert evidence to show 
compliance with the Plan and ordinance. Such action is arbitrary and capricious. 
8. THE BOARD'S DECISION CONSTITUTES UNLAWFUL SPOT ZONING. 
"A claim of 'spot zoning' is essentially an argument that change in zoning is not in 
accord with the comprehensive plan. There are two types of 'spot zoning.' Type one spot 
zoning may simply refer to a rezoning of property for a use prohibited by the original zoning 
classification. The test for whether such a zone reclassification is valid is whether the zone 
change is in accord with the comprehensive plan. Type two spot zoning refers to a zone 
change that singles out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest 
of the zoning district for the benefit of an individual property owner. This latter type of spot 
zoning is invalid." Evans v. Teton Cou1t.t: 139 Idaho 71, 76-77 (2003), citing Dawson 
Enters., Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 514 (1977). 
It is clear from the "inevitable" decision that board members approved the special use 
permit and made findings around it to provide a special economic benefit to a board member's 
brother. From the inception of these proceedings, the Road Superintendent identified 
Tungsten as the county's rock provider of choice. The same rock from other sources was not 
"suitable." The intensive commercial mining use of Tungsten's property permanently 
changes the agricultural character of the Porthill area, as the rural atmosphere and continued 
usefulness for livestock production are severely compromised by such operation, if not 
completely devastated. 
The county's argument that Tungsten's pit provides a public benefit is an obvious 
excuse for singling out Tungsten for a special economic benefit. There is no competent 
evidence that Tungsten's rock is any better or different from the rock on other properties in 
the same area, or that the Board cannot economicaIly obtain rock from other areas. The 
/ /  gravel pit provides a personal economic benefit to a board member's brother, not to the 
public. The public pays for the rock either way. The same public benefit comes from rock 
from any source. Tungsten's SUP is clearly "type two" spot zoning, and is, therefore, invalid. 
9. APPELLANTS' SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN PREJUDICED. 
The Board's action granting the SUP prejudices appellants because the operation will 
/ /  disrupt their cattle breeding operation, the peaceful enjoyment of their property, and will 
11 devalue their property for any purpose. Appellants exhausted their administrative remedies /I under I.C. 67-6512 and I.C. 67-8003 (approval of a special use permit with conditions I /  unacceptable to the landowner may be subject to a regulatory taking analysis). The board's 
I/ regulatory takings analysis denying violation of appellants' vested property rights is arbitrary I I and capricious for all the reasons stated above, and must be overturned. 
10. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS. 
I/ Appellants are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to I I I.C. 12-117(1) which states, in part, that: 
(1) Unless othenvise provided by statute, in any 
administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a .  . . county . . . and a person, the court 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that 
the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
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I.A.R. 41(a) requires any party seeking attorney fees on appeal to assert such a claim 
as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party. Appellants 
herein complied with said section. 
I.A.R. 35(a)(5) requires appellants, seeking attorney fees on appeal, to so indicate in 
the division of issues and state the basis for the claim. Again, appellants have complied with 
this mle. 
Several recent Idaho Supreme Court cases are instructive on this issue and support an 
award of attorney fees to appellants. In Reardon v. Citv of Burley, 140 Tdaho 115 (2004), the 
Idaho Supreme Court quoted prior case law and stated: 
The purpose of I.C. 5 12-1 17 is two-fold: First, it serves 
"as a deterrent to groundless arbitrary agency action; and 
[second] it provides a remedy for persons who have borne 
unfair a id  unjustified financial burdens defending against 
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes 
agencies never should have made. 
Under the statute, attorney fees must be awarded if the court finds in favor of the appellant 
and further finds that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
~ t t o r n e ~  fees were awarded to the plaintiff in Reardon on the basis that the court 
determined that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law where an agency 
had no authority to take a particular action. In that case, a county ordinance was enacted 
contrary to the provisions of Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act. The court noted that the 
county's ability to make and enforce local regulations was dependent on the fact that the 
regulations were not in conflict with the general laws of the state of Idaho. Idaho Const. 
Art. XII, 5 2. 
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Although the county ordinance in Reardon involved areas of city impact, the argument 
is equally applicable in the instant case on the basis that respondent Boundary County enacted 
Chapter 7 Section l(E) in December, 2001 at a point in time after the Legislature repealed 
similar language in the earlier version of LC. 67-6512.. Accordingly, the county knew, or 
shouldhave known at the time of enactment of the ordinance, that the language contained 
therein had been expressly disapproved by the Legislature. 
Perhaps even more galling, however, is the fact that appellants' original Petition for 
Judicial Review, filed October 3,2005, raised this issue. Paragraph 5.A 4) of said Petition for 
Judicial Review stated: 
4) The decision of the Boundary County Board of 
Commissioners is in violation of LC. 67-651 2 in that a 
special use permit may be granted only if the proposed use 
is constitutionally permitted by the terms of the zoning 
ordinance. Bonner(sic) County Zoning Ordinance 
Chapter 7, section 1, relating to agriculture/forestry zones, 
does not allow a gravel pitlrock quarry operation as a 
conditional use in said zone. 
I 
I The issue was reasserted in appellants' Petition for Judicial Review filed 
September 1 I ,  2006 (see paragraph 5.A 2)). 
In Fischer v. Citv of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
awarded attorney fees against the City of Ketchum on the basis that the City wholly ignored a 
provision of its ordinance requiring certification by an Idaho licensed engineer prior to 
granting of a conditional use permit. Although the Boundary County ordinance does not 
expressly require expert testimony to support the issuance of a special use or conditional use 
permit, the provisions of Chapter 13: Special Uses Section 4: Application Procedure: 
subparagraph C.4) require the county to find that the proposed special use will not create 
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noise, traffic, odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses within 
the zone district. The failure of the county to require the applicant to provide any credible 
evidence whatsoever to meet this burden, and the resulting decision made by the county 
without any such evidence, falls within the same realm of prohibited conduct in that the 
county wholly ignored the provisions of its zoning ordinance. 
In County Residents Against Pollution from Septic Sludge (CRAPSS) v. Bonner 
m, 138 Idaho 585 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of attomey fees. 
In that case the District Court awarded plaintiffs attofney fees against respondent county. The 
county argued that it acted with a reasonable basis in fact because it simply followed its 
ordinance. However, in that case, the District Court held that the county had not followed its 
ordinance. The court held that when the county failed to follow its ordinance, it acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. In the Bonner County case, the county arbitrarjly dismissed 
plaintiffs' administrative appeal with no basis. In the instant case, as can be gleaned from the 
prepared decision that mirrored exactly the prior decision (with the exception of one 
condition), the county arbitrarily granted the special use permit with no basis under the 
ordinance for doing so. 
The standard for awarding attorney fees under I.C. 12-1 17 requires focusing on the 
overall action of the agency. Rincover v. State Dep't of Fin., 129 Idaho 442 (1996). In this 
case the overall action of the agency seems somewhat comparable to that of Bonner County in 
the case of w, supra. In that case the District Court awarded attomey fees to appellants. 
Although the Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds, a reading of the &t case 
reveals similarities to the instant case. 
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In m, the applicants applied for a variance; in this case Dinning applied for a 
special use permit. In both cases the application was denied by the planning and zoning 
commission. Jn. each case the board's actions and reasoning differed markedly from that of 
the planning and zoning cormnission. In each case there were allegations that the 
commissioners encouraged the applicant to apply (Dinning) and reapply (Harris). In each 
case the board of commissioners appeared to have reached a decision on the application prior 
to final hearing before the board. Although in m t ,  it was Harris who had ex parte contact 
with the commissioner, in this case it is the respondent county's road commissioner having ex 
parte contact. 
In each case bias of a decision-maker was a primary concern. The reason for this, of 
course, as set forth more fully above, is that the due process clause entitles a person to an 
impartial and disinterested tribunal. Bias of a board member renders that board member's 
participation in the due process hearing constitutionally unacceptable. Commissioner Dinning 
has, previously, been disqualified from the decision-making process for conflict of interest. In 
that case bias is presumed. Equally offensive, however, are the comments and statements of 
board chair Smith, especially with regard to the contention that the applicants had a "right" to 
have a gravel pit and that the granting of the same was "inevitable." Further evidence of bias 
can be found when chairman Smith promoted 12 days of blasting as opposed to the two that 
had been requested by the applicant. 
Commissioner Mueller criticized the decision of the zoning commission; 
commissioner Smith did as well. 
In analyzing the remarks of commissioner Mueller, the court noted that a decision- 
maker is not disqualified simply because he has taken a position and that, further, pre-hearing 
1 / MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -Page 40 3.5 
statements are not fatal to the validity of a zoning determination so long as the statement does 
not preclude the finding that the decision-maker maintained an open mind and continued to 
listen to all of the evidence. With regard to the issue of an open mind, it would appear as 
though the purpose behind deliberating, after closing of public hearing to testimony, is so that 
a decision-maker, as a result of hearing statements from fellow commission members, might 
have an opportunity to reflect and consider various points of view. The summary reading of a 
decision, without deliberation, modeled on the prior decision, is persuasive evidence that the 
respondent board did not come to a decision with an open mind. Just as Mueller's comments 
foretold the result in the case, the current board's lack of deliberation foretold the 
result of the proceedings in this case. 
Finally, in the instant case the county's desire to obtain rock from the gravel pit led to 
a conclusion, unsupported by evidence, that this rock was, apparently, the only suitable rock 
in the general area. 
The overall action of the agency in this case clearly discloses that the respondent acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law and, as a result thereof, appellants are entitled to 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Appellants are entitled to have the agency action set aside in whole. There is no need 
to remand for further proceedings. The reversal of the agency's decision is consistent with 
the provisions of I.C. 67-5279(3) in that the decision was: 
A. In violation of constitutional and statutory provisions; 
B. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
C. Made upon unlawful procedure; 
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D. Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as  a whole; and 
E. Arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. 
Respecthlly submitted this day of April, 2007. 
Attorney for ~ ~ G l l a n t s  
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this -iib day of April, 2007, I delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Boundary County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 3136 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FLRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT@ T 48- STATE OF IDAHO, W AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDAR 1 p& 57 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA CASE NO. CV-2 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
Petitioner, 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
) OF APPELLANTSTETITION 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF ) FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
COMMISSIONERS, 
1 
Respondent ) 
COMES NOW, TEVIS W. HULL, Boundary County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney and 
hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition of Appellants' Petition for Judicial 
Review of the decision of the Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
On March 22,2005, Tungsten Holding, Inc., filed an application for a special use permit to 
operate apermanent commercial gravel pit on seven (7) acres near Porthill, Boundary County, Idaho 
The Appellants' property is adjacent to the Respondent's property. (R.O.A. 2006, p.1-2) The 
appellants operate on their property a registered Angus cattle ranch, 
The President of Tungsten Holding, Inc., is Rick Dinning. Rick Dinning is the brother of 
Dan Dinning, a member of the Boundary County Board of Commissioners. (R.O.A. p. 216) On 
May 19,2005, the Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission held a public hearing and 
after that hearing the evidence was submitted and findings, a recommendation to the Boundary 
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County Board of Commissioner to deny the special use permit. (R.O.A. 2006 p183-184). However, 
the Boundary County Board of Co~nmissioners is charged with making the final decision. 
The Boundary County Board of Commissioners held a hearing on July 26, 2005, in which 
the Board tentatively approved the special use permit but took under advisement to determine 
whether or not mitigating conditions could be imposed. A subsequent hearing was held on August 
8, 2005, in which Board of County Commissioners approved the special use permit subject to 
suggested conditions. Dan Dinning participated in the hearing but abstained from voting. (C.T. 
8/8/05 p.l:23, p 39:24-25, p41:14-25, p. 42:l-4). On September 6, 2005, the Board of County 
Commissioners met once again to address the Findings prepared by Zoning Coordinator, Mike 
Weland. No public discussion was permitted and Dan Dinning did not participate in the discussions 
and abstained from voting. (C.T. 9/6/05 p.18, R.O.A. 2006, p.172-174). 
On September 13,2005, the Appellants filed a Request for Regulatory Taking pursuant to 
Idaho Code 67-8003. On September 27,2005, the Board of County Commissioners denied that the 
taking of Appellants' property had occurred. The Appellants filed a Petition for Judicial Review on 
October 3, 2005. (R.O.A. 2006, p.218). Pursuant to the filing of the Judicial Review and further 
negotiations between the Appellants and the County, on April 30,2006, the palties stipulated that 
Dan Dinning's participation in the previous hearings constituted a conflict of interest and that the 
special use permit previously granted should be voided. In addition, the parties stipulated that the 
matter would be remanded for a new hearing without Commissioner Dinning's participation. That 
stipulation was memorialized and signed by the Court on May 26,2006. (R.O.A. 2006, p.216-217) 
A new hearing took place on July 24,2006, and additional testimony was presented both in 
favor of and in opposition against the special use permit. The Appellants presented to the Board of 
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County Commissioners two additional written documents including a letter dated July 19, 2006, 
written by Pat and Ada Gardiner and a letter dated July 17,2006, from Kristine Uhlman, R.G., who 
was hired by Pat and Ada Gardiner providing a hydrogeology analysis of the proposed special use 
permit and its potential affects on the Gardiner property. In addition, the Appellants provided a 
report from theMichigan State University Extension entitled "Getting the COW Herd Bred." Finally, 
the Gardiners also presented a list of approvals and disapprovals of requests from individuals for 
gravel pit operations in certain geographical locations. It was also stated at the July 24,2006, public 
hearing by John Topp, the Attorney for the Board of County Commissioners, "The previous record 
of the board heard pursuant to this stipulation is part of this record as well as basically everything 
that you have heard before you can utilize and make in your decision, you can go back through and 
review that information as necessary. Also we stipulated that it would be back before the County 
Commissioners for a hearing andCommissionerDanDinning, therecordneeds to reflect, is not even 
present within this room. . ." (C.T. 7/24/06 p.2-4) At the conclusion of the hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement and the hearing was rescheduled for August 7,2006. (C.T. 8/7/06 p. 1) The 
Commissioners approved the special use permit affirming the findings that had been voided by the 
Court due to the conflict of interest allegations. Moreover, an additional condition was placed on 
the special use permit. Again the Appellants filed a request for regulatory taking on August 29, 
2006. On September 26,2006, the County denied that a taking had occurred. The Appellants have 
now fiIed this petition for judicial review. 
I1 
STANDARD OF REVlEW 
This appeal is filed in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act ("IAPA"), 
Title 67, Chapter 52 of Idaho Code. The court reviews the decision of a governmental agency under 
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the standards set forth in the IAPA, and in accordance with Idaho Code Section 67-5270(2), which 
states: 
"A person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a contested 
case is entitled to juridical review under this chapter if the person complies with the 
requirements of Sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code." 
There is no issue that the County is treated as an administrative agency for the purpose of 
judicial review. The court has solidified this position, see Allen v Blaine County, 131 Idaho 138, 
140,953 P.2d578,580(1998), SouthforkCoalition vBoard of Commissioners, 117 Idaho 857,860, 
The scope of review is set forth in Idaho Code Section 67-5279 which provides in part as 
follows: 
"(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 
(2) When the agency was not required by provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of law to base its action exclusively on a record, the court shall 
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the action was:. . . 
(3). . . the court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon the unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the 
petitioner have been prejudiced." (Emphasis added) 
Thus, the function of the reviewing court is to determine whether the decision of the County 
is supported by substantial evidence, and if so, whether the conclusions properly apply the law in 
relation to the facts as found. The court should be guided by Howard v Canvon Countv Board of 
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Commissioners, 128 Idaho 497,480, 915 P.2d 709, 710 (1996), in determining "There is a strong 
presumption of the validity favoring the actions of zoning authorities." Id. "The County's findings 
of fact are upheld if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. The court must defer 
to the agency findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." See Castaneda 11 Brighton Corn., 
130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998) citing Southfork Coalition v Board of 
Commissioners, 117 Idaho 857,860,792 P.2d 882,885 (1990). Further, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has indicated that "the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Id. (Emphasis added) 
The district court must not interfere with the County's substantiative decision making 
process. It is essential to note that the term "substantial evidence" does not refer to a particulal- 
quantum of evidence, but rather "substantial" requires that there be evidence that is sufficient in 
quantity and value that reasonable minds could conclude that there is evidence supporting the 
decision. Owen v Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 559 P.2d 1021 (1979) (emphasis in original). The 
Supreme Court in Mancilla v Greg, 13 1 Idaho 685,687 (1980), defines ''substantial and competent 
evidence." The court stated: 
"Substantial and competent evidenceis more than a scintilla of proof, but less 
than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
to support a conclusion. Where conflicting evidence is presented that is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence, the findings of the commission must be 
sustained on appeal regardless of whether this court may have reached a different 
conclusion." Mancilla 131 Idaho at 687 (citation omitted) 
Regardless of whether the petitioners or the court may have reached a different decision than 
that of the Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission and that of the County, the decision 
of the County must be upheld by this court. 
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ISSUES 
Did the Boundary County Board of Commissioners action violate Idaho Code Section 67- 
6512? 
Does the Boundary County Board of Commissioners' decision conflict with the 
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinances? 
Was the Boundary County Board of Commissioners' decision supported by substantial 
evidence on the record? 
Did the Boundary County Boardof Commissioners' decision fail to comply with ldaho Code 
67-6535? 
Do the Appellants have standing to bring this appeal? 
Did the Boundary County Board of Commissioners adopt unlawful procedures and deprive 
the Appellants of due process? 
Did the actions of the Board of County Commissioners deprive the Appellants of due process 
based upon impartiality? 
Was the Boundary County Board of Commissioners decision arbitrary and capricious and 
an abuse of discretion? 
Were substantial rights of the Appellants prejudiced? 
Does the Board of County Commissioners' decision constitute unlawful spot zoning? 
Is the county entitled to attorneys' fees? 
1. Did the Boundary County Board of Commissioners action violate ldaho Code 
Section 67-6512? 
No. Idaho Code Section 67-6512 provides in part in subparagraph (a): "As part of a zoning 
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ordinance each governing hoard may provide by ordinance adopted, amended, or repealed in 
accordance with the notice and hearing procedures provided under section 67-6509, Idaho Code, for 
the processing of applications for special or conditional use permits. A special use permit may be 
granted to an applicant if the uroposed use is conditionally permitted hv the terms of the ordinance, 
subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the ability of 
political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the proposed use, and when 
it is not in conflict with the plan . . . " (Emphasis added) 
The appellant argues that the Code 67-6512 specifically provides that the special use permit 
may be granted to an applicant "if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the 
ordinance." The position taken by the Appellants is narrow inits scope and application. Appellants' 
position more correctly would be stated that unless it is a conditional use permit it cannot be a 
special use permit. The term used in the statute does not provide that special use permits are the 
same as conditional use permits. The statute specifically provides that "a special use permit may be 
granted to an applicant i f  the proposed useis conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance ..." 
If intent of the statute was to say that there must be a conditional permit, it would logically follow 
then that there would be no need for special use permits. One must look at the county ordinances 
to determine if special use permits are conditionally permitted within the ordinance. 
Pursuant to Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7, Section 
I ,  subparagraph (e) it provides "Any use not specified in this section as a use by right or conditional 
use is eligible for consideration as a special use, subject to the provisions of Chapter 13." Therefore, 
the ordinance conditionally permits special use permits subject Chapter 13 of the Boundary County 
Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06. Variations of special use permits are defined in Chapter 
13, Section 1, subparagraph (A) "Special Uses are uses which, by their nature, are significantly more 
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intensive than the permitteduses in azoned district, but which can be carried out with paticular safe 
guards to insure compatibility with suli-ounding land uses. Special Uses are, therefore, subject to 
restrictions, requirements and conditions more sttingent than those applying generally within the 
zoned district." It is clear that Idaho Code Section 67-6512 provides counties a mechanism to 
process applications for special or conditional use permits as part of their zoning regulations. 
Special use permits may be allowed with conditions attached to extent provided in local ordinances 
subject to the ability of local government to provide services if appropriate for the proposed use, and 
when the use is, as proposed, not in conflict with the comprehensive plan. 
The issue raised by the appellants is also addressed by Mike Weland, the Planning Director 
for Boundary County, at the July 24, 2006, public hearing. Stated by M k e  Weland, "...The 
agciculture/forestry zone district encompasses over 85% of the land area in Boundary County and 
it is by far the most predominant zoning in Boundary County. Rural community commercial zoning, 
which allows both residential and commercial development, comprises of less than 1% of the land 
area in Boundary County situated primarily in community centers in areas zoned for higher density 
development. Industrial zoning comprises of a fraction of 1% of the land area currently situated 
solely at the Boundary County airport and at two locations at three mile. Further, the Boundary 
County Zoning and Planning Ordinance defines commercial use as a use or structure intended 
primarily for conduct for retail trade of goods or services and industrial use as use of a partial or 
development of a structure intend primarily for the manufacture, assembly or finishing of products 
intended primarily for wholesale distribution. Boundary County Comprehensive Plan identifies 
minerals as a natural resource and note that nonmetallic mineral resource in the county may have an 
economic impact greater than that of metallic. Same gravel and crushed rocks are produced at 
minimal costs at various locations in the county. Deposits of sand and gravel are found in abundance 
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at lower elevations within the valley. Crushed rock is obtained from crushing operations at rock 
quarry sites with mineral deposits found at various locations throughout the county. Minerals are 
vital to the health and prospelity of not only to our area, but to the nation as a whole. In the first road 
and building rock, sand, gravel and related material have been mined here in abundance. Pits and 
quarries can be found throughout the county and are too numerous to list. Because the costs of roads 
and materials for building whatever materials were found on federal land and close to the area where 
to be used, they were mined. Mining for sand and gravel for road building and construction has been 
and remains a huge economic importance to Boundary County. Every road has gravel pits that were 
used during construction and remain in use as needed through the years. Boundary County Zoning 
and Subdivision Ordinance does not specifically refer to mining gravel pits or rock quarry in any 
district. Therefore, such use may be considered as a special use in any zoned district. 
Based upon a reference made on the importance of mining in the comprehensive plan, i t  is 
unreasonable to assume that mining would be prohibited use in all zoned districts based simply on 
specific mention. It is recognized that miningis commercial as are agriculture and forestry. It is also 
recognized that mining is an extension of a natural resource and mining can only be accomplished 
where the resource exists. 
Again, it is important to stress that the narrow reading of the appellants would have the cou11 
conclude that the term conditionally permitted as used in Idaho Code 67-6512, would be the same 
as a conditional use permit. By mere definition, a conditional use permit is different from a special 
use permit. Had Boundary County's ordinance been silent as to allow for a special use permit in the 
particular zonedarea, then thecounty would be prohibitedfrom granting a special use permit. Given 
the forethought of the Commissioners in adopting the ordinances provided that special use permits 
can be conditionally permitted according to the terms of their ordinance. 
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2. Does the Boundary County Board of Commissioners' decision conflict with the 
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinances? 
No. The decision holds firm on the protection of private property rights expressed in the 
comprehensive plan. "Boundary County policy will advocate the rights of property ownership 
recognizing the prima se of private property rights and sanctity of private property ownership as 
annunciated in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Articles 1 and Article 14 of 
the Idaho Constitution. There is no doubt that the Appellants feel that there is a competing interest 
in the approval of the special use permit. However, they have failed to recognize that the use of a 
special use permit granted is compatible with the Appellants' own use of their land. The concerns 
of the Appellants were specifically stated within the findings and decisions regarding the special use 
permit in this case which were duly noted and taken into consideration in approving the special use 
permit. Blasting was limited to 12 week days during a calendar year between the hours of 8:00 a.m. 
to S:00 p.m. In addition, the crushing operation would only be allowed from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
on Monday through Friday between the dates of February 15, and May 2 of each year. (See Finding 
and Conditions of Special Use Permit) There was not factual information presented by either the 
appellants or anyone in opposition to the special use permit that would demonstrate to the 
Commissioners that there would be any adverse effect on the community as a whole. There are only 
five residences within a mile radius of the proposed gravel pit. 
As previously stated, the commissioners reviewed the information provided by the Appellants 
from their expert, Knstine Ulhman. On page five of her report, she draws generalized conclusions 
such as "due to the complicated nature of fracture rock, fractures important to the performance of 
the irrigation well be intersected or the elevation of fracture drainage could be changed. It is 
obvious that any fractures that may have contributed to the imgation well that are within the area of 
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excavation drain as much as 100 feet, the maximum dept of excavation in the hill side. The 
effect of such drainage from the aquifer could reduce or alter ground water flow to the irrigation 
 ell." Furthermore, she went on to state on page six of her evaluation in the last full paragraph 
"...Excavation to a depth greater than 1840 . . . result in drainage of important fractures 
providing water to the well." (Emphasis added) 
In rebuttal, Rick Dinning made valid points stating, "Regarding the letter from Knstine 
Ulhman, the expert, I will remind you that she was employed by the Gardiners to assess the potential 
for water loss to the property as a result of our rock pit. In her conclusions, conclusion one she says 
there is a risk of dewater aquifer fractures. There is also a risk that the well could run dry from over 
use. Now this is what I am saying now, there is also a risk that the well could run dry from over use 
by irrigating too heavily, there is also a risk that the drought could cause the well to change, there 
being also a risk that the Gardiners' electric fence could start a wild fire which would cause 
irreparable harm to Tungsten Holdings and property. The world is full of risk. Her conclusion two 
the pit would induce drainage that could dewater aquifer fractures. Just south of our pit site are 
exposed cliffs and cuts made into the rock faces where, when the railroad was built in this area, I 
have never seen water running out of these rock faces. It is also interesting to note that based on Ms. 
Ulhman's letterand a well driller's report filed with the Idaho Department of Water Resources, all 
hut five gallons per minute of the water located in the irrigation well was found at the elevation of 
1,727 to 1,747 feet above sea level or lower. The bottom of our pit will be the valley floor which 
will be 1,760 feet above sea level. We will be a minimum of 33 to 55 feet above the elevations. Mr. 
Minden, the well driller, found 89.6% of the water when he drilled. Getting back to her point that 
it could dewater, could is not the same word as will. Could means might or mav perhaps or 
possibility will. I could run for president or I could rob a bank, I will probably will not . . . " 
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(Emphasis added) He was using extreme examples in his argument, however, his point is certainly 
well taken. There is nothing of a definitive nature that talked about scientific probability of damage 
to the cattle operation of the Appellants. Nor is there any indication in the repol? authored by 
Michigan StateUniversity Extension that would draw anyone to the conclusion that a rock crushing 
pit would cause infertility or abortions of cattle, but only provided general information with regard 
to inseminated cows being put in a minimum stress situation as possible. 
The Board of County Commissioners was not provided any information which would show 
any substantial adverse effects or would create hazards to the adjacent property owners. In the 
findings adopted by the Commissioners, they took into consideration, private property rights, 
population, economic factors, land use factors, natural resource factors, hazardous areas, public 
services facilities and utilities, transportation, recreation and community design. Each of those areas 
for consideration are outlined in the comprehensive plan. 
3. Was the Boundary County Board of Commissioners' decision supported by 
substantial evidence on the record? 
In addition to what has been stated above, it is imperative to recognize that making a decision 
as a board it is a matter of discretion. Specifically, in approving a special use permit, the 
Commissioners are directed tomake appropriate conditions in a special use permit that would protect 
the consistency of the comprehensive plan. Therefore, the Commissioners made specific condition 
to the approval of the special use permit, which include roads and access that must be approved by 
the Boundary County Road and Bridge; dust abatement; operations of the pit that follow the best 
management practices for mining for Idaho, published by the Idaho Department of Lands on 
November 16, 1992, or as updated; blasting conditions which require 15 day notification in advance 
specifying the date, time and length of blasting, and that all blasting must meet OSHA requirements 
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established at 29 CFR, subpart U; that the pit must comply with all Idaho Department of Lands 
Reclamation Plan; all persons employed to blast must be qualified, licensed and insured; and any 
persons employed to conduct blasting operations shall be notified prior to blasting of the concerns 
expressed during the hearing process of the potential damage to area water systems including Trow 
Creek Water Association. Both the written documentation and oral testimony taken substantially 
support the decision made by the Commissioners to approve the special use peimit. 
4. Did the Boundary County Board of Commissioners' decision fail to comply with 
Idaho Code 67-6535? 
Idaho Code Section 67-6535 (a) provides "The approval or denial of any application provided 
for in this chapter shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth in the 
comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or 
county." 
Subparagraph (b) provides "The approval or denial of any application provided for in this 
chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by the reason statement that explains the criteria and 
standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and explains the 
rational for the decision based upon the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant 
ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual information 
contained in the record." 
In addition to Idaho Code 67-6535, Boundary County ordinance requires that the final 
decision of the special use must be in accordance with paragraph (g) of Chapter 13, Section 4(g) 
which states that the decision be in writing setting forth the reason for the decision and the ordinance 
sections referred to by the county which is a more restrictive standard than that stated in Idaho Code 
67-6535. Specifically, the findingsdraw attention to theconcerns expressed by surrounding property 
RESPONDENT'S BREF - PAGE 13 96 
owners, most notability regarding the potential adverse effects of blasting on surround water well 
and the Trow Creek Water Association and the increase dust and noise. Taking into consideration 
those factors, the Board of County Commissioners made findings to address those concerns and also 
made a finding to mitigate and establish terms and conditions that would address those concerns of 
the surrounding public. In addition, the concerns with regard to road dust, noise, blasting, were all 
concerns that were addressed by the Board of Commissioners. Therefore, the Board of County 
Commissioners was not in violation of Idaho Code 67-6535, nor were they in violation of their own 
county ordinance in paragraph (g) of Chapter 14, Section 4(g). 
We are left to conclude that the Appellants are simply disgruntled. That the County 
Commissioners did not agree with their position. Appellants attempt to allege that the 
Commissioners misapplied law and implied that evidence imposed special use permit was ignored 
and somehow the Appellants' evidenceand testimony should bemorecompellingto thecounty. The 
Commissioners chose to rely upon all evidence in the record. 
If Court were to reverse and remand the actions of the county, then there would be no need 
for elected officials to made decision and interpret their own ordinances, as opposing parties could 
say to the court, "I disagree with the decision made by the governmental agency" and the court would 
be left to decide the issue of permits. Obviously, such a proposition is not recognized in the law and 
substitutes reason the governmental decision for activism. The Commissioners made the proper 
written finding and acknowledged the concerns of the Appellants in the written conditions of the 
special use permit. 
5. Do the Appellants have standing to bring this appeal? 
The party attacking a planning and zoning board's decision, in this case, the decision of the 
County, under Idaho Code 67-5279, first must illustrate that the County enedin amanner specified 
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in Idaho Code 67-5279(3) and then must show a substantial right of the party has been prejudice. 
Pavette River Prop. Owners Assn. v Board of Commissioners, 132 Idaho 554,976 P.2d 480 (citing 
Castaneda v Brighton Com., 130 Idaho 923,926, 950 P.2d 1262,1265 (1998)) (citing Amgstman 
v Citv of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409,412 (Ct.App. 1996). (Emphasis added) 
In Troutner v Kemothorne, 142 Idaho 389, 128 P.3d 926 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court 
summarized the law of standing as follows: 
"Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this court before 
reaching the merits of the case." Young v Citv of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 
P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking 
relief and not on the issue the party wishes to have adjudicated." Miles v Idaho 
Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). To satisfy the 
requirement of standing, "Litigants generally must allege or demonstrate any injury 
in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or 
redress the claimed injury." Id. 'The injury must be distinct and palpable and not be 
one suffered alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction." Selkirk-Priest Basin Assn., Inc. 
v State ex rel, BATT, 128 Idaho 831,833-34,919 P.2d 1032,1034-35 (1996). There 
must also be a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the 
challenge to conduct. Young v Citv of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 
(2002). An interest as a concerned citizen in seeing that govelnment abides by the 
law does not confer standing. Id 128 P.3d 928. (emphasis added) 
Based upon the above, the court held the plaintiffs in Troutner lacked standing to seek an 
order enjoining the governor's alleged violation of Idaho Code Section 1-2101(1) by appointing a 
republican to the judicial counsel. Idaho Code 67-5270(1)(2) states: 
"(1) Judicial review of an agency action shall be governed by the provisions 
of this chapter unless other provision of law is applicable to the particular matter. 
(2) A person ap-grieved by an agency action other than an order in a contested 
case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with the 
requirements of 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code." (emphasis added) 
Idaho Code Section 67-5270(2) is clear and unambiguous in that an appeal may only be 
undertaken by "aperson aggrieved by an agency action." To bean "aggrieved person" with standing 
to appeal the County's decision, the prerequisite of being aggrieved must first be met. In order to 
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be "aggrieved," there must be a substantial property light that is adversely affected. This 
proposition is found in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(4), which states: 
"(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
seetion, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the 
petitioner have been ~reiudiced. (Emphasis added) 
A disagreement with the County's interpretation of its own ordinance does not confer 
standing. In addition, the petitioners claim that they were not able to be fully heard. The Idaho 
Supreme Court in Sweilzer v. Dean, 118 Id 568,573,798 P.2d 27.32 (1990) stated "The due process 
requirement of opportunity to be heard is fulfilled if the opportunity is at a meaningful time and in 
a meaningful manner." 
Merely filing an appeal and disagreeing with the County's decision does not provide a basis 
for judicial review that would allow the petitioners to pursue this appeal. 
The petitioners have not cited one issue that would allow them relief by the Court. Due 
process rights accrue only when there has been actual or potential deviation of a property right, and 
said proposition has been dealt with repeatedly in the court in determination of standing. This 
principal has been unwavering even where a property right is attached to real property. Sweitzer v. 
L&m, 118 Idaho 568,798 P.2d 27 (1990) 
The record in this case discloses that there were multiple hearings on the proposed special 
use. The County's decision must be upheld under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act unless 
there is a showing by the petitioner that his rights have been prejudice. The petitioners have made 
absolutely no factual representation supported by the record that they have asserted a cognizable 
right upon which to claim a basis for standing. 
The petitioner cannot obtain the status of standing absent being an "aggrieved person" within 
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the meaning of the statute. In the standing analysis, the petitioner must show that he has what has 
been identified an "affected person." Again, as stated, the district court must first find that the 
petitioner has standing in order to bring this action. The court cannot reach the merits of the case 
until such determination is made. Young v City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102,44 P.3d 1157 (2002). 
A person wishing to invoke acourt's jurisdiction must have standing to raise the issue to be litigated. 
Id. It is not enough that the party is a concerned citizen that seeks to insure that a governmental 
entity abides by the law. Thomas v City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,50P.3d488 (2002). "To have 
standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that 
judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. Just because the petitioner 
is opposed to the County's determination in this case does not confer standing. 
The court can look for more guidance in determining whether or not the petitioner has 
standing by reviewing Glen~rv-Gemlin Protective Ass'n. v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84 (Ct.App. 1983). In 
that case GIenerv-Gemlin Protective Ass'n. appealed the issuance of a conditional use permit by 
Bonner County to Forest M. Bird for the construction of a commercial air transport base. In making 
their determination that the association have standing as an affected person, the court cited the 
U.S. Supreme Court's summarization of the rules of organizational standing as set forth in 
Washington Auule Advertizing Commission, 432 U.S. 333,343,97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 
3 (1977). Although difficult to tell by the pleadings, the case before the court is not about 
organizational standing. However, the guidance given by the court in Glennrr as to the procedural 
requirement in order to confer standing is very instructive. As part of the procedural requirements 
for standing, the court in Glenpry (Id. 88) stated: 
In determining whether these tests had been satisfied the court should 
examine the pleadings and any supplementary materials filed . . . " 
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The court must review the pleadings of the petitioner in order to determine whether there 
have been sufficient allegations supported by the record to support standing. In the present case as 
indicated, there have been no allegations that would confer any standing rights to the petitioners. 
In other words, the petitioners have failed to articulate absolutely any facts that would indicate that 
they have been "aggrieved" by the action being appealed. Again, it is not sufficient that an 
individual disagrees with a decision by the County to be "aggrieved." Simply stated, disagreement 
does not equal standing. 
There are no allegations by the petitioners identifying a particularized ham to a legally 
protected interest. There is no allegation or support in the record that the petitioners have been 
aggrieved by the County's decision as defined in law. The Idaho Supreme Court in Miles v Idaho 
Power Co, I16 Idaho 635,778 P.2d 757 (1989) andin Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v State, 128 Idaho 
831,919 P.2d 1032 (1996), examined the issue of what type of injury must be alleged in order to 
obtain standing. In making its determination cited for authority the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Duke Power Co. v Carolina Env Studv Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 SUP:C~. 2620, 2630, 57 
L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). The Court in Q&g stated: 
"The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke 
the court's jurisdiction has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation 
upon which the court so depends . . . , as refined by subsequent reformation, this 
requirement of a 'personal stake' has come to be understood to require not only a 
'distinct palpable injury' to the plaintiff, but also 'fairly traceable' causal connection 
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has upheld this concept and in Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v State, 
(Supra 833) wherein the court stated: 
'The injury must be distinct and palpable and not be one suffered alike by all 
citizens in the jurisdiction . . . (stating that 'an interest,' as a concerned citizen, in 
seeing that government abides by the law does not confer standing'). Although the 
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record has testimony in opposition to the planned unit development, the petitioner 
has not alleged any facts that would support 'injury in fact' to a legally protected 
interest of the petitioner." 
The united states Supreme Court further detailed the elements necessary to demonstrate an 
"injury in fact" in Luian v Defenders of Wildlife, 112 SUP.Ct. 2130 (1992), the court in Luian 
stated: 
"The plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' - an invasion of a legally 
protected interest, which is (a) concrete and particularized, . . . ; and (b) 'actual or 
immanent', not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,' second, there must be causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be 
'fairly. . . traceable' to the challenged action of the defendant and not . . . [the] result 
[of! the independent action of some third party not before the court. . . third, i t  must 
be 'likely' as opposed to merely 'speculative' that the injury will be 'redressed by a 
favorable decision'." 
Again, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate that they have standing in their own right 
by alleging an "injury in fact" as an "aggrieved person" or that this action will protect any property 
interest that they have. Petitioners have simply failed to allege any "injury in fact" whatsoever and 
have not demonstrated an "injury in fact." Therefore, it is impossible for the petitioners to seek 
redress by this court as the petitioners are simply not "aggrieved" under the law. 
The petitioners cannot show how any injury could arise by allowing the special use as 
approved by the Caunty to proceed forward. The petitioners have failed to cite absolutely any errors 
associated with the findings and decision. Therefore, unless the petitioner can allege a legal basis for 
being an "aggrieved person" alleging an "injury in fact," they simply do not have standing to 
proceed. Where standing cannot be adequately demonstrated, dismissal must follow. Thus, because 
the petitioners have failed to show any basis for standing, the Court must dismiss this appeal 
In addition, pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6535(c), "...only those whose challenge to a decision 
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demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall 
be entitled to a remedy or reversal of the decision." The Appellants have presented to the Board of 
County, Commissioners their own personal opinion with regard to potential hazards to their- 
embryonic breeding cattle and a potential hazard to their water system. However, they are dealing 
in the realm of possibility, but there is not actual harm that has been caused to the Appellants and, 
therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6535 they are not entitled to a remedy or a reversal of the 
County Commissioners' decision. 
The Appellant has shown no actual harmor aviolation of afundamental right, and, therefore, 
cannot use the court system for judicial review to seek a remedy. 
6. Did the Boundary County Board of Commissioners adopt unlawful procedures 
and deprive the Appellants of due process? 
Idaho Code 67-6512(b) provides for the notice requirements for special use permits. In 
reviewing the Appellants' brief they are acknowledging they were given the proper notice 
requirements provided by Idaho Code 67-6512, however, they are objecting that the notice 
requirement pursuant to that statute is inadequate to protect their due process rights. However, they 
do not make a claim that the statute in and of itself is unconstitutional in its creation and application. 
The central focus is Appellants' inability to gather the necessary expert testimony to support the 
Appellants' position. However, the Appellants were able to provide a hydrogeologist, as well as, 
information from an animal science university and present that information to the Commissioners 
at the July 24, 2006, hearing. Not only did they receive that opportunity on July 24, 2006, but 
because of the previous hearings that they were involved in which resulted in the voiding of the 
original use permit, they certainly had been put on notice of over a year that they would perhaps need 
to present information that would support actual harm to themselves. They choose not to do that. 
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The Commissioners wanted to give everyone an opportunity to heard, in addition to the previous 
hearings, that opportunity came and went and it was their fault that they feel that their due process 
was violated. 
7. Did the actions of the Board of County Commissioners deprive the Appellants 
of due process based upon impartiality? 
The County recognizes that impartiality is an important role in any type of legislative or 
judicial body. The taint due to a conflict of interest had been stipulated to by the parties in the May 
26,2006, Order of the Court remanding this matter back for rehearing. Both parties stipulated that 
the previous hearings could be used for the bases of the Commissioners' decision and now they are 
attempting to come back and say that the taint once removed but has returned even though Dan 
Dinning was not present. 
The Petitioners' position is that the decision made by Commissioners Smith and Kirby would 
always be tainted if they agreed to follow the previous decision to approve the special use permit. 
It is a dammed if you do and dammed if you don't argument. There was no information presented 
during any of the hearings to suggest that either Commissioners Smith and Kirby were interested in 
providing work to their fellow Commissioner's brother. In any event, that taint was removed by 
stipulation of the parties when they allowed Commissioners Smith and Kirby to decide the matter 
without the presence and input of Commissioner Dinning. 
8. Was the Boundary County Board of Commissioners decision arbitrary and 
capricious and an abuse of discretion? 
No. The Appellants failed to recognize that the original decision plus Lhe addition of one 
additional condition was a well-reasoned decision by the Commissioners. The Appellants simply 
object because they do not like the decision of the Commissioners. There are not any suggestions 
by the Appellants of what the Commissioners could have done differently, except deny the request. 
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They accept expert testimony presented the Appellant, they reviewed that information, they made 
a decision and they moved on. That does not qualify as arbitrary and capricious. 
9. Were substantial rights of the Appellants be prejudice? 
No. All the due process rights afforded to the Appellant have been given with regard to 
proper notice, oppoitunity to be heard at the hearings, administrative remedies pursuant to Idaho 
Code 67-6512 and Idaho Code 67-803. There has been actual harm, just a mentioned a mere 
possibility by the Appellants and dissatisfaction of the Commissioners' decision. 
10. Does the Board of County Commissioners' decision constitute unlawful spot 
zoning? 
The Appellants in this case think that rock that would be found in the proposed pit i f  the 
special use permit were granted would be the same rock that would be found in other gravel pits i n  
the general location. Testimony was given by RickDinning which provided an overview of location 
of the site and what could be found. He stated: 
"Once again I'd like to state there's a real need for a rock quarry and gravel 
pit in the northern part of Boundary County. The closest pit with a rock source of 
this type of located approximately 23 miles south of ourproposed site. Currently, the 
closest pit with crushedrock available to buy is theRedi-Mix pitnear Moyie Springs, 
approximately 30 miles away. We have met all the requirements with the State 
regarding having a pit. We have an approved reclamation plan on file with the State 
and county and the pit area has a recorded survey showing it to be 7 acres, as required 
at our first meeting. This pit is important to Tungsten for our own uses and to the 
residents at the north end of the county. I have been personally contacted by farmers 
in the Kootenai Valley wondering when they can purchase rock to stabilize the river 
bank as we've had uh some high water lately, and for rock for their driveways. They 
can't afford to truck the amount of rock needed from 23 to 30 miles away. 
Additionally, with Boundary County experiencing a period of growth in population 
like I have not witnessed in 48 years here, there is an increasing need for rock 
products, whether it be for landscaping or base for roads or fine crushed for finished 
surfaces. The price of rural property has risen to the extent that the local wage 
earning families have great difficulty affording the dream of owning a place in the 
country to raise their children in a rural lifestyle. With the desire to keep and create 
good paying jobs in Boundary County, certain infrastructure must be in place to 
attract and retain business. The cost to haul rock material at a minimum of 23 to 30 
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miles is quite a constraint to any sort of development in the State Highway 1 area of 
Boundary County. Without the ability to obtain less expensive raw materials, the 
dream of rural life will be relegated to those people who are independently wealthy 
and do not rely on our local economy to make a living. One of the arguments made 
against our proposed site was that there are already 3 rock pits in the area. The 
Munson pit is an entirely different sort of rock; it is round, tumbled stones with a lot 
of dirt and sand. This type of rock is unacceptable for road building because it does 
not adequately compact. There is not crushed rock available there. The Bushnell pit 
was subdivided by Mr. Bushnell in 2005 and sold in several pieces. It was never in 
production. The Ponsness pit has no crushed rock. Currently, you cannot buy a load 
of crushed rock in the Porthill area, unless you import it from Canada. One of the 
reasons for this is because there are certain fixed costs required to open and create a 
rock pit of sufficient size to be viable. Rock of different sorts and sizes must he on 
hand and stockpiled. This is an expensive process with no guarantee of return. The 
average individual is not able to put the finances into developing a pit whereas 
Tungsten Holdings is able to and has. We chose the location for our pit with many 
factors in mind. Our site borders a county maintained road. Access to our pit is 
entirely on Tungsten property to the county road. The closest neighbor IS 
approximately 8/10 of a mile away by road. Within one mile radius of the site, there 
are only five residences, one of which is now vacant." 
This testimony was unrebutted. The actions of the Commissioners do not constitute split 
zoning. 
11. Is the county entitled to attorneys' fees? 
Idaho Codesections 12-121 and 12-1 17 form the basis for an award of attorneys' fees against 
the petitioner in this case. Attorneys' fees may be awarded under Idaho Code Section 12-121 if the 
court finds the actions were defended frivolously reasonably or without foundations. In addition, 
Idaho Code 12-1 17 provides "unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county, or other taxing 
district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness 
fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds the party against whom the judgment is rendered 
acted without some reasonable basis in fact or law." 
The County is of the position that the petitioners' appeal in this matter rises to the level for 
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an award of attomeys' fees and costs. Petitioners in t.his case have frivolously andlor without some 
reasonable basis in fact or law brought this appeal. The petitioners simply disagreed with the 
County's determination and desires this court to subplant its finding for that of the county and as 
such the petitioners' appeal is frivolous. The County is entitled statutorily to collect its costs and 
attomeys' fees in defending this cause of action. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The function of the reviewing court is to determine whether the county's findings are 
supported by substantial evidence, and if so, whether the conclusions properly apply the ordinance 
to the facts as found. In the present case, the petitioners disagree with the facts found by the County. 
The decision of the County cannot be reversed by this court unless it finds that findings of the 
County are clearly erroneous. Despite the assumed alleged of error by the County, Idaho Code 
Section 67-5279(4) requires this court to affirm the actions of the County, unless substantial rights 
of the petitioner have been prejudiced. The petitioner has failed to meet the threshold of standing, 
and again, mere disagreement with the County's decision does not equate to a determination that 
substantial rights have been prejudiced. The factual determinations made by the county can only be 
overturned where the court finds that the facts found are clearly erroneous, but only after resolving 
the threshold of standing in favor of the petitioners. 
The county has required its legal representative to do significant research i n  defending this 
action, and due to the frivolous nature andlor without some reasonable basis in fact or law, 
substantial amounts of time have been invested. Therefore, the County is entitled to attomeys' fees 
and costs in defending this action. Moreover, the Boundary County Board of Commissioner's 
decision in this matter must be affirmed by the court. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - PAGE 24 l0J 
Respectfully submitted this 
Attomey for Boundary County 
CERTIF'ICATE OF SERVICE 
bY sue- 
I hereby certify that on the day of &007, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Paul W. Vogel 
Attomey at Law 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Legal Assistant 
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Paul William Vogel, P.A. 
Anorney-at-Law 
120 East LakeStroet 
Suite 313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, 10 83864.0903 
I Ph: (208) 263-6636 
1 Far: (208) 2656775 
PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
STATE OF [DAllO 
CUUWTY GF BOUNDARY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST KJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
I GARDINER, husband and wife, 1 CASE NO. CV-ZOO6339 
Respondent. I 
I Appellants, 
I 
vs. 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Idaho Code of Civil Procedure $ 9-101 authorizescourts to take judicial notice of facts 
of common knowledge and of official records of legislative, executive and judicial 
departments of the state and United States. Under this authority, the court may take judicial 
notice of ordinances of cities and towns within its jurisdiction. Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 
322,420 P.2d 805 (1966). 
The documents for which judicial notice is requested consist of chapters of the 
Boundary County zoning ordinance, and an appendix to the Boundary County comprehensive 
plan, which are the subjects of these judicial review proceedings. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES 
MEMORANDUM OF POMTS AND AUTHOFUTIES - 1 
103 
While the reporter's transcript of proceedings contains the Boundary County 
comprehensive plan and several chapters of the zoning ordinance, it does not contain 
Appendix I to the comprehensive plan or a complete copy of the ordinance. These oMicial 
documents are relevant to the issues in these proceedings, and necessary for a full 
understanding of county zoning hearing procedures and zone designations, construction of 
language in the ordinance, definitions of terms, conditional use permits, and the objectives of 
the comprehensive plan. 
Appendix I to the comprehensive plan was referred to by the county commissioners in 
their written decision which is the subject of this appeal, and was one of the bases for the 
decision, although it had not been made a part of the record. 
For the above reasons, judicial notice of these documents is appropriate and necessary 
to a h l i  understanding of the issues, and this request should be granted. 
Dated this 30th day of July, 2007. 
k ~ @ d (  
PA ' L WIL TAM VOGEL 
Attorney for Appellants 
Il CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this B' th day of July, 2007, I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES via U.S. first class mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Boundary County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 3136 
Bonners Feny, ID 83805 
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Psul William Vogel, P.A. 
Attorney-at-Law 
120 East Lakestreel 
Suite313 
P.O. Box 1828 
Sandpoint, ID 83864.0903 
Ph: (208) 263-6636 
Fax: (208) 265-6775 
PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Appellants, REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDTNER, husband and wife, 
VS. 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARTI OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. I 
Appellants, Patrick and Ada Gardiner, request judicial notice of the following chapters 
in the Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06 as amended through March, 
2006, under Idaho Code of Civil Procedure 5 9-101 (facts judicially noticed): 
1. Chapter 1 : Title, Authority, Purpose; 
2. Chapter 12: Conditional Uses; 
3. Chapter 16: Public Notification and Public Hearings; 
4. Chapter 18: Definitions. 
Appellants W h e r  request judicial notice of Appendix 1 to the Boundary County 
Comprehensive Plan under Idaho Code of Civil Procedure 5 9-101. 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1 
105 
This request is based on the attached memorandum of points and authorities and 
declaration of Ada Gardiner, and all the papers and documents filed herein, 
Dated this 30th day of July, 2007. 
1.4g 
PAUL WILL1 VOGEL 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this A day of July, 2007, I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Boundary County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 3136 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 
PAUL WILLIAM VOGEL, P.A. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1828 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
PHONE (208) 263-6636 
FAX (208) 265-6775 
ISB NO. 2504 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STAm OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Petitioners, DECLARATION OF ADA GARDINER 
PATRICK GARDINER and ADA 
GARDINER, husband and wife, 
VS. 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
Respondent. I 
I 
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I 
DECLARATION OF ADA GARDINER 
I, Ada Gardiner, declare as follows: 
1. I am one of the petitioners in these judicial review proceedings. 
2. 1 make this declaration in support of the petition for judicial review. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and if called as a 
witness would competently testify to these facts 
4. Attached hereto as exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of Chapter 12 of the 
Boundary County, Idaho Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, as amended through 
March, 2006 ("the ordinance.") Chapter 12 is entitled "Conditional Uses." 
5. Attached hereto as exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of Chapter I8  of the 
ordinance, entitled "Definitions." 
I 
I 
6. Attached hereto as exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of Chapter 7, 
section 6 of the ordinance, "Zone District Specifications -- Industrial." 
p o p  1 - 3 of- 
7. Attached hereto as exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of Appendix I to the 
A 
Boundary County, Idaho Comprehensive Plan, entitled "Histories of Boundary County." 
8. Attached hereto as exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of Chapter 1 of the 
ordinance, 'Title, Authority, Purpose." 
9. Attached hereto as exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of Chapter 16 of the 
ordinance, "Public Notification and Public Hearings." 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho that the 
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lHAPTER 12: CONDITIONAL USES 
kction 1: General 
iection 2: Duration of Permit 
Section 3: Pre-Application Review 
Section 4: Application Procedure 
ection 1: General: 
A. Conditional uses as set forth in each zone district are uses that, by their nature, are more intensive than permitted 
ses. Conditional uses may have adverse affects on surrounding properties and are therefore subject to additional 
:strictions or requirements more stringent than those applying generally within the zone district. 
B. Once a conditional use permit is approved, the terms and limitations of the permit shall become the controlling plan 
,r the use of the property and shall not be changed or amended except by application for a new conditional use permit. 
~ n y  development or use in violation of the terms and conditions of the conditional use permit shall be deemed a violation 
f this ordinance. 
:ack to Top 
ection 2: Duration of Permit 
A. Conditional use permits shall be deemed to run with the land to which they are attached, and the terms of such 
emits shall not be modified, abrogated or abridged by change in the ownership of said land. 
B. Should the use for which the conditional use permit was issued not be established within twenty four (24) months of 
le approval date of the permit, the conditional use permit shall be deemed to lapse. 
C. The zoning administrator may, upon request by the applicant, issue an extension not to exceed twelve (12) months 
~ould hardship or unforeseen circumstance preclude establishment of the conditional use per Section 2B above. 
ack to Top 
ection 3: Pre-Application Review: 
A. Prior to submission of an application for a conditional use permit, the applicant may request apre-application 
:view to determine whether the proposed conditional use meets the requirements of this ordinance and the 
:omprehensive Plan, and if not, what measures may be available to bring about compliance. A request for review shall 
lclude all information required by Section 4 of this chapter. 
B. Upon receipt of a request for review, the zoning administrator shall consider the facts of the application and provide 
le applicant a written report of findings based solely on the provisions of this ordinance and the Boundary County 
:omprehensive Plan. Should the applicant decide to submit an application for a conditional use permit, these findings 
la11 be included in the application documentation. 
C. Findings of a pre-application review will not constitute a formal decision and will not waive any procedures set 
)rth by this chapter for completion of the application. There shall be no fee for a pre-application review. 
.ack to Top 
ection 4: Application Procedure: 
A. Applications for conditional use permits shall be made on forms supplied by the zoning administrator. These 
3plications shall include: 
1. The name, address and telephone number of the applicant and the location and parcel number of the property on 
,hich the conditional use is proposed. 
2. A written description of the proposed use, including the type of activity, hours of operation, estimated number of 
ehicle trips per day expected to result from the use, whether the use will be temporary, seasonal or permanent, the size 
~d nature of structures to be built, and actions planned to reduce the effects of the activity on surrounding properties. 
3. A site plan showing the property boundaries, general topography, building and accessory structure layout, access, 
srking, landscaping and other such details necessary to clearly depict the nature of the proposed use. 
4. An application fee as set forth at Chapter 17. 
B. Upon receipt of a completed application for a conditional use permit, the zoning administrator shall schedule a 
ublic hearing on the next available planning and zoning commission agenda, allowing for public notification established 
Chapter 16. 
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C. The planning and zoning coin1 ;i, shall hold public hearing on cond. re' use permit applications in accordance 
lith the provisions of Chapter 16. In r e a ~ , ~ n g  a decision, the commission will cokAl.her the following: 
1. That the site plan and other documentation included with the application provide sufficient detail to provide a 
lear description of the nature of the conditional use. 
2. Written and oral statements and testimony submitted by interested persons affected by the conditional use. 
3. That there is sufficient land area to accommodate the proposed conditional use and that any structures are so 
rranged as to minimize adverse effects on surrounding properties. 
4. That the proposed conditional use will not have substantial adverse effect on adjacent properties. 
5. That adequate public services, including water, sewage disposal, roads, fire protection, etc., exist or will be built 
) accommodate the proposed use. 
D. Upon conclusion of the public hearing, the commission may: 
1. Approve the conditional use permit. 
2. Table the application pending receipt of additional information or amendment of the application. 
3. Disapprove the application for cause and recommend what actions, if any, may be taken to gain approval. 
4. Determine that, due to the scope or potential impact of the proposal, the final decision should rest with the board 
f county commissioners. Should the commission elect to forward the application to the board, the commission may 
:commend: 
a. Approval of the application. 
b. Specific provisions to be required prior to approval. 
c. Disapproval. 
E. Should the commission exercise option D4 above, the zoning administrator shall place the conditional use permit on 
ie next available agenda of the board of county commissioners. The board shall consider the facts of the application, the 
w ing  record, the standards set forth by this ordinance and the Boundary County Comprehensive Plan, and the 
:commendation of the planning and zoning commission. The board may: 
1. Approve the conditional use. 
2. Require specific changes prior to approval. 
3. Disapprove the application, specifying actions, if any, the applicant could take to obtain approval. 
F. The final decision on any conditional use permit application shall be made in writing, setting forth the reason for the 
:cision and the ordinance sections referred to. If the decision is made to approve the application, a conditional use 
crmit shall be issued, specifying terms and conditions. 
kDDED SEPTEMBER 2003) 
G. Upon approval of a conditional use permit, the specifications in the application and the limits specified on the 
srmit shall be the controlling documents for that use, and any expansion or alteration shall require additional permitting 
recesses. 
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CHAPTER 18: DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of this ordinance, the following words and terms shall have the specific meanings set 
forth in this chapter, unless the context in which the word or term is used clearly indicates otherwise: 
Accessory: A building, structure or use which is a necessary and customary part of, but subordinate to 
and clearly incidental to, the primary building, structure or use. 
Agricultural Lands: Lands used for the production of crops, timber or livestock. 
Auto wrecking yardljunk yard: An open area where waste, used or second hand materials are bought, 
sold, exchanged, stored, baled, packed, disassembled or handled, including but not limited to scrap iron 
and other metals, automobile parts and bodies of three (3) or more inoperative and unlicensed vehicles. 
The terms auto wrecking yard and junk yard shall not be constmed to include automobile sales lots, 
service and repair businesses, nor sanitary landfills or transfer stations. 
Base Flood: The temporary inundation of lands from floodwaters of the nature and extent which is 
calculated to have a one (1) percent chance to be equaled or exceeded in any given year. The term is 
synonymous with "hundred year flood." 
Body of Water: For tbe purpose of determining setbacks, a body of water shall include permanent and 
seasonal lakes and ponds, rivers and streams having a defined bed and banks with definite flow for more 
than four (4) months during the year, and swamps or bogs having standing water for more than four (4) 
months during the year. The term shall not include drainage or irrigation ditches, artificial swales for the 
on-site retention of stormwaters, livestock watering structures, springs, or natural depressions which 
contain standing water for shod periods. 
Commercial: A use or structure intended primarily for the conduct of retail trade in goods and services. 
Conditional Use: Any use within a particular zone district specified by Chapter 7 of this ordinance and 
specifically referred to as a conditional use, subject to the procedures set forth at Chapter 12. 
condominium: A residential development which ownership consists of an undivided interest in 
common in a potion of real property, together with a separate interest in space, the boundaries of which 
are described on a recorded final plat in sufficient detail to locate all boundaries thereof. 
Dwelling: A building or mobile structure or portion thereof designed exclusively for residential 
purposes. The term shall not include transient residential structures such as hotels, motels, campgrounds, 
boarding houses, etc. 
Dwelling Unit: One or more rooms in a dwelling, commercial building apartment house or any type of 
building designed for occupancy by one (1) family. 
Floodplain: Lands subject to inundation during a base flood. 
Floodway: The channel of a river or stream and the adjacent portion of the floodplain which generally 
canies floodwaters with destructive volumes and velocities, and which is resewed in order to discharge 
the base flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface elevation of the base flood more than 
CHAPTER 18 
one (1) foot. 
Front Yard: For the purpose of detennining the setback requirements for any particular building, the 
Eront yard shall be deemed to be that part of the lot or parcel of land which is adjacent to a street or road, 
or which is entered by a sheet or road. Where a lot or parcel lies at the intersection of two (2) streets or 
roads, the street or road which is faced by the primary entrance to the building or dwelling shall 
determine the location of the front yard, and the other sheet or road shall be considered the flanking 
street. The front yard shall be deemed to extend the full width of the lot. 
Industrial: Use of a parcel or development of a structure intended primarily for the manufacture, 
assembly or finishing of products intended primarily for wholesale distribution. 
Major facilities of public or  private utilities: Structures, lines, towers and other facilities which are 
part of utility services and which are designed to provide service or transmission on a regional or 
community scale. 
Manufactured home/Mobile home: A dwelling unit designed and constructed so as to be transported 
as a unit or in sections from one place to another, and which may have permanent location and 
attachment to a foundation and permanent connection to utility services. 
Parcel: An unplatted piece of land which is uniquely described and meets the minimum zoning 
requirements for the district in which the property is located. 
Permitted Use: Any use within a particular zone district specified by Chapter 7 of this ordinance and 
specifically referred to as a permitted use, which shall require the issuance of a permit by the zoning 
administrator following the procedures set forth at Chapter 5. 
Rear Yard: That portion of a lot or parcel located at the opposite side of the lot from the front yard, and 
extending the full width of the lot or parcel. 
Recreational VehicleITraifer: A dwelling which may be driven or towed, designed for temporary 
occupancy and containing holding tanks for drinking water or waste water and which cannot 
accommodate permanent utility service connections without modifications to the original structure. 
Side Yard: That portion of a lot or parcel along a property line which is neither a front yard nor a year 
yard. 
Single Family Residence: A separate or zero lot line dwelling unit designed for occupancy by one (1) 
family, or by eight or fewer unrelated mentally or physically handicapped or elderly persons which is 
supervised in accordance with the provisions of 67-6531 and 67-6532, Idaho Code. 
Special Use: Any use in a particular zone district specified in Chapter 7 of this ordinance, and which is 
not specifically listed as a use by right, a permitted use or a conditional use, shall be considered a special 
use, subject to the provisions of Chapter 13 of this ordinance.. 
Stock Cooperative: A land development where title is held in common and individuals or bodies 
corporate receive a right of exclusive occupancy for building construction in a portion of the real 
property. 
StreetlRoad: A pubIicly owned and maintained or recorded private thoroughfare which affords primary 
means of access to property, including a recorded easement for ingress or egress or a publicly owned 
right of way where no public highway agency has accepted the right of way for maintenance. 
Structural alteration: Any change in the suppo'rting members of a building, such as foundations, 
bearing walls, columns, beams, girders or supporting members of the roof, or any addition to an existing 
structure which changes the "footprint" of the building. 
Subdivision: Any tract of land divided into four (4) or more lots, parcels or sites for the purpose of sale 
or building development, whether immediate or future, providing that this definition shall not include 
bona fide division or partition of agricultural land into lots, all of which are five (5) acres or larger, and 
maintained as agricultural lands. 
Use: The purpose fox which lands or buildings are arranged, designed or intended or for which they are 
occupied or maintained. 
Use by Right: Any use within a particular zone district specified in Chapter 7 of this ordinance and 
specifically referred to as a use by right, which requires no application, permit or action by the Boundary 
County Planning and Zoning Department. 
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CHAPTER 7: ZONE DISTRICT SPECIFICATIONS 
Section 6: Industrial 
A. Purpose: To provide locations for industrial and manufacturing uses which, by their nature, may not be compatible 
with uses permitted in other districts. 
B. Permitted Uses: 
I .  Industrial and commercial uses and structures, with approved site plans, on parcels of sufficient size to 
~ccommodate the specific use but not less than one fourth (114) acre in size. 
2. An owners or caretakers residence, located within the same structure or on the same parcel, as the industrial or 
sommercial use. 
3. Public service facilities, with approved site plans. 
C. Special Uses: All uses not specifically listed as a permitted or prohibited use by this section are eligible for 
sonsideration as a special use subject to the provisions of Chapter 13. 
D. Prohibited Uses: Residential uses except as specified at B2 of this section. 
EXHIBIT 4 
.. 
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Appendix I 
Histories of 
Boundary County 
As draffd by Public Land Use Committee members: 
Jon Adams, Bud Behrman, Gene Blackhurst, Wally Cossairt, 
Car1 Dalberg, Phil Davis, David Eby, Janice Eby, Larry Engert, 
Ken English, Denise Fodge, Sam Fodge, Helen Foust, Dave Gray, 
~ o ~ a h d  HaII, Doug Higgins, Frances Houck, Terry Howe, 
Craig Hubbard, Tom Iverson, Myrna Johnson,  om Mackey, 
Mike Naumann, Bob Neumeyer, Don Nysh-om, Bob Olson, 
Ina Pluid, Brion Poston, Bob Raaurn, Gary Regehr, Mike Ripatti, 
Chuck Roady, Tim Rosco, Cal Russell, Sally Shaw, Elmer Smith, 
Steve Tanner, Adrian Wages, Wayne Wakkinen, 
Dave Walter and Lon Willoughby 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The custom and culture of agriculture in Boundary County can be best characterized as 
varied and predicated on unique environmental and soil resource conditions. The agricultural 
soils of Boundary County are sedimentary by origin, highly fertile and structured for a wide range 
of crop adaptability. 
The prime bottomland soils and much of the benchland soils are topographically situated 
not to be threatened by wind or water erosion. Zero level on the Kootenai River proper is 1,743 
feet elevation. A 136-day fiost Eree period and a mean temperature of 51 degrees Fahrenheit 
coupled with a long day length at this north latitude makes these county agricultural lands a truly 
unique resource. 
Over the past 100 years, the production of crops and livestock have changed in response 
to reclamation and technological advances in equipment, produdion practices, crop varieties and 
livestock breeds, transportation, marketing and communications. Adjustments in crop and 
livestock selection and the production methods have been necessary to counter problems f?om 
disease, insects, nutrition and weeds. Environmental concerns and continually changing 
governmental regulations have necessitated production changes and narrowed the options 
available. 
Although agriculture has been through considerable change and variability, the two major 
themes that have continued to drive its perseverance are profitability and retention of lifestyle. 
Agriculture is a business and as such must maintain some level of profitability over time to 
survive. Producers in Boundary County have traditionally been wiEng to accept what most 
would consider minimal monetary return for their investment in exchange for a lifestyle rhey 
treasure. They value their freedom of choice, right to self-regulation, independence and 
wholesome family values which stress unity, high moral standards, hard work and pride in their 
accomplishments. 
There exists a delicate balance between the social and economic cobtributions which 
agriculture makes to the community. It is imperative that any proposed land use changes consider 
not only the economic impact, but also the effects on the rural Westyle that has evolved over time 
and upon which no monetary value can be placed. 
The custom and culture of agriculture in Boundary County has always managed to retain 
both prof i tabi i  and retention of lifestyle through change and viriabiity. The right to continue 
to contribute to  the socio-economic well-being of the community and state has been established 
by the Idaho Legislature (IC 22-4501, IC 224502, IC 22-4503 and IC 22-4504). 
The following text is provided as an overview of the custom and CIIkUre of agriculture in 
Boundary County. It is not intended to be exhaustive but merely an ourline of the agricultural 
activities in the county. The ultimate goal of this document is to expose those involved with land 
use planning to characteristics of apridture in this c o m d t y .  
DL BISTORY OF BOUNDARY COUNTY AGIU[CZrLrn 
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Following the hunting-gathering tradition of the Kootenai Indians, early white settlers to 
this region invariably cleared land and set about planting berry bushes, fruit trees and gardens and 
raised livestock for subsistence. Wdd grass was cut for hay on overflow lands in the Kootenai 
Valley. The first commercial farms appeared in the late 1800s. Ranches, h i t  orchards and berry 
production became common. 
By 1910, the Bomers Ferry area had become known for its mild climate, abundant rainfall, 
low elevation and the richest soils in Idaho, and was producing hay and cereal crops with huge 
steam tractors. The farm lands were promoted widely for twice the normal yields of such crops as 
wheat, barley, oats, potatoes, cabbage, tomatoes, timothy grass, pears, apples, peaches, prunes, 
chemes, melons, corn, apricots and strawbemes. The valley was called "The Nile of the North" 
since it supposedly possessed the richest lands this side of the Nie valley.' 
The first county agent arrived in 1910. As more land was cleared and settled in the 
"teens," the production of dajr  products, hogs, poultry, bees, sheep and cattle grew.2 
Every year during the spring runoff the water from melting snow in the mountains of 
British Columbia caused the river in the Kootenai Valley to riseand overflow its banks? Afrer 
the water receded, wild hay could be harvested on the open areas. Many times the town of 
Bomers Ferry was flooded and once or twice the town was nearly washed away.4 
Early historical accounts describe the land in the Kootenai Valley as being divided into 
two general classes; that which was flooded annually and that which was ody inundated in times 
of extremely high water. The value of the land which was subjected to annual f l o o d i  was 
between $50 and $75 per acre even though it had been cleared and was under cultivation, while 
the land removed from flood danger was worth twice that amount, even though it was less 
- 
productive. 
Some 35,000 acres of bottornIand were drained and died beginning in the 1920s. Excess 
water &om streams and river seepage was either pumped or naturally flopred into the Kootenai 
River by a system of d-e ditches. While the valley lands grew mainly cereal crops, the 
tradition of experimentation with new crops continued withthe growing of vegetable seeds and 
produce, edible dry and seed peas and mustard. 
Nearly al l  of the, Kootenai Valley bottom land is now in drainage districts. These were 
fonned, starting in 1921, by landoimers who taxed themselves to pay for the dikes and dmhage 
ditches that converted swamps into highly productive fkdands. A system of ditches wfiects , . 
excess water from creeks and springs, and gravity flows it into the Kootenai River. When the 
river level is above the outlets, drains ari closed and water is pumped into the river.' Except for a 
few years, the dikes kept the high river waters from flooding'the farmlands, but heroic efforts . . . . 
were required to keep the dikes &om giving way in high water years. ' .  . 
The Kootenai River has a record o f k s i u g  &om of dollars h damage in Montana, , .: . . 
Idaho and ~r i t i sh  Columbia by its many bverflo& through the years. The Kootenai is a 
. . . .  . . .  . . 
. . 
. . 
. . . 
. . 
4. ' History ofNorth rdabo, ~ e s t e r n p u b ~ ~  Company,' 1903 . . ' . - 
... 
Eomday county himy pamphlet ~ile,  ~emspa* ( ~ o , ~ ~ ' ~ e r r y  exals)  clip^&& ' : ' ".: . ' 
. History of Bdundary County, Idaho, 1987, Boundary County Histoxical Society , - . ,  , 
, . 
Bonncrs Feny Herald, Op.Cit, p5 . . . I , '  . .  ,.. . . . .  , . 
' A Ground Water Monitoling Network: for Kmtenai Flats, ~oahem'1dah0, ldaho ~ e ~ a r t m e n t  o f  water -' : . .. 
Information Bull& No. 33 . . 
trib<tary to the Columbia River, hence any unrestrained high flows corning down from Canada 
and going on into the Columbia River added to the flood problems along that river's main stem - 
between Washington and 0regoa6 Libby Dam was built upstream in the early 1970s to turn this 4 
loss into benefits through flood control and power generation. Significant hydroelectric power is I 
generated at the dam in Montana and downstream in the many other dams on the Kootenai and 
Columbia Rivers in two countries. Reservoir storage and stream flows are controlled by 
international joint use agreements. 
Nowadays, there are no more devastating floods. 
The farm population grew rapidly in the depressed agricultural times of the 20s and 30s as 
people left other areas, especially the "dust bowl" states, to seek rekge here on "stump ranches" 
carved from cutover lands sold by timber companies afker being logged. Most non-valley farms 
have woodlots from which wood products are still sold. 
By the 1950s, dairying had become a principle occupation of the bench farms and miIk 
was being produced. Boundary County produced 80 percent of the world's White Dutch Clover 
seed. Rural water systems supplied water from the mountain streams to rural dwellings via 
pipelines. 
To~iists driving through the county wouid view the lush, green fields surrounded by 
timbered mountains and, following local custom, would consider this scenery to be beautifbl and 
orderly. They would recall it fondly and invariably refer to it as "God's Country." 
Boundary County agriculture was considered an example of man living harmoniously with 
nature. Many tourists and visitors returned to become permanent residents. 
Afker Libby Dam was constructed and valley farmers no longer faced the threat of 
Kootenai River floods, more specialized crops emerged, such as seed potatoes, hops and various 
seed grasses. Diversification continued when Boundary County became a leading area for the 
production of Christmas trees and later an enormous array of cold-hardy nursery stock species. 
Today, the hops and nursery industries are the largest employers of workers. Both use irrigation 
from local streams and rivers. 
While the valley lands are strictly commercial enterprises, the other !ands with their alfalfa 
hay, grazing, beef and woodlots are comprised of fbU-time and part-time farms providing 
subsistence, extra income and the rural lifestyle suitable for a safe and wholesome f a d y  life - the 
number one reason for immigration to this area. Almost all the 400-plus farms are owner 
operated, with very few absentee owners. A third are part-time fanns. Over half the operators 
work off the farm, mainly in the timber industry. Approximately 14 percent (1 15,000 acres) is in 
farms, and some 1,500 people, or one in five, live on farms.7 
Types of Crops 
Grains: The largest amount of agricultural acreage in Boundary County is devoted to the 
production of small grains with most of the fertile valley land utilized for grain production. 
Wheat is grown on 15,000 to 20,000 acres annually. While soft white winter wheat is the 
predominate type of wheat produced, varying amounts of hard red winter, hard red spring and 
L i i  Dam and Reservoir, Fed& Multip 
, ;:.. , '  . Anny Engineering Diskict, S d e ,  Nw. 1964 ' ' . . 
' U.S. Ce1m.s figures, Boundary County Library : . . .  . . . ..  .. :..; .. j: ';: . ,  . "- ,.. .' 
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CHAPTER 1: TITLE, AUTHOIUTY, PURPOSE 
Section 1: Title: This ordinance shall be known as the "Boundary County Zoning and Subdiv 
Ordinance," also referred to hereinafter as "ordinance." 
Section 2: Authority: This ordinance is adopted pursuant to the authority 
Idaho, per Title 67, Chapter 65, and Title 50, Chapter 13, of the Idaho 
2, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, as amended. 
Section 3: Purpose: The purpose of this ordinance is to promote the health, safety and 
of the people of Boundary County pursuant to the guidelines established in the 
Comprehensive Plan, published and adopted May 26, 1998. 
CHAPTER 2: GENERAL PROVISIONS I 
Section 1: Construction of Language: When consistent with the text of this ordinance, words in the 
singular include the plural, words in the plural include the singular and words in the present 
include the future. Words used in this document, except as specified in definitions included 
further refinement is necessary, wilt be derived from definitions provided in the Second 
of the American Heritage Dictionary, published by Houghton Mifflin. 
Section 2: Applicability 
A. The provisions of this ordinance apply to all lands situated within the boundaries of 
County, Idaho, as established by the State of Idaho. The provisions set forth herein do 
lands situated within the incorporated boundaries of cities located within Boundary 
B. From the effective date of this ordinance, all uses of land and structures erected 
to the provisions of this ordinance. Uses of land and structures which were 
the effective date of this ordinance and which do not conform to the 
the provisions established in Chapter 8 of this ordinance. 
C. This ordinance will not be construed to void or impair 
between private parties andlor governmental agencies, but shall set 
to all. Where standards set forth in this ordinance impose greater 
provisions of this ordinanee shall prevail. I 
Section 3: Violations and Penalties: 
(AMENDED SEPTEMBER 2003) 
The violation of any provision of this ordinance shall be deemed a misdemeanor, punishable y a fine 
not to exceed three hundred dollars ($300), imprisonment in the Boundary County Jail for a riod not 
to exceed six (6) months or both fine and imprisonment. In addition to the criminal penalties et forth 
above, the Boundary County Prosecuting Attorney, at the direction of the Board of County 
Commissioners, may take steps necessary to civilly enjoin further violations of this ordinanc 1 . I 
Section 4: Notice of Violation/Enforcement 
(AMENDED SEPTEMBER 2003) 
A. If the zoning administrator has cause to believe that a violation of this ordinance has 
occumng, a notice of violation will be issued to the owner of record of the property on 
violations have occurred. Notice will be sent by registered mail, return receipt 
visions of this ordinance believed to have been violated, a specific description of the 
ns which could be taken to remedy the violation, and a date certain, not to exceed ninety 
issuance of the notice, during which steps may be taken to bring about compliance 
er enforcement action. 
ns causing violation of this ordinance be deemed by the Board of County 
to constitute a threat to the health or welfare of citizens of Boundary County, a cease 
will be obtained by the Boundary County Prosecuting Attorney to halt such activity 
iew by the Planning and Zoning Commission, the Board of County Commissioners 
County Prosecutor. 
en by the property owner to bring about compliance with a legally issued notice of 
me kame established, or if no attempt has been made to appeal the allegations 
inistrator shall forward a formal complaint to the Board of County 
commendation that the violation be submitted to the prosecutor for 
The provisions of this ordinance are hereby declared to be individually 
of this ordinance be declared invalid by a court of competent 
not affect the validity of the remaining provisions. 
Date: This ordinance shall be in full force and effect upon its passage and 
in one (1) edition of the Boundary County Newspaper of Record. 
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CHAPTER 16: PUBLIC NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC HEARINGS 
(AS AMENDED DECEMBER, 2001) 
Section 1: Public Notification: When so required by the provisions of this ordinance, the 
procedures shall be followed to ensure the widest possible public notification of proposed 
allow for public comment on those proposals. 
A. Upon receipt of an application requiring public notification, the zoning administrator s 
establish the date, time and location of the public hearing during which the application 
considered, and will cause to be published in the official county newspaper of record, 
(15) days prior to the scheduled hearing, legal notice to include but not be limited to 
information: 
1. The name of the applicant, the parcel number on which the action is proposed and a g k neral 
description of the location. 
2. A brief but clear description of the proposed action. 
3. The date, time and location of the public hearing and any conditions, including 
deadlines and time limits on testimony, that will apply for that particular hearing. 
4. An address to which written comments should be addressed and a deadline by 
comments should be sent. 
5. A telephone number for those seeking further information on the proposal. 
6. The location where the full public record can be reviewed. 
B. The zoning administrator will prepare a press release on the application for gene 
local media outlets. 
C. The zoning administrator will compile a list, using the records of the assessor's 
property owners adjacent to or within three hundred (300) feet of the parcel on whi 
proposed and a list of all governmental or quasi-governmental agencies which w 
application and cause a letter of public hearing to be sent to each by first-class 
applicant. The letter of public hearing shall contain all information provided in 
contain additional information. If the mailing list exceeds two hundred (200) 
agencies, a display advertisement of at least four (4) inches by two (2) col 
county newspaper of record at least fifteen (15) days prior to the hearing i 
D. At least seven (7) days prior to the public hearing, the zoning admi 
publicly visible site on the parcel on which the activity is proposed p 
application and the date, time and location of the public hearing. 
Section 2: Public Hearings: 
A. Order of Proceedings: 
1. The hearing chair shall announce that the public hearing is opened, define the 
and state the purpose of the public hearing. The chair shall call for conflict of 
citing conflict of interest shall remove themselves from the panel. Removal 
not preclude that member from making public comment, but the member 
decision making process. 
2. Presentation by the applicant or designated representative. 
will entertain questions from the commission to the applicant. 
3. Staff report. Following the staff report, the chair will 
the staff. 
4. Statements from those members of the public 
the commission may ask questions through the chair. 
l aq 
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5. Statements from those uncommitted on the application. Members of the commission 
questions through the chair. 
6. Statements from those opposed to the application. Members of the commission may 
questions through the chair. 
7. Rebuttal or clarification by the applicant. If any material changes are made to the 
result of testimony received or if new information is entered into the record, steps four 
shall be repeated. Members of the commission may ask questions through the chair. 
8. Upon completion of all testimony, the chair shall close the public hearing and 
among members. No tinther questions shall be asked of those who testified. The 
aimed toward developing a motion for a reasoned recommendation or decision. 
include but are not limited to: 
b. To continue the public hearing to a future date certain. 
c. To reopen the public testimony portion of the hearing. 
d. To table the decision until a future date certain. 
a. Recommendation, approval or denial. On a final decision, the motion 
allow the drafting and approval by final motion of the written decision. 
u 
B. General Provisions 
1. A deadline for the submission of written materials exceeding one (1) page in 1 
imposed by publishing the deadline date in the legal notice and in letters of public he 
materials received after this deadline shall not be considered unless read into the 
hearing by the person making the submission. 
2. A reasonable time limit may be imposed on public testimony provided su 
established in the legal notice and letters of public hearing. Those providing 
their name and address for the record and may be required to write their n 
prior to testifying. At the discretion of the chair, this register may be used 
3. Written materials submitted in support of an application or public 
property of Boundary County and shall be maintained as part of the perm 
4. All public hearings shall be recorded to provide a transcribable 
shall be maintained by the zoning administrator for a period of at least 
final decision. Written minutes shall be kept of all Planning and Zo 
minutes shall be maintained as a permanent record for a period of 
the minutes are subsequently typed, the original notes from which 
maintained as part of the hearing record. 
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REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REVIEW 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Correcting errors in respondent's brief, the Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
("board" or "county board") is the only respondent. Tungsten has not intervened. Appellants' 
registered Angus cattle ranch is adjacent to Tungsten's property, not to respondent's property. 
The proximity of appellants' property to the gravel pit site adversely affects appellants' 
property rights and reduces the value of their property. 
Appellants did not fail to present expert evidence. In the 2006 hearing, they presented 
written testimony from a registered hydrologist that the gravel pit causes a risk of permanent 
harm to the water under appellants' property. Appellants depend on this water for irrigation, 
livestock and personal use. Appellants presented studies from veterinary experts that a stress 
free environment is critical for successful A.I. and E.T. cattle breeding. Tungsten did not 
provide expert evidence to rebut any of this testimony. 
Respondent does not dispute, and thus concedes, these facts: 
(1) Rick Dinning, Tungsten's president, is County board member Dan Dinning's 
brother. (The parties stipulated to these facts.) 
(2) The initial reason for the gravel pit was that county road superintendent, Jeff 
Gutshall, encouraged Tungsten's president, Rick Dinning, to apply for a special use permit 
("SUP") to supply rock to the county for road maintenance. Earlier, Gutshall had encouraged 
two other families in Porthill to do the same thing. 
(3) The SUP confers a financial benefit on Rick Dinning, Tungsten Holdings, Inc., 
and the other Dinning family members who are principals of the corporation. 
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(4) In 2006, the county board re-affirmed its conflicted 2005 decision granting the 
SUP, and re-adopted the conflicted 2005 findings and conclusions verbatim. 
11. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The board's decision must clearly and precisely state what it found to be the facts, and 
M y  explain why those facts lead to its decision in order to demonstrate the board applied the 
criteria prescribed by statute and zoning ordinance and did not act arbitrarily or on an ad hoc 
basis. Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 37 (1982); Price v. 
Payette County, 131 Idaho 426, 431 (1998) (board must make specific factual findings). 
Merely stating conclusions is not sufficient. Workman Family Partnership, 
Board member's personal inclinations are not findings of fact. Workman Family 
Partnership 104 Idaho at p. 38. The presumption of validity favoring actions of a 
zoning authority does not apply unless the actions are free from capriciousness, arbitrariness 
or discrimination. Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Goodinp County, 118 P.3d 116, 120 
(2005). The court does not defer to an agency's interpretation of law. Friends of F m  to 
Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196 (2002) (interpretation of an ordinance, like 
construction of a statute, is an issue of law over which the court exercises free review). No 
deference is due to an agency's findings that are clearly erroneous. Butters v. Hauser, 125 
Idaho 79,81 (1993). 
111. 
ISSUES 
1. The County Board's decision violates 1.C. 67-6512. 
I.C. 67-6512(a) prohibits a county board from issuing SUPS for uses not conditionally 
permitted by the zoning ordinance. Respondent argues the zoning ordinance conditionally 
permits gravel pits because: (1) Ch. 7, section 1(E) of the ordinance, pertaining to 
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agriculture-forestry zones, allows the board to issue SUPs; (2) mining for gravel is important 
to the county, and (3) appellants' interpretation of LC. 67-6512(a) makes SUPs and 
conditional use permits ("CUPS") the same thing. 
Respondent is wrong for five reasons: (1) The terms of ch. 7, section 1 of the 
ordinance do not permit gravel pits; (2) use of property contrary to zone district designations 
does not mean the zone designations are erroneous; (3) respondent's interpretation conflicts 
with the plain language of LC. 67-6512(a), and is repudiated by the legislature's repeal of 
former language in that provision that allowed SUPs for non-permitted uses; (4) respondent's 
interpretation violates the rule of expressio unius esf exclusio alterius (designation of specific 
things in a statute excludes other things not mentioned); (5) by their inherent nature, gravel 
pits and rock quarries cannot be included in agricultural zones, and this SUP should never 
have seen the light of day. 
a. Ch. 7, section 1(E) does not conditionaIZy permit gravel pits. 
Ch. 7, section 1 of the ordinance specifies the uses that are permitted in agriculture 
forestry zones. These include five specific agricultural uses, six specific farm structures, ar 
five specific recreational activities as "uses by right"; four specific residential structures, o 
community structure and public parks as "permitted uses," and 15 specific activities that 
permitted as "conditional uses." (R.O.A. 256.) Gravel pits, rock quarries, and surface min 
operations are not included in any of these specifications. 
Respondent concedes this fact, but contends that since subparagraph (E) of secti 
allows the board to issue SUPs for non-permitted uses, gravel pits are conditionally pern 
by the ordinance. Respondent's roundabout interpretation is completely erroneous beca 
conflicts with the plain language of I.C. 67-6512, which states the contrary; and ignor 
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problem that since subparagraph (E) conflicts with LC. 67-6512(a) it is illegal and void, and 
provides no authority for SUPS. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356 (2005) 
(county has no authority to act on an ordinance that conflicts with statute). Accordingly, the 
SUP cannot be issued under subparagraph (E), and the board's decision must be vacated. 
b. Alleged existence of gravel pits throughout the county is irrelevant. 
Respondent argues that the ordinance conditionally permits gravel pits because it is 
not reasonable to assume that gravel pits would have been left out of agriculture-forestry 
zones since these comprise over 85% of the county, and sand and gravel deposits are 
"abundant" in the county in pits and quarries "too numerous to mention." 
If so, county lawmakers would have known about this, and could have included gravel 
pits as conditionally permitted uses in appropriate zones, or made appropriate zone 
designations for gravel pits if they had wanted to. Having not done so, it is reasonable to 
conclude that county law-makers did not intend to include gravel pits, probably because such 
use is incompatible with agricultural uses and detracts from the rural atmosphere they wanted 
zoning laws to retain. See Meader v. Unemployment Compensation Division, 64 Idaho 
716, 723 (1943) (had the legislature intended to include the raising of fish as "livestock" in 
covered employment it would have said so, as it did with bees and poultry). 
The county board's current view, which has only been mentioned in these legal 
proceedings, does not make the official zone designations erroneous. Indeed, Munson's 
gravel pit was "grandfathered" in precisely because it was a non-conforming use, not a 
permitted use. See Glengary-Gamlin Protective Association, Inc. v. Bonner County, 106 
Idaho 84, 90 (1983) (land use that conflicts with subsequently enacted zoning ordinance is a 
non-conforming use). 
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The courts correctly reject the proposition that a zoning designation is erroneous based 
on alleged non-conforming historical use in the zone district. See Tavlor v. Board of Countv 
Comm'rs , 124 Idaho 392, 396 (1993) (where zone designation was contained in zoning map, 
commissioners' later interpretation based on alleged historical use that zone designation was 
erroneous fails). 
Even if the county board mistakenly thought it could issue SUPs for gravel pits or 
other non-permitted uses in any zone district, and even if such interpretation had not violated 
I.C. 67-6512(a) when the comprehensive plan was adopted, the fact remains that gravel pits 
are not conditionally permitted uses in agricultural-forestry zones. Thus, from and after 1999, 
when I.C. 67-6512(a) was amended to prohibit SUPs for non-permitted uses, the board is not 
authorized to issue SUPs for gravel pits. Statutory procedures exist for amending zone district 
designations where appropriate. Where not appropriate, as here, prohibited uses may not 
come into a zone district through another door. 
c. Respondent's view conflicts with the plain language of LC. 67-6512. 
Whether a board of commissioners violated a statute is a matter of law over which the 
court exercises free review. City of Sandpoint v. Sandvoint Indep. Hi~hway Dist., 139 Idaho 
65 (2003); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley Countv, 137 Idaho at 196. Statutory 
construction always begins with the literal language of the statute. If a statute is 
unambiguous, the court need not consider rules of statutory construction and the statute will 
be given its plain meaning. Evans v.Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,77 (2003). 
I.C. 67-6512(a) is unambiguous. It prohibits SUPs for uses that are not conditionally 
permitted by the terms of the ordinance. Thus, the zoning ordinance must expressly permit 
the particular special use, not just special uses in general. Accordingly, for an SUP to issue, 
somewhere in the zoning ordinance, in some zone established by the zoning ordinance, gravel 
pits must be permitted as a conditional use. 
Respondent's brief, at page 7, nips at the heels of the confusion. If gravel pits were a 
conditional use in an ag-forestry zone, there may well be no need for it to be a special use. 
The apparent contradiction. however, is resolved by a closer examination of the statute. When 
the statute makes reference to "terms of the ordinance," the only logical reading of this is that 
it refers to the zoning ordinance in its entirety. Accordingly, if gravel pits were a conditional 
use in some other zoning district, but not in an ag-forestry zone then, in that event, a gravel 
permit might be allowed in an ag-forestry zone as a special use and in accordance with a 
special use permit. The failure, however, to permit, either conditionally or as a matter of 
right, gravel pits in any zone, results in a prohibition against a special use permit in any zone. 
Since special uses are more intense, why should they be allowed if the less-intense conditional 
use is not allowed? 
Respondent concedes that the ordinance "does not specifically refer" to gravel pits, 
rock quarries or surface mining as permitted uses in any zone district. Therefore, under the 
plain language of I.C. 67-6512(a), the board may not grant an SUP for a gravel pit. 
Accordingly, the SUP violates LC. 67-6512, and must be vacated. 
The plain, statutory language makes sense. It does not mean that CUPs and SUPs are 
the same animal. It means that uses that are not permitted anywhere in the zoning ordinance 
can no longer come in through SUPs. 
I.C. 67-6512(a) allows counties to process applications for SUPs or CUPs. Indeed, the 
ordinance provides for CUPs and SUPs. The difference is one of degree, in that CUPs are for 
"more intensive" uses, and SUPs are for "significantly more intensive" uses. (See Ord., 
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Ch. 12 "Conditional Uses" [Judicial Notice Request, exh. 11; Ch. 13, "Special Uses," R.O.A. 
258.) But to obtain a permit for a significantly more intensive use, the particular use must 
first be one that is conditionally permitted somewhere in the ordinance. 
Essentially, respondent contends that the plain meaning of LC. 67-6512(a) does not 
mean what it says, and that the statute should be interpreted as if it had never been amended. 
But the county is not free to ignore a state statute. Clearly, the legislative amendment 
supersedes the provisions in the county ordinance, such as subsection (E), that conflict with it. 
Fischer v. City of Ketchum, supra. Accordingly, respondent's argument that section 1(E) 
"conditionally permits" SUPS for gravel pits is completely erroneous because the legislature 
rejected this interpretation years ago. 
d. Respondent's interpretation violates the rule of expressio unius. 
Interpretation of an ordinance, like construction of a statute, is an issue of law over 
which the court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 196; 
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho at 78; Fischer v. Citv of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 349, 354 
(2005). The same principles that apply to construction of statutes also apply to municipal 
ordinances. Friends of Farm to Market, at 197. 
If statutory language is ambiguous, courts apply rules of construction for guidance. 
Statutes must be interpreted to effectuate legislative intent. Fremont-Madison Irr. Dist. v. 
Idaho Groundwater Approp.. Inc., 129 Idaho 454, 461 (1996). Constructions that lead to 
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Evans v. Teton Countv, at 77; 
Fischer v. Citv of Ketchum, 
Essentially, respondent's view is that since gravel pits are important to the county, 
permission for gravel pits may be implied in the ordinance because it would be unreasonable 
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not to. Even if I.C. 67-6512(a) were ambiguous, such interpretation violates fundamental 
rules of statutory construction that require words in a statute to be given their plain meaning, 
and instruct that things left out of a list of things in a statute are intended to be left out, and 
cannot be implied in. Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375 (1941); D&M Country Estates Homeowner 
Ass'n v. Romriell, 138 Idaho 160, 165 (2002); Idaho Press Club, Inc. v State Legislature, 132 
P.3d 397,399 (2006). 
Under the rule of expressio unius, the exclusion of gravel pits From permitted uses in 
agricultural-forestry zones must be interpreted as excluding gravel pits, and cannot be 
interpreted as including gravel pits by implication. Otherwise, neither the state statute nor the 
county ordinance makes sense, and both would lead to absurd results because all prohibited 
uses could be impliedly permitted. Such an interpretation is disfavored. 
The state of Idaho applies the rule of expressio unius to the interpretation of statutes. 
Peck v. State, SUJI& The rule clearly applies here, since there is no indication that the 
exclusion of gravel pits from the specific list of permitted uses in agricultural zones was not 
intentional. 
e. Gravel pits are not an allowed use in agricultural zones. 
The ordinance defines "agricultural lands" as "lands used for the production of crops, 
timber or livestock." (Ordinance, Ch. 18, Judicial. Notice Request, exh. 2.) Gravel pits and 
rock quarries do not fall into those categories. Thus, it is clear that gravel pits are not uses as 
a matter of right, permitted uses, or allowable under any other theory. Accordingly, gravel 
pits are not allowed in agricultural zones and thus are a prohibited uses. See Counhi of Ada v. 
96 Idaho 630, 632 (1975) (commissioners do not have authority to allow a use within 
a zone that would constitute a prohibited use). Obviously, a gravel pit supplying rock for 
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county road maintenance and residential development is not compatible with public parks, 
hiking and riding trails, farm residences, commercial kennels or any of the permitted uses in 
agricultural-forestry zones. 
What this SUP amounts to is an invalid attempt to change the zoning of seven acres in 
Porthill from agricultural to industrial, which the board cannot do without complying with the 
procedures for re-zoning in I.C. 67-651 1. County of Ada, m a ;  Price v. Pa~ette County, 
m a ,  131 Idaho at 430 (permitting a prohibited use without complying with re-zone 
procedures is unlawful in violation of I.C. 67-5279(3)(c)).' 
But an attempt to rezone the gravel pit would be unlawf%l spot zoning because such 
use neither conforms to current uses of surrounding properties nor is in accordance with the 
comprehensive plan, under which this area is zoned agricultural. Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho at 76 (test for valid zone reclassification is whether zone change is consistent 
with permitted uses in the rest of the zoning district). 
This SUP is being used for only one purpose -- to confer a financial benefit on an 
absentee landowner for his own purposes regardless of zone designations. The SUP plainly 
violates LC. 67-6512 and must be vacated. 
2. The decision conflicts with the Plan and Ordinance. 
a. The SUP does not protect private property rights. 
Tungsten has no property right to a gravel pit because the property is in an 
agricultural-forestry zone in which gravel pits are prohibited. Therefore, contrary to board 
members' personal inclinations, Tungsten does not have a right to a gravel pit next to 
appellants' cattle ranch. 
I Residential subdivisions are prohibited in industrial zones. Ord., Ch. 7, Section 6, Judicial Notice 
Request, exh. 3. 
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In contrast, appellants' cattle ranch is a use by right in the zone district. Appellants 
have substantial investment backed expectations in their cattle ranch, and the legal right to use 
and protect the water under their property. See Follett v. Taylor Bros., 77 Idaho 416, 425-26 
(1956) (property owner's decreed water rights are real property; adjacent property owner may 
not interfere with the flow of property owner's water). Thus, appellants have a property right 
not to have a gravel pit next to their cattle ranch. Therefore, an absentee landowner is not 
allowed to do what he wants with his property. 
b. The SUP conflicts with the ordinance and comprehensive plan. 
In granting the SUP, the board prioritized mineral extraction and transportation goals 
of the comprehensive plan over the conflicting goals of encouraging agriculture and retaining 
the community's rural atmosphere. But complying with some of the plan does not mean the 
SUP is in accordance with the plan. A special use must comply with all the provisions in the 
plan, not just some of them. See Taylor v. Board of Countv Comm'rs, supra, 124 Idaho at 
399-401 (board cannot pick and choose between provisions that conflict with the proposed 
use and those than can be reconciled with it). Since the gravel pit conflicts with these goals, 
the SUP is not in accordance with the plan. 
Similarly, the SUP must comply with all provisions in the ordinance, not just some of 
them. Tavlor v. Board of County Commissioners, m a  (land use permits are governed 
strictly by ordinance requirements; decision must make findings that use complies with each 
ordinance requirement). Here, the decision does not contain findings the gravel pit complies 
with provisions that special uses must "have any substantial adverse effects on adjacent 
properties"; must not "create hazards to adjacent property owners," and must not "create 
noise, traffic, odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses in the 
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zone district." (Ordinance, Ch. 13 (C)(3), (4); R.O.A. 259.) Accordingly, the SUP does not 
comply with the ordinance. 
Respondent contends the decision complies with the ordinance because the board's 
11 conditions make it comply, in that they "reduce" the gravel pit's "impact" on adjacent 
property owners. But "reducing" the "impact," whatever that means, does not comply with 
the above ordinance provisions that require substantial adverse impact on adjacent 
properties. 
Apparently, board members assume the gravel pit will not injure appellants. But that 
is only the non-expert assumption of persons who do not live or work next to the gravel pit, 
and no facts in the record support that view. Additionally, the board has an ulterior motive for 
granting the SUP in their desire to obtain rock only from Tungsten, that has nothing to do 
with impact on the neighbors. 
Importantly, no facts or expert evidence support the board's proposition that 12 days 
of blasting and 60 days of crushing wiIl adversely affect appellants. The only expert 
evidence in the record establishes that blasting per se adversely affects appellants because it 
causes an existing risk to the aquifer under appellants' property which once lost, cannot be 
restored. There is no expert or credible contrary evidence. 
Permitting blasting at all creates this risk. Allowing 12 days of blasting every year 
expands it. Board member Kirby's non-expert view that 12 days of blasting means "less 
intensity," is baseless. There is no evidence that Tungsten wanted more days of blasting in 
order to use less dynamite. The opposite conclusion may reasonably be drawn. While 12 and 
60 days may have less cumulative "impact" than 365 days of such activities, the ordinance 
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does not allow EIJY impact that could substantially adversely affect adjacent property owners. 
Thus, the conditions do not comply with the ordinance. 
Similarly, respondent does not explain how the noise and disruption of 60 days of rock 
crushing during appellants' cattle breeding season will not affect the cattle. No facts in the 
record support the board's view that the cows will not mind. Blasting and crushing activities 
create these potential adverse effects. Ensuring 12 days for blasting and 60 days for rock 
crushing guarantees appellants will be impacted. 
c. The gravel pit is not a compatible use. 
Obviously, blasting and crushing belong in industrial zones, not agricultural zones 
because such noisy and disruptive activities are not compatible with the peaceful, rural 
environment in agricultural zones. Respondent's view the SUP does not adversely affect "the 
community as a whole" because there are "only five residences" within a mile of the pit, 
misses the point that five families will be substantially adversely affected. Accordingly, the 
SUP violates the ordinance. 
This fundamental principle that the comprehensive plan protects seems to have 
escaped respondent lawmakers. Since, under the plan, rural residences are a permitted use 
and gravel pits are a prohibited use, rural residences are not subordinate to the opportunity for 
profit.2 
It is not true that gravel pits and cattle ranches have existed "side by side." There was 
no such testimony. The decision's "side by side" language derives from Appendix I to the 
plan, a document outside the record. Documents outside the record cannot be used to support 
a finding. Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 782-83 (2004) (decision may not be 
2 Rick Dinning indicates that the Bushnells have subdivided and sold their property. If so, more families 
live or will soon be living around Tungsten's propert). 
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based on evidence outside the record); Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 
/ 1 702-03 (2002) (decision based on matters outside the record prejudicial and void). Therefore, 
/I no evidence supports this self-serving view. 
In selectively relying on Appendix I, board members chose not to reveal other portions 
of the same document that conflict with the decision; for example, that it is "imperative" that 
proposed land use changes consider not only econoinic impact, but also the "effects on the 
rural lifestyle that has evolved over time and upon which no monetary value can be placed." 
(Judicial Notice Request, exh. 4, p. 1 .13 
Clearly, if Tungsten's gravel pit had been there first instead of the other way around, 
appellants would not have established a registered Ailgus cattle ranch on the adjacent 
property. Indeed, the board's list of approved gravel pits reveals that none like Tungsten's 
exists. (R.O.A. 114-1 18.) In fact, the board denied a recent identical gravel pit application. 
(McLeish application, R.O.A. 116.) 
The other two gravel pits in the area are not evidence that Tungsten's gravel pit can be 
operated without "undue" adverse impact. While the Ponsness and Bushnell pits are not 
directly at issue, they also are operating illegally for the reasons that Tungsten's pit is illegal. 
Tungsten's operation would add more damage to that already caused by the existing pits. 
Tungsten purports to do what Rick Dinning says the existing pits cannot do because, 
according to Rick Dinning, none have the finances or equipment to produce rock of sufficient 
3 The decision is replete with references to alleged facts outside the record. Another example is a 
statement that the gravel pit's location is in an area "furthest removed from established residences" on 
Tungsten's property. (R.O.A. 209.) There are no residences on Tungsten's property. Tungsten's "bench" 
property is being subdivided. Tungsten's subdivision is removed from the gravel pit on the county road below, 
on which appellants' property is located. 
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quantity and quality for the county's needs. Thus, Tungsten's operation would overpower the 
other pits. Accordingly, Tungsten's pit would be unduly disruptive. 
d. Respondent's dispute of expert evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Hydrology is a proper subject for expert testimony because it is a science about which 
laypersons lack competence. Marty v. State of Idaho, 122 Idaho 766, 762 (1992) (resident 
who had no training or background in hydrology lacks the necessary expertise to render an 
expert opinion). Non-experts lack competence to render opinions on scientific matters. 
Rule 701, Idaho Rules of Evidence (lay witness opiliions limited to those not based on 
scientific, technical or other special knowledge). 
Where, as here, expert scientific evidence is presented and there is no expert evidence 
to rebut that testimony, a non-expert board's independent interpretation of expert testimony is 
clearly erroneous. St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County Commissioners, 
134 Idaho 486,471,489 (board's independent interpretation of medical records must be ruled 
clearly erroneous). 
Hydrologist Uhlman's written, expert testimony about the gravel pit's potential 
adverse effects is uncontroverted in this record. Uhlman's expert opinion constitutes 
substantial competent evidence of the gravel pit's potential adverse effects. St. Joseph 
Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County Commissioners, 134 Idaho at 489-91 
(uncontradicted expert's opinion constitutes substantial, competent evidence). 
Rick Dinning's non-expert argument that such risk is "a remote possibility," and 
"merely conjecture," and the board's adoption of this argument is not supported by any 
rebuttal expert testimony or any fact in the record, and thus, is clearly erroneous. St. Joseph 
Medical Center, m a  (inexpert board may not independently analyze expert testimony); 
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Martv v. State of Idaho, m, 122 Idaho at 766 (resident having no training or background in 
hydrology lacks the qualifications to render an expert opinion). 
Respondent's argument is not responsive to Uhlman's testimony that Tungsten's 
excavation causes a permanent risk of harm to the underground aquifer. Tungsten provided 
no one of any expertise to rebut Uhlman's testimony. Rick Dinning has no qualifications to 
rebut Uhlman's testimony. Board members are not experts in hydrology, or cattle breeding, 
from the erroneous assumptions they make. 
Although not glowingly clear, the board's dispute with Uhlman's testimony boils 
down to the meritless argument that (1) "could" does not mean "will"; (2) the excavation is 
far enough from appellants' wells to not cause damage; (3) Tungsten submitted a reclamation 
plan and received a mining permit from the Idaho Department of Lands; and (4) the 
assumption that "initial" blasting in connection with the revoked 2005 pennit did not 
adversely affect appellants' well. Respondent is wrong on all counts. 
According to Uhlman's testimony, appellants' well functions because there is a 
column of water ABOVE the pump. As this column of water is depleted, the yield of the well 
is reduced in addition to the fact that water is being removed from the aquifer. (See Uhlman 
report, R.O.A. 79-84; expert qualifications, R.O.A. 85-87.) 
The aquifer receives water from ABOVE. It rains, water enters the subsurface through 
the fractures and cracks, and recharges the aquifer. Although appellants' well driller found 
89.6% of the water when he drilled, that water came from ABOVE that elevation and trickled 
down to fill up the aquifer. The bottom of Tungsten's pit on the valley floor allows drainage 
of any fractures the pit intercepts to that level. 
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Rick Dinning says he has never seen water running out from rock faces near the 
railroad, and that is because they have already DRAINED. Excavation of the pit will allow 
for more drainage, and will reduce the volume of water entering the aquifer and the amount 
of water accessible to the well; will reduce the column of water above the pump, and will 
impact the well. We will not know the extent to which this will occur until afterwards -- 
when it is irreparable. 
Respondent's point that "could" does not mean "will" overlooks the fact that the risk 
of dewatering created by Tungsten's excavation is an existing risk, not the possibility of a 
risk; and also overlooks the flip side of that argument which is that "could" does not mean 
"won't." The plan and ordinance require dewatering won't occur if an SUP is to issue. The 
only thing in the reclamation plan having to do with water is a requirement to maintain state 
water quality against contamination. (R.O.A. 282.) This is irrelevant to dewatering the 
aquifer and does not prevent the dewatering risk. 
Nobody knows at this point whether Tungsten's initial blasting affected the aquifer 
under appellant's property. Tungsten did not provide expert evidence that the aquifer was 
safe, or any evidence that continued blasting in the area would not disrupt the flow of water to 
the aquifer. Tungsten does not specify whether it will use greater charges of dynamite as rock 
becomes more deeply imbedded in the ground. 
3. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Respondent argues that the 11 conditions support the board's decision, but does not 
point to any facts to support this bare conclusion. As stated above, no facts support this 
conclusion. Thus, the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, and must be vacated. 
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Price v. Pavette Counm, a 13 1 Idaho at 43 1 (decision must be supported by substantial 
evidence). 
As stated earlier, the 1 I conditions purport to shift the burden of protecting adjacent 
property owners on Tungsten's neighbors and other agencies. The conditions & not: prohibit 
blasting, or specify the intensity of blasting; protect the neighbors from blasting activities; put 
any noise or dust buffers on rock crushing, truck traffic or the other disruptive quarrying 
operations; safeguard appellants' water supply or cattle breeding operation; contain 
requirements for walls, fences or trees to contain noise or protect property or the aesthetic 
value of the area. There is little, if any, protection for people using the Farm to Market road 
fronting the open pit. 
The only evidence respondent points to in support of the conditions are statements or 
arguments of Rick Dinning, an admitted non-expert in these matters. There is no other 
evidence. Chairman Smith and member Kirby, also non-experts, simply "concurred" with 
each other that the old conditions provide "sufficient restriction." (R.O.A., p. 232, para. (iv).) 
They did not require any evidence to support this conclusion, and there is none to support it. 
Accordingly, the conclusion is clearly erroneous. 
Land use decisions affecting people's property are not that simple. Conditions have to 
be relevant to the potential adverse effects and must control or eliminate them based upon 
competent evidence. A county board does not have discretion to make findings out of the 
clear blue sky. 
4. The board's decision fails to comply with 1.C. 67-6535. 
Respondent erroneously contends the decision complies with I.C. 67-6535 because it 
is written, refers to standards in the plan and ordinance, draws attention to surrounding 
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, property owners' concerns, and addresses and mitigates those concerns. But while the 
decision is written and pays lip service to community concerns, it does not factually address 
or mitigate any of them. 
The decision document's 12 pages are deceiving. They consist almost entirely of 
argument and conclusions. They refer to few, if any facts. They do not contain findings on 
all zoning requirements and base their decision on selective plan goals. The first page of the 
document consists of the P&Z findings and recommendation to deny the SUP because of the 
lack of expert evidence of possible mitigation, if any. Tungsten's factually deficient record is 
unchanged in these proceedings, and does not support the county board's opposite decision. 
The next eight pages restate and repeat the old conclusions that mitigation is available, and 
the old conditions purporting to mitigate potential adverse effects. They do not explain how 
the board's leap of faith to other agencies and the courts is anything more than a red hexing. 
The remaining three to four pages consist of the board's one-sided description of these 
judicial review proceedings and the parties' stipulation for new hearing based on 
Commissioner Dan Dinning's unlawful conflict of interest; selections from documents outside 
the record supportive of the board's views, the board's legal interpretation of state statute and 
independent interpretation of expert testimony on hydrology. None of these narratives merit 
deference. 
For example, the decision argues in the "narrative" section, that the ordinance 
conditionally permits gravel pits because gravel pits meet the definition of "a commercial 
business supplying products and services for agriculture and forestry activities," which is 
permitted as a conditional use in agriculture-forestry zones. Their conclusion is based on the 
fuzzy thinking that "construction of roads" and "protecting against flood" promote the 
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"continuity and continued productivity of agriculture," and therefore, "mineral extraction" 
supplies products for agriculture. (Decision Narrative, R.O.A. p. 235.) As discussed earlier, 
respondent argues differently in its papers that gravel pits are conditionally permitted because 
of their historical presence. These contradictory, self-serving arguments are the antithesis of 
reasoned decision making. 
Plainly, gravel pits do not supply products for agriculture, and therefore are not 
permitted as a conditional use on that flimsy basis. The ordinance requires words to be 
interpreted according to their dictionary definition. (Judicial Notice Request, Exh. 4, p. 1.) 
The dictionary definition of "agricultural products" is feed, veterinary supplies, fann 
equipment, tools and supplies used directly in agricultural pursuits, or "work ordinarily done 
by farmers." See Lesperance v. Cooper, 104 Idaho 792, 794-95 (1983) (raising crops for 
feeding to cattle is an agricultural pursuit). 
Neither farmers nor lumbermen ordinarily operate gravel pitskock quarries for county 
road building or residential development. Neither agriculture nor forestry is work typically 
done by miners or county road departments. Tractors use gasoline, but that does not mean an 
oil refinery is a commercial business supplying products or services for agriculture. This 
overly broad, self-serving analysis fits any zone classification, and permits uses the zone 
district prohibits. Such interpretation is ciearly erroneous. 
5. Appellants have standing. 
Respondent erroneously contends that appellants lack standing because they: (1) are 
not aggrieved persons; (2) are only interested in disagreeing with the board's interpretation of 
the ordinance; (3) are not being deprived of a property right; (4) have not been prejudiced; 
(5) have no injury in fact; and ( 6 )  no particularized h a m  to a legally protected interest; or 
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(7) any personal stake in the outcome, or (8) a distinct or palpable injury; or (9) suffered 
actual harm. Respondent is wrong again. 
Respondent confuses standing for judicial review of local land use decisions under 
LLUPA with standing to confer jurisdiction on a court to hear and determine a civil 
complaint. Appellants clearly have standing under LLUPA. 
Under LLUPA: 
I.C. 67-6521 . . . provides that an 'affected person' is entitled to be 
heard when an application for a permit is submitted to local land 
use authorities. An 'affected person' is defined as 'one having an 
interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the 
issuance or denial' of a permit. . . [Alfter the land use authorities 
have made a final decision upon the application, an 'affected 
person aggrieved' by the decision may 'seek judicial review 
under the procedures provided by sections 67-52 15(b) through (g) 
and 67-5216, Idaho Code.' 
Glengarv-Gamlin Protective Assn., Inc. sut7ra, 106 Idaho at 87. 
Appellants have an interest in real property because they own property adjacent to 
Tungsten's gravel pit that may be adversely affected by the SUP because the gravel pit's 
operation would disrupt appellants' cattle breeding activities, endanger their water resources, 
and reduce their property values in view of their ranch's close proximity to the industrial pit. 
Appellants are aggrieved by the board's decision because of the gravel pit's potential adverse 
effects on the investment backed expectations in their cattle business, residence, and property. 
Accordingly appellants have standing to seek judicial review. Glenaarv Gamlin, 
Respondent's view that appellants are not "affected persons" is clearly erroneous. 
While respondent thinks that property owners are not "affected persons" until and unless they 
have suffered actual damage, that is not the test of standing under LLUPA. Pursuant to 
LC. 67-652l(l)(a), a property owner is an "affected person" if the property may be adversely 
affected by the board's decision. Evans v. Teton Countv, 139 Idaho at 76 (existence of 
real or potential harm sufficient to challenge decision). 
Thus, affected persons do not have to sustain actual damages to seek judicial review of 
potentially damaging local land use decisions. To hold otherwise means that property owners 
have no remedy to prevent potential ham from happening, and thus, no administrative 
remedy for local agency land use decisions under LLUPA. Since LLUPA provides an 
administrative remedy for potentially damaging decisions, respondent's contention is wholly 
erroneous. 
Appellants' standing cannot be seriously questioned. 111 Glengarv-Gamlin, -a, the 
land in issue was zoned "recreational open space." Applicants for a CUP sought to construct 
a commercial air transport base on property in the area. The court deemed it clear that 
individual landowners in that vicinity were "affected" within the meaning of LC. 67-6521, 
and thus had standing to sue in their own right, because airplane and helicopter traffic to and 
from a nearby commercial air transport base could impact the enjoyment and value of 
properties in the area. Id., at 88-89. 
Similarly, blasting, crushing, quarrying, and truck traffic to and from an adjoining 
rock quarry could impact the enjoyment and value of appellants' property as described herein. 
Accordingly, appellants are "affected persons" under LLUPA and have standing to seek 
judicial review of the board's decision. Respondent knows this because, as affected parties, 
appellants were provided written notice of the SUP hearings as the ordinance and state statute 
require. Affected persons are "aggrieved parties" for the purposes of LLUPA. 
I.C. 67-652I(d). 
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Accord: Evans v. Teton Count\: 139 Idaho at 75-76 (adjacent property owners 
within 300 feet of proposed PUD have standing to appeal board's approval of PUD); 
v. Board of County Com'rs ,  124 Idaho at 401 (zone change to industrial prejudices 
adjacent property owners in suburban district who stand to have their use and enjoyment, as 
well as the value, of their real property adversely affected); Cowan v. Board of 
Commissioners, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006) (neighbor has standing to appeal county board 
decision approving subdivision); County Residents Apainst Pollution, et al. v. Bonner 
138 Idaho 585, 587 (2003) (residents' association may seek judicial review of P&Z 
decision granting CUP for storage of septic tank sludge). 
The record clearly supports appellants' standing. AppeIlants received written notice 
of the gravel pit hearings. Appellants opposed the SUP in each of the hearings on the basis of 
the adverse effects on appellants' property; namely, that the proposed blasting and its effects 
on underground water flow could diminish or destroy appellants' water source and cause 
irreparable injwy to appellants' ranch; that the constant noise of rock crushing and other 
quarrying operations would disrupt the peaceful, rural environment necessary for a successful 
cattle breeding program, and that the permanent, intensive quarrying operation would 
interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of appellants' home and diminish the value of their 
property. (R.O.A. 18, 24, 31, 33, 67-70, 71-78, 79-87,88, 89-107, 108-113, 119-134, 146, 
147,149, 151-152, 158-161, 165, 172-177, 185-187, 193-194, 216-217, 218-223, 268-69; see 
also transcripts of all hearings.) 
6. UnlawfuI procedures deprived appellants of due process. 
Respondent's argument that appellants were provided due process because they knew 
they had to present expert evidence in the 2006 hearing, and that any lack of due process was 
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appellants' fault misses the point. Appellants are not complaining that they were unable to 
present expert evidence in the 2006 hearing, in which they did present expert evidence. 
Appellants contend that at least six unlawful procedures deprived them of due process in basic 
and fundanlental ways. 
First, respondent disallowed appellants a reasonable continuance to get expert 
evidence for the initial P&Z hearing in May, 2005. As it turned out, this was not critical to 
the P&Z hearing, since Tungsten provided no expert evidence either, and the P&Z 
commissioners denied the SUP. 
Second, appellants' inability to obtain expert evidence for the P&Z hearing became 
critical in the county board hearing on July 26, 2005, when respondent unlawfully reversed 
the burden of proof and required appellants to prove actual damages from Tungsten's 
proposed gravel pit rather than requiring Tungsten to show that appellants would not be 
harmed. This violated due process because the order of presentation of evidence at the 
hearing is based on the applicant having the burden of proof (applicant makes opening 
statement, objectors respond, applicant allowed to make rebuttal statement. Ordinance, 
Ch. 16, Judicial Notice Request, exh. 5. The board's action surprised appellants and 
prejudiced them because their lack of expert evidence of harm on July 26, 2005 was a 
deciding factor in the board's decision to grant the SUP. 
Third, the board's decision granting SUP was based in part on documents and facts 
outside the record and to which appellants had no opportunity to respond. Appellants were 
prejudiced because all of these outside references could have been rebutted had these 
documents or facts been made known. 
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I Fourth, the board's discussions about the case and contacts made outside of public 
session violate I. C 67-2340, et seq., that require all meetings of a public agency governing 
body to be open to the public. I.C. 67-2342. Governing boards may not make decisions on 
discussions held outside public session without notice and opportunity for all parties to 
participate. Eacret v. Bonner Countv, 139 Idaho 780, 786-87 (2004). Board member Kirby's 
desire to "dig around" about the matter outside of public session violates these provisions and 
deprived appellants of a fair hearing. 
Fifth, the board scripted its discussion for the July 24, 2006 hearing in advance, which 
implicitly shows a pre-existing decision and no genuine deliberation that is required by 
I.C. 67-6535. Obviously, the board approved the final script before the 2006 hearings. The 
pre-existing decision deprived appellants of due process. 
County board members Smith and Kirby's scripted re-adoption of the old decision as 
their final decision on the matter confirms the new hearing was a sham, and also revives board 
member Dan Dinning's conflict of interest under which the 2005 findings and decision were 
made. Appellants were prejudiced because the 2005 decision remained the board's final 
decision one year later, and the new, 2006 hearing was a sham. 
7. Appellants were deprived of an impartial hearing. 
Appellants do not contend that the 2006 board was biased due to board member Dan 
Dinning's admitted conflict of interest. Appellants waived that argument when the county 
board members agreed to hold a new hearing. 
Appellants contend that the remaining board members were not impartial because of 
their personal resolve to grant Rick Dinning a financial benefit and to protect road 
superintendent Gutshall by retaliating against the people who criticized him. Thus, 
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commencing at a time prior to the SUP application, board members and their employees were 
personally involved in the gravel pit that caused them not to be impartial. 
Eacret v. Bonner Countv, is directly on point. That case involved an 
application for a variance from a lake setback requirement. As here, the county P&Z 
commission denied the variance, but the county board granted the variance, reaching exactly 
the opposite conclusion as the P&Z commission on each of the standards required in the 
zoning ordinance for a variance to be granted. p. 782. 
In m t ,  prior to the hearing before the county board, a county board member had 
conversations with the applicant, encouraged him to re-apply for a variance and stated 
publicly that he (the board member) had a personal interest in promoting "blanket" variances 
like the applicant sought. The board member also said that "[iln the end, [the variance 
application] is going to get approved . . .". Eacret% suura, 139 Idaho at 785. The court held 
these statements revealed lack of impartiality. 
In the instant case, board member Dan Dinning made statements during the July 26, 
2005 hearing that he had a personal interest in promoting property owners' economic 
interests, and that opponents should pay the property owner for lost economic opportunities. 
Chairman Smith stated publicly in the course of the hearing that Rick Dinning "had a right" to 
his gravel pit, and that the SUP was "inevitable." Chairman Smith also told objectors that the 
board did not like criticism of Gutshall. These statements and board members' special 
interest in Tungsten's gravel pit reveal a lack of impartiality that continued throughout these 
proceedings. 
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While there is no direct evidence that any board member privately discussed the gravel 
pit with the applicant, road superintendent Gutshall did, and it was Gutshall who encouraged 
Rick Dinning to apply. The road superintendent reports directly to the county board. 
Board members were clearly aware of Gutshall's interest in the gravel pit before the 
county board's July 26, 2005 hearing, and acted to protect it at the hearing. Their bias 
deprived appellants of an impartial hearing. As in Eacret, supra> the decision makers' minds 
were already made up prior to the hearing. 
Individuals have a constitutional right to criticize public employees without fear of 
retaliation or humiliation by elected government officials. Leventhal v. Vista Unified School 
Dist.. 973 F.Supp. 951, 957 (1997) (school district's bylaw prohibiting public criticism of 
district employees violates First Amendment). Insofar as the "inevitable" decision resulted 
from retaliation for criticizing a public employee, it must be vacated. 
8. The decision was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. 
For a11 of the reasons stated herein, the decision was arbitrary and capricious and an 
abuse of discretion. There is a double standard at work here. While respondent demanded 
that appellants produce expert documentation of harm from Tungsten's gravel pit, it did not 
hold Tungsten to the same standard by requiring expert testimonj~ of safety. Such ad hoc 
reversal of the burden of proof is arbitrary and capricious. As shown by the decisions on 
gravel pit applications such as Bushnell, McLeish, and Tungsten, there is no uniformity in the 
board's decision-making on these applications. Standards in the ordinance must be followed 
for uniformity to occur. 
9. The substantial rights of appellants were prejudiced. 
Respondent at times appears to be confused as to the applicability of the provisions of 
I.C. 67-5279. The statute is argued under the standing provisions of respondent's brief, but 
not argued when respondent alleges that appellants' substantial rights were not prejudiced. 
Standing, of course, refers to the entitlement to bring a lawsuit. LC. 67-5279(4) establishes an 
element of petitioner's burden of proof. 
Idaho's appellate courts have not addressed, to a significant extent, the meaning of 
I.C. 67-5279(4). To the extent that "substantial rights of the appellant" have a correlation 
with the type of palpable injury required by standing, respondent submits and contends that 
the arguments contained above under "6. Appellants have standing" establish that their 
substantial rights have been prejudiced. 
The rights referred to in the statute, however, do not relate solely to substantive rights 
but to due process rights as well. In (CRAPSS) v. Bonner County, 138 Idaho 585 (2003), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the board of commissioners' summary dismissal of plaintiffs 
appeal of a decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission to the board of commissioners 
"clearly prejudiced the plaintiffs substantial rights." Accordingly, in addition to the 
substantive harm as pled in this matter, this court is also entitled to consider petitioners' 
procedural rights and whether they have been infringed upon in reaching a determination as to 
whether substantial rights of petitioners have been prejudiced. 
In Lane Ranch Partnership v. Citv of Sun Valley, Doclcet No. 32545, 2007 Opinion 
No. 76, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a developer's substantial rights had been 
prejudiced because the developer was entitled to receive due process in quasi-judicial 
proceedings like those conducted by zoning boards. 
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It is clear, as argued extensiveIy in petitioners' opening brief and as set forth above, 
that the decision of the board of commissioners violates the provisions of I.C. 67-5279(3). It 
is equally clear that petitioners have three substantial rights that have been prejudiced by the 
board's decision. Those rights, at a minimum, consist of their water right to the irrigation 
well water; the gravel pit on adjacent property will reduce the value of petitioners' real 
property; all of the unlawful procedures deny petitioners their entitlement to procedural due 
process. Certainly, diminished property values should qualify as actual injuries and the 
impairment of a substantial right. 
10. The decision constitutes unlawful spot zoning. 
Respondent contends that the gravel pit is not unlawful spot zoning because there is a 
need for crushed rock in the State Highway 1 area of Boundary County, and Tungsten is the 
only one financially able to provide such rock in the quantity and quality needed for road 
building, flood control and residential development. But these reasons constitute type two 
spot zoning and thus, the SUP is illegal and void. 
Other rules apply to a county's need for supplies or materials for road building and 
flood control. Under I.C. 67-2808, a county governing board may declare that an emergency 
exists and the public interest demands immediate expenditure of public money if there is an 
extraordinary flood or other disaster, or for emergency work for national defense or to 
safeguard life, health or property. The county board has not declared that any such 
emergency exists. Therefore, the need for Tungsten's rock was not "critical," except insofar 
as the county wanted rock only from Tungsten's property. 
In the absence of an emergency. counties obtain materials through competitive bidding 
laws under I.C. 67-2802, et seq., that are intended to "safeguard public funds and prevent 
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favoritism, fraud and extravagance in their expenditure." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. City of 
Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 861-62 (1993). These laws apply to expenditures in excess of 
$25,000. I.C. 67-2806. Contracts or purchases under $25,000 are excluded from these 
requiremeilts. LC. 67-2803. But I.C. 67-5726 prohibits county employees from influencing 
or attempting to influence the award of a contract to a particular vendor. 
I.C. 18-1361 prohibits county officers and employees from contracting with relatives 
unless the contract is competitively bid and the relative submits the low bid; and the relative 
takes no part in the preparation of the contract or bid, and the public servant makes full 
written disclosure of the relative's interest in, and intention to bid on the contract, and neither 
the public servant nor the relative has violated competitive bidding laws. These laws prevent 
the bias in county contracts with relatives that occurred here. 
The county made no attempt to comply with competitive bidding standards with 
respect to Tungsten's rock. Instead, a parcel of land was singled out by the county for use 
inconsistent with the permitted uses in the zone district for the benefit of an individual 
property owner. This is type two spot zoning E. Evans v. Teton C o w ,  -a, 139 
Idaho at 76-77 (this type of spot zoning is invalid). 
There is no evidence that this atleinpt at a de facto zone change is in accordance with 
the comprehensive plan, and respondent does not argue that it is. Respondent quotes Rick 
Dinning for the proposition that there is a need for rock in Porthill. But there is no evidence 
of any such need. Only Rick Dinning, a developer, said there was. Porthill residents said they 
had no trouble obtaining crushed rock. (Tr. July 26,2005,29:1-17, 30:21-25-31:l-3 (Banks); 
32:7-10 (Ponsness); Tr. July 24,2006,22:6-10 (Banks).) 
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Without competitive bidding procedures being followed, there is no evidence that 
crushed rock could not otherwise be obtained from other sources, or that the county or anyone 
could obtain crushed rock from Tungsten "at reduced cost." The details of the arrangement 
between Tungsten and the county were not revealed. Clearly, Tungsten does not intend to 
give crushed rock away. 
Contrary to the views expressed by board members, zoning decisions do not depend 
on what is the most profitable use of property. If it were otherwise, "the very purpose of 
zoning would be nullified and spot zoning would be the order of the day." Dawson 
Entemrises v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 514 (validity of zoning regulations has never 
been determined by the highest and best use concept or in terms of dollars and cents 
profitability. To hold otherwise would be the very antithesis of sound zoning). 
The board gave no real reasons other than "economic advantage" to impose an 
industrial use on the agricultural zone at the expense of adjacent property owners. Thus, the 
SUP changes the zone designation to confer an economic benefit on Tungsten, and constitutes 
unla~vful spot zoning. Accordingly, the SUP must be vacated. 
11. The county is not entitled to attorney fees. 
The pleadings in this matter, as well as tlie evidence before the respondent county, and 
the record in this case, clearly establish a basis for this Petition for Judicial Review. Under no 
circumstances is the county entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners reassert their contention that the decision of the Boundary County Board of 
Commissioners should be set aside in whole without necessity for remand on the basis that the 
agency action did not comply with any of the requirements contained in said statute. 
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Dated this 31st day of July, 2007 
Respectf$ly submitted, 
By: 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTI&@ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BO 
PATRICK GARDLNER and ADA 
GARDINER husband and wife, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
CASE NO. CV-2006-339 
BOUNDARY COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. I 
Memorandum Opinion and Order 
Setting Aside Special Use Permit 
Background: The Boundary County Board of Commissioners granted a special use 
permit to Tungsten Holdings, Inc. for a gravel pit operation in an agricultural/forestry 
zone after the Boundary County Planning and Zoning Commission had recommended a 
denial of the permit. Petitioners Patrick and Ada Gardiner seek to have this court reverse 
the decision of the county board. 
Holdings: James R. Michaud, Senior District Judge held that: 
1. Petitioners have standing to be heard on their appeal. 
2. The county board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten may not be 
granted under Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7, 
pertaining to special use permits. That ordinance violates LC. 67-6512 which allows a 
special use permit only if the use is a listed conditional use in the applicable zone. The 
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use in the agricultural/forestry zone in the 
Boundary County Zoning Ordinance. 
3. The county board failed to hold the applicant Tungsten to the burden of persuasion 
required by law. Instead the county board unlawfully imposed upon the petitioners 
Gardiner's the burden to demonstrate why the special use permit should not be granted. 
4. The petitioners suffered no prejudice as regards notice of hearing in 2005. They were 
able, due to the remand, to acquire expert hydrological evidence to present at proceedings 
held in 2006. 
6.The use by the county board of a statement of potential findings and conclusions and 
which were prepared prior to the deliberation to guide deliberations is, by itself, not 
arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion nor a deprivation of due process. 
7. The written decision of the county board does not comply with LC. 67-6535 because it 
is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant. 
The decision does not fairly resolve all relevant contested facts. The decision lacks a 
rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statuto~y provisions. 
8. The board's decision prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioners and would, if 
permitted to stand, result in actual harm. They are entitled to relief from this court setting 
aside the decision of the county board. 
9. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this action. 
L Fact and Procedural History 
In March 2005, Tungsten Holdings, hc., a Montana real estate developer 
("Tungsten"), applied for a special use permit to operate a permanent, commercial gravel 
pit on seven acres of property in the agricultural/forestry zone at Porthill, Boundary 
County, Idaho. The proposed gravel pit site is on property adjacent to appellants' 
Registered Angus cattle ranch. The Boundary County Planning & Zoning Commission 
held a public hearing on May 19,2005. R.O.A. 2006, p. 29. The zoning commission 
made findings and a recommendation to the Boundary County Board of Commissioners 
("county board"), to deny the permit. After a public hearing the county board approved 
the special use permit on September 6, 2005. Petitioners filed a request for regulatory 
takings analysis pursuant to I.C. 67-8003 which the board later denied. 
Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review under Boundary County Case No. 
CV-2005-380. On April 30,2006, Petitioners and the board stipulated that participation 
by board member Dinning in the hearings had been a conflict of interest that was 
prohibited by LC. 67-6506, and that the permit should be voided and the proceedings 
remanded to the board for a new public hearing, without member Dinning participating. 
In the stipulation, Petitioners waived any objection to member Dinning's participation in 
the prior proceedings. On May 26,2006, the Court entered an Order of Remand voiding 
the special use permit and remanding the matter to the county board for a new public 
hearing. 
A new hearing took place on July 24,2006, before board members Smith and 
Kirby. A second board proceeding took place August 7,2006 and board members 
Smith and Kirby approved the special use permit. Petitioners filed a request for 
regulatory takings analysis and the county board denied that a taking had occurred 
Petitioners filed the petition for judicial review in this case on September 8,2006. 
K Issues Presented 
Petitioners raise the following issues in support of the relief sought in their 
petition for judicial review: 
1. Did the county board's action violate LC. 67-6512 in that a special use permit 
may be granted only if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the 
zoning ordinance? 
2. Does the county board's decision conflict with Sections I and IV of the 
Comprehensive Plan in that said approval interferes with appellants' health and safety, 
adversely impacts appellants' agricultural use of their property, does not evaluate the 
impact of the gravel pitlrock quany operation on current uses of surrounding land, and 
constitutes uncompensated deprivation of petitioners' private property rights? 
3. Is the county board's decision supported by substantial evidence in the record? 
4. Does the county board's decision fail to comply with I.C. 67-6535 in that the 
fmdings approved on August 14,2006 do not state the relevant contested facts relied 
upon, fail to explain the rationale for the decision based on applicable provisions of the 
Comprehensive Plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions and pertinent 
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record? 
5. Was the county board's decision made upon unlawful procedure and did it 
deprive appellants of due process of law because of inadequate notice or opportunity to 
respond? 
6. Was the decision was made upon unlawfirl procedure and has it deprived 
appellants of due process by the Board's pre-hearing statements of confidence in their 
Road Superintendent's advocacy for the special use permit, pre-hearing discussions 
between the road superintendent and the applicant about obtaining rock from the 
applicant's property, statements at the hearing supportive of the road superintendent in 
retaliation for adjacent property owners' public comment at the zoning commission 
hearing, and the Board's failure to allow appellants to comment on matters outside the 
record the county board relied on in making its decision? 
7. Was the board's decision arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion in that 
deliberations undertaken by the Board on August 7,2006 show bias, and do not constitute 
true deliberations but, instead, consist of a mere recitation of a document containing 
prepared statements and predetermined responses by unknown parties prior to 
deliberation? 
8. Doesthe board's decision constitutes unlawful "spot zoning?" 
9. Has the board's decision prejudiced substantial rights of the appellant? 
10. Are petitioners entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in this 
action? 
Respondents raise the following issues: 
1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring their petition for judicial review to 
this court? 
2. Is the county is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs against petitioners? 
Not all of the issues raised by the parties will be addressed by the court. The rulings of 
this court on the issues discussed herein render the remaining issues moot. 
m. Nature and Scope of Judicial Review 
The standards governing judicial review provide that this Court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. 
I.C.§67-5279(1). Rather, this court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Custanedz v. Brighton Corp., 130 Xdabo 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 
1265 (1998). The agency's factual determinations are binding on the this court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Judicial review shall be 
conducted by the court without a jury, with the review of disputed issues of fact to be 
confined to the agency record. LC. 5 67-5277. There is a strong presumption of the 
validity favoring the actions of zoning authorities. Howard v Canyon Cmnty Board of 
Commissioners, 128 Idaho 497,480,915 P.2d 709, 710 (1996). 
The county board's decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) 
violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; 
(c) are made upon unlawkl procedure: (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. 5 67-5279. 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of law 
over which the court exercises flee review. F r i e d  ofFam to Market v. Valley County, 
137 Idaho 192, 196 (2002), Evum v. Teton Corn@, 139 Idaho 71, 75 (2003). 
The party attacking the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in a manner 
specified in Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial right has 
been prejudiced. Price v. Payene Couniy Bd Of Comm'rs, 13 1 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 
583, 586 (1998). 
I%'. Analysis 
A. Appellants Have Standing to Challenge the Board of Commissioner's Decision to 
Approve Tungsten's application for a special use permit. 
The county board argues the appellants lack standing citing both LC. $67-6521(d) 
and LC. $67-6535. Standing also has a constitutional dimension. This Court first notes 
that while it recognizes the underlying policy of LC. 3 67-6521(d) conferring standing to 
affected persons, it is important to remember that the legislature cannot, by statute, 
relieve a party from meeting the fbndamental constitutional requirements for standing. 
SeeNoh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798,53 P.3d 1217 (2002). 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) confers standing to seek judicial 
review of a local land use decision to an "affected person" aggrieved by the decision. I.C. 
$ 67-652I(d). An affected person is "one having an interest in real property which may 
be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a pennit authorizing the development." 
I.C. 3 67-6521(a). Clearly, the appellants' properties may be adversely affected by 
development of a gravel pit operation with associated activities of crushing, blasting and 
truck traffic all on property adjacent to their rural home and cattle operation. The 
appellants have shown they may be affected and therefore they have standing. Standing is 
of course distinguished fiom entitlement to a remedy. 
I.C. 5 67-6535(c) requires "actual harm or a violation of fundamental rights" to 
obtain a remedy under LLUPA As stated in Evans v Teton County, Idaho Boardof 
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 71,73 P.3d 84: 
I.C. 5 67-6535(a) requires that approval or denial of any application provided for 
in LLUPA be based on criteria set forth in the local zoning ordinances and 
comprehensive plan. I.C. 5 67-6535(c) directs the review of a LLUPA decision. 
The language in LC. 5 67-6535(c) instructing courts that "[olnly those whose 
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental 
rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of 
a decision" cannot be construed as a standing requirement. The existence of real 
or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision. I.C. 3 67-6535(c) 
requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a fundamental right in 
order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA decision. 
Petitioners have met the requirements of I.C. 3 67-6535 as discussed later in this 
Memorandum Opinion. 
B. The special use permit for a gravel pit, rock quarry or surface mining operation 
is not a lawfully issued permit because such uses are not conditional uses listed in 
the agriculturaWforestry zone. 
Tungsten's application was for a special use permit. The zoning commission held 
a special use permit hearing, and the county board considered and premised issuance of 
the permit upon Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance 99-06, Chapter 7, 
pertaining to special use permits. 
It is the contention of petitioners that under LC. 67-6512, a special use permit 
may only be granted for conditionally permitted uses in the zone district and the uses 
proposed by Tungsten are not listed among any category of uses listed in the 
agricultural/forestry zone. The county board argues that appellants read the statute too 
narrowly and it relies on the ordinance to argue that the permit is lawf~il. The county 
board argues that because such permits are "conditionally permitted" that the conflict 
with LC 67-6512 alleged by petitioners does not exist. Therefore, according to the county 
board, the ordinance is not in conflict with the statute and by the Tungsten permit is 
proper. The county board's position ignores the plain meaning of the statute which 
requires the use, and not the pennil, to be conditionally permitted. It also ignores the 
definition of a conditional use as set forth in the definition section of the zoning 
ordinance. 
This Court must construe a local ordinance as it construes a statute. Friends of Farm 
fo Market v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. Such construction begins 
with the literal language of the ordinance. Id. at 197,46 P.3d at 14. If an ordinance is not 
ambiguous, this Court need not consider rules of statutory construction and the ordinance 
is to be given its plain meaning. Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 
Idaho 568, 572,21 P.3d 890, 894 (2001); CamI~orcresf/CobumbusAction Comm. v. 
City ofBoise, 136 Idaho 666,670,39 P.3d 606,610 (2001). Where the language is 
ambiguous, this Court applies rules of construction for guidance. Friends of Farm to 
Marker v Valley County, 137 Idaho at 197, 46 P.3d at 14. Constructions that lead to 
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Id. All sections of an appiicabie 
ordinance must be construed together to determine the legislative body's intent. Id. (citing 
Lockhart v. Dept. ofFish and Game, 121 Idaho 894, 897, 828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)). 
Ordinances are to be construed so as to give effect to all their provisions and not to render 
any part superfluous or insignificant. Id. (citing Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. 132, 
127 Idaho 112, 117, 898 P.2d 43,48 (1995)). There is a presumption that a local zoning 
board's actions are valid when interpreting and applying its own zoning ordinances. Id.; 
Evans, 137 Idaho at 43 I, 50 P.3d at 446. 
A conditional use is defined in the definition section of the ordinance as follows: 
"Any use within a particular zone district specified by Chapter 7 of this ordinance and 
specifically referred to as a conditional use, subject to the procedures set forth at Chapter 
12". Section 1E of Chapter 7 ofthe zoning ordinance states: "Any use not specified in 
this section as a use by right or conditional use is eligible for consideration as a special 
use, subject to the provisions of Chapter 13." Chapter 13 of the zoning ordinance 
delineates the procedures for obtaining a special use permit. By its terms I.C. 67-6512 
provides that a special use permit may be granted to an applicant "if the proposed use is 
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance." Chapter 7, Section 1 of the 
Boundaty County Zoning Ordinance specifies three categories of uses that are allowed in 
an agriculturdforestry zone. They are: uses by right, permitted uses, and conditional uses. 
Gravel pits, rock quarries, surface mining operations, rock or gravel extraction activities 
are listed on any list of uses in any of the three categories in the county ordinance. 
The county board adopted its planning st& determination that the use proposed 
by Tungsten may be considered a commercial use and thus permitted under the 
conditional uses of the agriculturaUforestry zone. Chapter 13 does provide for a 
conditional use permit for commercial business or commercial activity in the 
agriculturaUforestry zone. Considering the nature and purpose of comprehensive planning 
and zoning, the zones described in the Boundary County zoning ordinance, and the uses 
permitted it is not reasonable to conclude that a gravel pit or surface mining operation 
with its aspects of excavation, crushing and blasting can be deemed a commercial 
activity. There is an important distinction between commercial and industrial uses. 
Gravel pits and surface mines, in the context of community planning and zoning, are an 
activity of an extractive and industrial nature involving raw material extraction and 
processes such as excavation and crushing with use of heavy equipment and blasting. 
The definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is. "Commercial: A use or 
structure intendect primarily for the conduct of retail trade in goods and services." The 
definition of industrial use in the zoning ordinance is "Industrial: Use of a parcel or 
development of a structure intended primarily for the manufacture, assembly or finishing 
of products intended primarily for wholesale distribution." The use sought by Tungsten 
might be termed industrial but certainly not commercial. Industrial uses and may not be 
conditionally permitted in the agticulturaWforestry zone under the zoning ordinance. 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of 
law over which the court exercises free review. Friends- of Farm to Marker v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192, 196 (2002), Evans v. Tefon Cacntv, 139 Idaho 71,75 (2003). A 
county bas no authority to act on an ordinance that conflicts with I.C. 67-6512. Fischer 
v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,356 (2005). It is hndamental that a county ordinance 
may not conflict with general laws. Boise v. Bench Sewer Dist, 116 Idaho 25 (1989) 
(county ordinance that conflicts with general law is void); Brower v. Bingham County, 
140 Idaho 5 12, 5 15 (2004) (county ordinance that conflicts with local land use planning 
statutes is void); In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371, 375 (1897) (under section 2 of article 12 
of the Idaho Constitution, counties may not enact regulations that are in conflict with the 
general laws). 
LC. 5 67-6512 is applicable to this case. Because a gravel pit, rock quarry or 
surface mining operation is not listed as a conditional use, and cannot be deemed a 
commercial use, a special use permit cannot be lawfiilly issued under the regulations for 
the agriculturaVforestry zone of the Boundary County zoning ordinance. 
In purporting to make a property use that is not conditionally permitted eligible 
for permit as a special use, Section 1E of Chapter 7 of the zoning ordinance conflicts with 
LC. 67-6512. Therefore that section ofthe ordinance is void. The special use permit 
granted to Tungsten by the county board was predicated upon a section of the zoning 
ordinance which is in conflict with Idaho law. I.C. 67-5279 prohibits the granting of 
permits under an ordinance in violation of statutory provision or in excess of the authority 
of the county board. Because the permit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance the 
county board exceeded its statutory authority which is limited by I.C. 5 67-6512. The 
Tungsten permit is prejudicial to the interests of petitioners within the meaning of LC. 5 
67-5279(4) as explained below. Even if the ordinance did not conflict with the statute, the 
use proposed by Tungsten is not a conditional use or activity permitted under the 
ordinance because the use proposed is not a commercial use or activity. 
The county board's decision to issue the Tungsten permit is therefore reversed. 
The permit was issued pursuant to a void ordinance. Alternatively, if the ordinance is not 
void the permit was issued violation of that ordinance. Therefore, there is no occasion for 
this court to remand this matter to the county board for krther hearing. 
C. Petitioner's were not prejudiced by lack of adequate notice prior to the hearing 
or by the refusal of the county board to grant a continuance. 
The Zoning Office gave petitioners 15 days' notice of the hearing to be held in 
2005 as required by Chapters 13 and 16 of the ordinance. The petitioners claim that in 
view of the county board's requirement that a petitioners needed expert evidence to prove 
that the applicant failed to comply with the plan and ordinance, rather than the other way 
around, the abbreviated 15 day notice period was completely inadequate to protect 
appellants' rights. 
Petitioners contend that through its road superintendent, the county knew about 
Tungsten's intentions long before the zoning commission hearing in May 2005. They 
argue that the county did not mail notice of the application to petitioners or otherwise 
provide public notice until May 2,2005, only two weeks before the hearing. R.O.A. 
2005, p. 98. Petitioners' request for continuance of that hearing to submit expert 
evidence was denied. Petitioners' subsequent request for continuance of the county board 
hearing was denied on the basis that appellants had not obtained their expert evidence for 
the zoning hearing. They claim this is a Catch 22 and the county's hearing process 
deprived Petitioners of due process. 
Decisions by zoning commissions are "quasi-judicial" in nature. Cowun v. Board 
of Commissioners of Fremont County, Docket No. 30061,2006 Opinion No. 107,2006 
Ida. LEXIS 151 (November 29,2006,), p. 16 of Opinion, quoting from Chambers v. 
Koofenai Cmnty Bd. Of Comm'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 118 (1994). Land use hearings that 
are quasi-judicial are subject to due process constraints. Id Procedural due process 
reqilires some process to ensure the individua1 is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in 
violation of the state or federal constitutions. Id Due process issues are generally 
questions of law over which the court exercises free review. Id p. 17. 
Notice for special use permit hearings is governed by LC. 67-6512. LC. 67- 
6512(b) provides for published notice 15 days before the hearing, and that specific notice 
be given to property owners within 300 feet of the property being considered, and to "any 
additional area that may be substantially impacted by the proposed special use" as 
determined by the zoning commission. Chapter 13, Section 4@) and Chapter 16 of the 
zoning ordinance requires only 15 days' notice be given to property owners witbin 300 
feet of the land being considered. R.O.A. 2006, p. 259. 
Petitioners claim that the notice provisions in the zoning ordinance are inadequate 
to provide due process to impacted rural communities. Farm and ranch properties 
generally exceed 300 feet from all but their adjacent neighbors. They also argue: 
that in rural areas such as Porthill, the 300 foot limitation essentially restricts 
notice to all but the two or three neighboring farms. 
0 the impact of a gravel pitlrock quarry operation affects the entire community, not 
just the two adjacent neighbors. Such limited notice codicts with I.C. section 
67-65 12(b). 
e with only the nearest property owners notified, special use permits can be granted 
more or less in secret. Property owners or the county can quietly impose non- 
compatible uses without the impacted community being aware, as happened with 
the prior two special use permit applications in Porthill. 
notice by publication is insufficient to directly notice all of the impacted property 
owners in a rural area. 
e these limitations prevent due process and fair hearings. 
In planning and zoning decisions, due process requires an opportunity to present and 
rebut evidence. Cowan v. Board of Commr 's, supra. The petitioners got notice as 
provided by law. Petitioners sought a continuance in order to obtain expert testimony. 
The county board's denial of petitioner's motion for continuance prior to the 2005 
hearing was an abuse of discretion especially because the county board placed (albeit 
unlawfully) upon petitioners the burden to show the pennit should not be issued to 
Tungsten. Such an abuse of discretion would operate to deny a fair hearing. However, 
petitioners were not prejudiced by the denial since they were able to obtain expert 
hydrological evidence to present at the hearing in 2006. 
Petitioners do not have standing to complain about lack of notice to other landowners 
who did not get notice in a case where petitioners seek a petition for judicial review. In 
an appeal proceeding such as these petitioners cannot seek relief for others because the 
procedural rules do not permit a claim for others. Other persons claiming entitlement to 
notice would have to bring their own petition for review to this court and therein show 
their own entitlement to standing. 
D. The county board, by failing to hold Tungsten to the burden of persuasion, made 
their decision in violation of the county zoning ordinance and engaged in engaged in 
an unlawful procedure resulting in a decision which must be set aside. 
At the hearing held July 26,2005 Chairman Smith asked appellants for "any fact" 
or "documentation" that dynamiting could affect somebody's water, or if that was "just a 
fear" appellants had. C.T. 7/26/05, p.15:23-25, p.16:2-12. During that same hearing 
Chairman Smith said that Rick Dinning had a "right" to have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, 
p. 43: 1 I. Board chairman Smith also directed the staff to "come up with" conditions to 
"ease the pain" on the community. His directive to staffwas that one of the conditions 
could not be to not have a gravel pit. C.T. 7/26/05, p. 43:15-21. At the hearing on August 
8,2005 Chairman Smith said he "definitely want[ed] to approve the pit," and did not 
want "delaying tactics" or "road blocks" to "put off the inevitable." 
The burden of persuasion is upon the applicant to show that all of the 
requirements for a special use permit are satisfied. Fischer v. City of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 
349, 109 p.31~ 1091 (Idaho 2005). The statements by board chair Smith indicate that the 
burden was upon the Gardiners. There is no indication of any change between the 2005 
and 2006 county board proceeding as regards the statements related to the proper 
allocation of the burden of persuasion. There is no indication at the hearings held in 2006 
or in the written decision of August 14,2006 that the board was holding the applicant 
Tungsten to the burden of persuasion. 
The county board failed to impose upon Tungsten the burden of persuasion 
required by the ordinance provisions concerning special use permits or conditional use 
permits. Instead the county board u n l a d l l y  placed the burden of showing that the 
permit could not be issued upon Gardiners who opposed the application of Tungsten. The 
decision of the county board has thus been rendered upon an unlawful procedure. 
Therefore pursuant to 1.C. 67-5279 the decision granting the permit to Tungsten is set 
aside in it entirety. 
E. The written decision of the county board does not comply with LC. 67-6535 
because it is not a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards 
considered relevant. The decision does not fairly resolve ail relevant contested facts. 
The decision lacks a rationale based upon applicable ordinance and statutory 
provisions. 
Assuming that the Boundary County Zoning Ordinance authorizes a special use 
permit in an agriculturaVforestry zone, the board's decision must comply with I.C. 67- 
6535. Under I.C. 67-6535 the issuance of a written decision regarding a local land use 
agency's approval or denial of a land use application is required. Evans v. Teton Cotin&, 
139 Idaho 71, 80 (2003). I.C. 67-6535 requires the findings to be in writing explaining 
the relevant criteria and standards, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for the 
decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and ordinance and 
factual information contained in the record. The decision must demonstrate that the 
agency applied the criteria prescribed by the law, and did not act arbitrarily or on an ad- 
hoc basis. Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls,_lO4 Idaho 32 (1982). 
Under I.C. 67-6535, land use decisions are to be founded upon sound reason and 
practical application of recognized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, courts 
are directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of 
procedures and resultant decisions in the light of practical considerations, fundamental 
fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making. The decision of the county 
board in this case violates petitioners' rights. 
Petitioners contend that no meaningful discussion took place in the August 7,  
2006 hearing and that Chairman Smith simply parroted a document prepared in advance 
to bring the matter to a close. The use of a document, prepared in advance by staK 
identifling alternative findings or choices can be useful as a checklist to guide decision 
makers. As such a properly prepared document can be a useful part of the quasi-judicial 
process, assuming relevant choices or alternatives are listed and assuming it is understood 
not to limit the decision makers but to guide them as to all the issues for decision. The 
focus should be upon the board's written decision. The transcript of the board proceeding 
has also been reviewed in detail and considered by this court. 
This court must review the record to determine whether the relevant issues were 
identified and factual conflicts determined upon the available evidence. The court's task 
is to determine whether the rationale of the written decision is supported by the proper 
evaluation of evidence and application of the standards provided by law. In this case both 
the written decision issued August 14,2006 and the transcript of the August 7,2006 
board proceeding show an absence of meaninmi consideration of issues or resolution of 
conflicting factual information using the applicable criteria required by law. The colloquy 
between Smith and Kirby at the board proceeding of August 7,2006 does not address or 
resolve the material factual issues concerning the contentions regarding well dewatering 
and the impact of noise upon the cattle operation. The same is true as regards the impact 
upon the petitioners enjoyment of their residential rural property. There is no indication 
of a proper allocation of the burden of persuasion to contradict the statements by Chair 
Smith mentioned July 26,2005 The county board discounted the expert opinion of the 
hydrologist without basis for doing so. The county board decision briefly comments on 
dust abatement but does not fairly address the contentious issues of the adverse impact of 
the uses proposed by Tungsten upon the use and the peaceful enjoyment of petitioners' 
property. The impacts asserted relative to the cattle operation are dealt with in a 
conciusory fashion. A rationale for the conclusions relevant to a fair decision upon the 
application is not demonstrated. Thus there is no showing of a proper exercise of 
discretion. The written decision ultimately issued August 14, 2006 was likewise 
conclusory and lacks evidence of considered deliberation. As previously discussed 
incorrect criteria and standards were applied. The county board's decision must be set 
aside because it violates I.C. 67-6535. 
F. Petitioners substantial rights have been prejudiced and they are entitled to relief. 
The Board's action granting the special use permit to Tungsten prejudices 
petitioners because the gravel pit operation would likely cause actual harm by disrupting 
the use and the peacehl enjoyment of petitioners property. Petitioners have also shown 
prejudice to their substantial rights to proper application of both procedural and 
substantive law. Therefore, they have shown entitlement to relief %om this court as 
required by I.C. 67-6259 and LC. 67-6535. 
G. Petitioners are entitled to recovery of attorney fees and costs. 
Appellants claim entitlement to an award of attorney ,fees and costs pursuant to 
LC. 12-117 (1) which states, in part, that: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in 
any administrative or civil judicial proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a . . . county . . . and a 
person, the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable 
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom 
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Supreme Court cases are instructive on this issue of attorney fees involving 
government action. The standard for awarding attorney fees under 1.C. 12-1 17 requires 
focusing on the overall action of the agency. Rincover v. State Dep 't of Fin, 129 Idaho 
442 (1996). 
In Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
quoted prior case law and stated: 
The purpose of LC. 3 12-1 17 is two-fold: First, it 
serves "as a deterrent to groundless arbitrary agency 
action; and [second] it provides a remedy for persons 
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial 
burdens defending against groundless charges or 
attempting to wrrect mistakes agencies never should 
have made. 
Under the statute, attorney fees must be awarded if the court finds in favor of the 
appellant and further finds that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
In Reardon attorney fees were awarded to the plaintiff on the basis that the court 
determined that the county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law where an 
agency had no authority to take a particular action. In that case, a county ordinance was 
enacted contrary to the provisions of Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act. The court 
noted that the county's ability to make and enforce local regulations was dependent on 
the fact that the regulations were not in conflict with the general laws of the state of 
Idaho. Idaho Const. Art. XII, 3 2. 
While the county ordinance in Reardon involved areas of city impact, the 
argument is applicable in this case because respondent Boundary County enacted Chapter 
7 Section 1(E) in December, 2001 at a point in time after the Legislature repealed similar 
language in the earlier version of LC. 67-6512. The county board is charged with 
knowledge that at time of enactment of the ordinance that the language contained therein 
had been expressly disapproved by the Legislature. In this case appellants' original 
Petition for Judicial Review, filed October 3, 2005, raised this issue. The issue was 
reasserted in appellants' Petition for Judicial Review filed September 11, 2006. 
In Fischer v. Cip of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
awarded attorney fees against the City of Ketchum. The basis was that the city wholly 
ignored a provision of its ordinance requiring certification by an Idaho licensed engineer 
prior to granting of a conditional use permit. The Boundary County ordinance provisions 
of Chapter 13: Special Uses Section 4: Application Procedure: subparagraph C.4) 
require the county to find that the proposed special use will not create noise, trafftc, 
odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone 
district. Idaho law clearly places the burden of persuasion upon the applicant for a 
special use permit. The failure of the county board to place the burden upon the applicant 
is prohibited conduct because the county ignored the provisions of its own zoning 
ordinance and violated state law. 
The issue of attorney fees was present in County Residents Against Pollutionfrom 
Septic Sludge (CRAPS9 v. Bonner Coimty, 138 Idaho 585 (2003). The Idaho Supreme 
Court in that case upheld the decision of the District Court awarding attorney fees against 
the respondent county. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that when the county failed to 
follow its ordinance, it acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. In that Bonner 
County case, the county arbitrarily dismissed plaintiffs' administrative appeal with no 
basis. In this case concerning the Tungsten application, the county board arbitrarily 
granted the special use permit with no basis under the ordinance for doing so. 
The court concludes that the overall action of the county board warrants this 
courts's determination that the county board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. Therefore, petitioners are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. Attorney fees 
are limited to proceedings subsequent to the stipulation of the parties that each would 
bear their own fees incurred prior to April 30,2006. 
V. Conctusion 
Petitioner's request that the agency action be set aside is granted. Under the 
provisions of LC. 67-5279(3) the decision of the county board was: 
a. In violation of constitutional and statutory provisions; 
b. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; and 
c. Made upon unlawful procedure. 
Defects in hearing procedure in some cases warrant remand for further proceedings to be 
held in conformity with the law. However, in this case there shall be no remand. The 
county board acted either upon an invalid ordinance or failed to comply with the 
ordinance if the ordinance is considered valid. The county board acted in excess of their 
IawfUl authority. 
V1 Order 
The county board decision to issue the special use permit to Tungsten is set aside. 
Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs against the respondent. 
Done and dated this 3'd day of January, 2008. 
o$mx district Judge 
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